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I. Introduction
Chemical warfare has long been considered a particularly loathsome
form of combat.1 The specter of unprotected soldiers and nearby non-
combatants incapacitated or killed within moments by invisible, silent,
odorless vapors discharged by a far-distant enemy has terrified many,2
and has also energized repeated international attempts to prohibit, or at
least to moderate, these applications of deadly science.3
1. Winston Churchill captured the general public reaction by referring to chemical weap-
onry as "that hellish poison." Satchell & Blaug, A Plague of "Hellish Poison," U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 26, 1987, at 30. Both supporters and opponents of United States produc-
tion of chemical weapons acknowledge that the emotional content of the arguments, rather
than intellectual considerations of military and political strategy, often dominates the debates.
See Harden, The Gassing of Washington, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1984, at 125.
2. See Address by Kenneth L. Adelman, Arms Control and International Order in a Dis-
orderly World, Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 17, 1984) (describing the wonder,
fear, and ultimately the panic of soldiers confronted with chlorine gas on the battlefields in
Belgium in World War 1); see also Robinson, The Rise of CB Weapons, in 1 SIPRI, THE
PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 231-67 (1971) (surveying popular atti-
tudes toward chemical and biological warfare held by populations of United States and United
Kingdom in period between World Wars I and II). Some have argued that chemical arms are
actually more humane than other weapons, causing less human suffering than other forms of
combat. Supporters of chemical weapons have attempted to rally public opinion to this per-
spective. See, eg., J. ROTHSCHILD, TOMORROW'S WEAPONS: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
1-10 (1964); Boserup, Robinson & Neild, The Prevention of CBW (App. 1), in 5 SIPRI, THE
PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 124-36 (1971); R. CLARKE, THE SI-
LENT WEAPONS 1, 203-06 (1968).
3. This article does not deal substantially with other important aspects of the overall ques-
tion of chemical weapons, such as the domestic United States controversy regarding the advis-
ability of producing new generations of chemical weapons prior to the conclusion of a
satisfactory international convention. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, BINARY WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, REP. PREPARED
FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE H.R.
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE]; Harden, supra note 1; Hamm, Deterrence, Chemical Warfare, and Arms Control, 29
ORBiS 119 (1985); Douglass & Lukens, The Expanding Arena of Chemical-Biological Warfare,
12 STRATEGIC REV. 71 (1984); Gold, Land War #3: Chemical Warfare, 2 J. DEF. & DIPL.
40 (1984); GAO, CHEMICAL WARFARE: MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS, COMPTROLLER
GENERAL'S REP. TO THE H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1983) [hereinafter COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL'S REP.]. Neither does it address the problem of how to deal effectively with
other countries that use CW or seem to be pursuing a CW capacity. See Lawmakers Plan
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Recently, efforts to achieve effective international regulation of chemi-
cal weapons (CW) have accelerated, and there is now optimism that a
major breakthrough may soon be attained.4 The Geneva-based Confer-
ence on Disarmament, a standing United Nations affiliate charged with
responsibility for multilateral negotiation of arms control accords,5 has
Chemical Weapons Curb, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1989, at A9, col. 1; R. Cohen & R. Ranger,
Enforcing CW Limits: An International Chemical Weapons Authority (Jan. 1989) (working
paper); Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Challenges and Re-
sponses: Hearings Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs of the Senate, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (mimeo version) [hereinafter Hearings on Global Spread] (statement of Sen. John
McCain); UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IS CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WARFARE FEA-
SIBLE? (In Brief, No. 1) (1989); Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (photocopied materials)
[hereinafter Hearings on Proliferation].
4. See United Nations Forum on Chemical Weapons, 11 DISARMAMENT 83-85 (1988) (re-
marks of Yasushi Akashi, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for the Dep't for Disarmament Af-
fairs) [hereinafter United Nations Forum]. It is hard to predict when a finished chemical
weapons treaty could be ready for multilateral signature, and many difficult issues remain to be
surmounted, but experts have suggested that with good faith negotiations, an agreement could
be concluded in 1990 or 1991. See Adams, Finding Verification Methods a Key Issue as Chemi-
cal Weapons Negotiations Resume, DEF. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1989, at 28; Chemical Arms Control
After the Paris Conference (transcript of press conference), 19 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 3, 5
(1989) [hereinafter After the Paris Conference]. But see 8 ARMS CONTROL REP. No. 5
704.B.384.20 (1989) (CD negotiations in 1989 have lost some of earlier momentum, not re-
cording much progress recently); Bowman, Chemical Weapons: A Summary of Proliferation
and Arms Control Activities, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (updated June 22, 1989) (1988 CD
session was disappointing; as United States and Soviet Union moved closer to agreement, other
states became more vocal with their concerns and objections); Dickson, Hopes Recede for
Early Ban on ChemicalArms, 240 SCIENCE 22 (1988). Most recently, the Bush administration
has signalled both that significant progress has been registered in the negotiations and that
substantial problems remain to be worked out before a treaty is signed. U.S. and Moscow
Settle Key Issues on ChemicalArms, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Kremlin Accepts
Early Inspection on Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Accord Near on
Chemical Weapons, Wash. Post, Sept. 12, 1989, at A29, col. 4.
5. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the current iteration of a long-standing se-
quence of multilateral negotiations concerned principally with arms control issues. The
United Nations Disarmament Commission, with five members, was created in 1952; after sev-
eral modifications, it still functions today. The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was
established in 1962; it was succeeded by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in
1969, the Committee on Disarmament in 1978, and the current CD in 1984. The CD and its
predecessors have provided the vehicle through which significant arms control initiatives, such
as the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Environmental Modification Conven-
tion of 1977, received multilateral approval. For a discussion of the history of multilateral
negotiations, see UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 7,
120, 190 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS];
Trapp, The Geneva Talks on Chemical Weapons and Attitudes Displayed There Towards the
Chemical Industry, in 1 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS OF A SIPRI/PuGWASH CONFERENCE at 107 (SIPRI
Chemical & Biological Warfare Stud., No. 4, 1986) [hereinafter 1 SIPRI/PuGWAsH CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS]; N. SIMS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR CHEMICAL DISARMA-
MENT 5-6 (SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Stud., No. 8, 1987). More recently, the CD
has considered items such as chemical weapons, militarization of outer space, nuclear weapons
testing, and radiological weapons. Hardenbergh, The Other Negotiations, BULL. ATOM.
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developed an impressive "rolling text ' 6 of a draft CW convention, re-
flecting substantial areas of consensus, as well as numerous issues still
under active consideration by its forty national participants. 7 These ne-
gotiations, led in large part by representatives of the United Statess and
the Soviet Union,9 are now closer than ever before to creating a meaning-
ful, reliable international regime prohibiting the scourge of chemical
warfare.
Substantial problems, however, remain to be resolved in the current
rolling text, 10 and this article attempts to shed light upon one matter that
has to date received too little attention from scholars and practitioners:
the geographic scope of the treaty and the corresponding jurisdictionzil
responsibilities of its future parties. This set of issues, sometimes referred
SCiENTIsTs, Jan. 1986, at 45-47. The CD is not a United Nations subsidiary body, and it
develops its own agenda and procedures. It does, however, receive funding and staff support
from the United Nations, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the Secre-
tary-General of the CD. 1988 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 10-11.
6. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarma-
ment on its work during the period 17 January to 3 February 1989, CD/881, Feb. 3, 1989
[hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee]. The rolling text has been reported, annually
or more often, as an appendix to the report of the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical
Weapons. Versions of the negotiating text were contained in documents denominated as CD/
416 (Aug. 22, 1983); CD/539 (Aug. 28, 1984); CD/636 (Aug. 23, 1985); CD/727 (Aug. 21,
1986); CD/734 (Jan. 29, 1987); CD/782 (Aug. 26, 1987); CD/795 (Feb. 2, 1988); CD/831
(Apr. 20, 1988); CD/874 (Sept. 12, 1988). See N. SIMS, supra note 5, at 43-48, 55.
7. The device of a periodically updated "rolling text" is frequently utilized in international
negotiations to reflect the current status of the drafting. Areas where tentative agreement has
already been reached are printed without any special designation, and brackets surround the
points where the delegations still hold divergent views. The evolving draft treaty does not
embody any binding commitment by the negotiators until it is formally signed, but it does
represent the clearest (albeit tentative) state of the talks. See United Nations Forum, supra
note 4, at 101 (remarks of Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, describing CD's use of bracketed rolling
text); McNeill, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Arms Negotiations The Process and the Lawyer, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 52, 58-59 (1985).
8. In the CD negotiations concerning chemical weapons, as in most other areas regarding
important national security considerations, the two superpowers have played pivotal and
sometimes leading roles, and agreement between them is a prerequisite for any multilateral
consensus. Regarding United States participation in the CD discussions on chemical arms, see
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. PROPOSES BANNING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, CURRENT POLICY No. 566 (Apr. 18, 1984).
9. The United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in direct bilateral discussions
concerning chemical weapons, as well as in negotiations inside the CD, and both states have
enlisted the participation of their allies and supporters. Regarding the Soviet Union perspec-
tive on the issues, see Soviet Embassy, Information Dep't, Statement on a Ban on Chemical
Weapons, News and Views from the USSR (Mar. 26, 1987); Address by Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Eduard Shevardnadze, International Conference on Chemical Weapons, Paris (Jan. 8,
1989), translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 9, 1989, at 2-5.
10. See 8 ARMS CONTROL REP. No. 5 704.D.131-37 (1989) (outlining principal remaining
issues in rolling text); Bowman, Chemical Weapons: A Summary of Proliferation and Arms
Control Activities, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, updated Feb. 15, 1989; J. BOULDEN, To-
WARDS A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ENTITLED
"IMPLEMENTING A GLOBAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION" HELD IN Or'rAWA, OCT.
7-9, 1987 (Aurora Papers 9, Jan. 1989).
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to as concerns about "extraterritoriality,"" has not yet emerged as a
salient matter for international attention, but it will soon pose thorny
difficulties for the negotiators.
Jurisdictional scope is always a potential question in the negotiation of
international agreements, and there is now a substantial and growing
body of legal literature regarding other applications of the intensely con-
troversial topic of extraterritoriality. 12 To date, the most difficult con-
flicts, at least those in the field of arms control, have remained peacefully
latent.13 In the case of the nascent CW convention, however, the subject
of extraterritoriality will have to assume far greater prominence, as the
issue of the treaty's application to privately owned overseas facilities, as
well as to governmental property, is raised in its most acute form. This
negotiation, therefore, presents the first occasion to apply the emerging
body of international law principles concerning extraterritoriality to a
new and more challenging context, testing the soundness of the existing
jurisprudence and extending or creating new standards to deal with a
highly sensitive area of national security.
The thesis of this article is that the new CW treaty should be drafted
with the intention of compelling its parties aggressively to push their ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction to new reaches, forging well beyond the "rea-
sonableness" standard of contemporary international law. The public
policy goals of the ban on chemical weapons are so important to the
peace and security of the international community that the traditional
notions of sovereignty and comity ought to be balanced in new ways,
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 401-442 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
12. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL
LAWS (International Chamber of Commerce, 1987); B. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME (1988); Maier, Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International
Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982) [hereinafter Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Cross-
roads]; Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The Need
for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981); D. ROSENTHAL & W.
KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF Ex-
TRATERRITORIALITY (Chatham House Paper No. 17, 1982); A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION (1983); see also Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The
Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 323 (1981) (legisla-
tive proposals to reform United States law of extraterritoriality).
13. Many other important arms control agreements could at least implicitly raise questions
of extraterritoriality, but no controversies have yet surfaced regarding this issue. The Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, for
example, requires each party to abstain from conducting certain nuclear explosions "at any
place under its jurisdiction or control," but does not define the precise reach of that phrase.
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. 1, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, 45 [hereinaf-
ter Limited Test Ban Treaty].
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stretching the assertion of national jurisdiction, for the purpose of en-
hancing the comprehensiveness of the treaty's geographic scope. Only by
obligating its parties to extend themselves and their jurisdictional reach
can the CW treaty attain its vital objectives.
The article is organized into the following sections. After this Intro-
duction (Part I), Part II presents the modern problem of chemical weap-
ons, describing the history of the use of CW, the history of previous
international efforts to regulate those uses, and the status of the current
negotiations. Part II also outlines the structure of the private chemical
industry in the United States and elsewhere, suggesting how the mainte-
nance of chemical operations in foreign states will inevitably generate
questions of extraterritoriality, and explaining how the problem of effec-
tive regulation of chemical weapons will soon collide with the impera-
tives of commercial operations.
Part III then surveys the international law of extraterritoriality, sum-
marizing the recognized principles of jurisdiction to prescribe and to en-
force rules applicable to a particular factual situation. It also explains
the paltry existing law regarding the resolution of conflicts of jurisdic-
tion, and describes its application in a few celebrated, controversial cases
of international competition. 14
Part IV juxtaposes the results of the prior two sections, applying the
too-thin principles of international law to the too-complex factual situa-
tion of CW. It examines the conflicts inherent in extending the principles
of extraterritoriality to the case of chemical weapons, and suggests de-
vices that may enable the negotiators, and their political superiors who
will ultimately have to implement the treaty, to deal productively with
the conflicts. In particular, Part IV examines the problems inherent in
the global operations of multinational chemical companies, where activi-
ties relevant to the central purposes of a CW ban may be undertaken by
nationals of state X (which does become a party to the future treaty, and
wants to encourage its worldwide implementation) operating a facility
inside state Y (which remains a holdout, not accepting the obligations of
the treaty regime, and resists application of the treaty's provisions inside
its own sovereign territory).
Finally, Part V offers some concluding observations and comments
about the role of chemical weapons arms control in the larger context of
14. Clashes over extraterritorial applications of United States law have generated a great
deal of international friction, creating "perhaps the worst post-war strain between the United
States and its European allies." Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 155 (1983).
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national and international security, and about the more generally appli-
cable lessons of this experience. It looks beyond the particular case study
at hand to consider the CW negotiations as a possible harbinger of the
nettlesome future in other areas of national security policy.
II. The Control of Chemical Weapons
A. History of Chemical Weapons
The use of chemical weapons 15 is among the most ancient organized
applications of violence in war. Indian, Chinese, and European military
treatises as far back as the nineteenth century B.C. record the use of
poisonous (or supposedly poisonous) chemicals, smoke and potions to
gain a physical or psychological advantage in battle. 16 The primitive ap-
plications of CW were gradually refined, as technology permitted, and by
15. For some purposes, it has been useful to differentiate chemical weapons from biological
weapons (BW), although the distinction remains elusive at the margins. Chemical weapons
generally utilize agents that are produced by chemical reactions and cause injury through di-
rect chemical processes; biological weapons rely upon living organisms which cause illness by
reproducing inside the victim's body; toxins are a class of agents produced by living organisms
and sharing some characteristics of both CW and BW. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 121; Finder, Biological Warfare, Genetic Engineering, and the
Treaty That Failed, WASH. Q., Spring 1986, at 5-14 (1986). Biological weapons have proven
less adaptable to military applications than CW, being less predictable or controllable. As
described below, the international arms control efforts have sometimes dealt with CW and BW
together, and have sometimes separated the two issues. This article will be principally con-
cerned with CW.
Chemical weapons themselves may be divided into two distinct types, according to their
intended effects. "Harassing agents" are designed to produce a temporary incapacity; they
include lachrymators (tear gases) and sternutators (sneeze or vomit gases). "Casualty agents"
are designed to cause longer-lasting injuries or death; they include choking gases (such as
chlorine and phosgene), blistering agents (such as mustard gas), blood gases (such as hydrogen
cyanide) and nerve gases (such as soman, sarin or tabun). JANE'S NBC PROTECTION EQUIP-
MENT 1989-90 (T. Gander ed. 1989); A. THOMAS, EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE: A
SELECTIVE REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BRITISH STATE PAPERS 5-6 (SIPRI Chemical &
Biological Warfare Stud., No. 1, 1985); Meselson & Robinson, Chemical Warfare and Chemi-
cal Disarmament, 242 ScI. AM. 38, 38-40 (1980); McGeorge, Chemical Addiction, DEF. &
FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 1989, at 16, 19; Wolfe, Chemical and Biological Warfare: Medical Effects
and Consequences, 28 MCGILL L.J. 732 (1983); J. COOKSON & J. NOTrINGHAM, A SURVEY
OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 181-258 (1969).
In addition, CW differ in delivery systems. Some are contained, in liquid form, inside pres-
surized cylinders which are used to create a cloud of vapors. Some are delivered by land
mines, bombs or shells. Some may be sprayed by aircraft. A. THOMAS, supra, at 5; H.
STRINGER, DETERRING CHEMICAL WARFARE: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 1990's 3-11
(Foreign Policy Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Apr. 1986); E. SPIERS, CHEMI-
CAL WARFARE 2-12 (1986).
16. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 125 n.1; Wolfe, supra note 15, at 734-35; 8 ARMS CON-
TROL REPORTER No. 5, at 12; S. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE:
AMERICA'S HIDDEN ARSENAL 3 (1968); J. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 2, at 12; E. SPIERS, supra
note 15, at 13. While some of the legendary reports concerning the efficacy of early chemical
weapons are probably exaggerated or even mythic, there is a substantial and diverse corpus of
citations, leaving little doubt that ancient military forces at least attempted to apply chemical
arms to their advantage.
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the middle of the 1800s, the question of chemical weaponry had attained
a substantial public salience, with numerous schemes being considered to
employ gas and smoke wherever conditions were thought favorable, in-
cluding during the American Civil War. 17
It was not until World War I, however, that the marriage of chemistry
and military science brought into being the full measure of chemical hor-
ror.18 Seven different countries used a total of 113,000 tons of CW be-
tween 1915 and 1918, on virtually all fronts of the war, producing some
1.3 million casualties, including almost 100,000 deaths. 19 Controversy
has raged concerning which country originally introduced CW into the
trenches, but it is clear that Germany was the first to make major use of
lethal chemicals, on the battlefield at Ypres, and that the French and
British quickly retaliated in kind.20 There is also a lingering uncertainty
about the overall effectiveness of CW during the war: the consensus may
be that CW was influential in several engagements but not itself decisive;
it made prosecution of the war more difficult and painful for both sides,
but the reciprocal use (especially against a reasonably well-equipped and
well-trained adversary) afforded neither a major advantage. 21
17. Robinson, supra note 2, at 126 n.1; E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 13; J. ROTHSCHILD,
supra note 2, at 13; Gutman, Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Silent Killers, I NBC
DEF. & TECH. INT'L 26 (1986) (use of CW by Union General Patrick Gilmore during the
American Civil War); see also Note, Chemical and Biological Weapons - Recent Legal Devel-
opments May Prove to Be a Turning Point in Arms Control, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 95, 95
n.1 (1986) (common use of crude biological warfare by both sides during Civil War).
18. F. BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RESTRAINTS 3 (1968); S. SEAGRAVE,
YELLOW RAIN: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE TERROR OF CHEMICAL WARFARE 37-61 (1981);
R. CLARKE, supra note 2, at 34-40; E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 13-33.
19. Robinson, supra note 2, at 126-29, tables 2.1 and 2.5. CW accounted for less than 5%
of the total casualties during World War I. Id. at 128, table 2.3.
20. Id. at 129-35; A. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 9-10. The early use of chemicals in World
War I was seen by both sides as largely experimental, and the inadequacy of the chemical
agents and the cumbersomeness of the delivery systems prevented them from being very effec-
tive. Improved weaponry soon drove both sides to higher levels of production, and CW were
seen as having a special place on the battlefield, possessing capabilities (if weather and terrain
conditions were favorable) that other ordnance could not rival. Robinson, supra note 2, at
134-41.
21. Robinson, supra note 2, at 140-41; S. HERSH, supra note 16, at 6. It is difficult to parse
the special impact of chemical weapons in the fighting, because so many other novel weapons,
including tanks, aircraft and submarines also made their debuts during World War I. It is
clear, however, that by the end of the war, CW was seen by most participants as a standard
element in a nation's arsenal, one to be taken seriously and likely to be used again. Robinson,
supra note 2, at 140-41; see also Hoeber, The Chemistry of Defeat: Asymmetries in U.S. and
Soviet Chemical Warfare Postures, INST. FOR FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS, SPECIAL REP. 28
(1981) (chemical weapons used during World War I were judged to be four to eight times as
effective as conventional explosive weapons).
Both of today's superpowers were heavily affected by CW during World War I. The Soviet
Union suffered more CW casualties than any other state, totalling approximately 500,000 inju-
ries, including 50,000 deaths. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT 2 (1985) [hereinafter SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS
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Just as dramatic as the widespread use of chemical weapons during
World War I, but certainly far less predictable, was the general pattern of
nonuse during World War II. Prior to 1939,22 Japan had used CW
against China, and Italy had used CW against Ethiopia. Moreover, the
Allies and Axis alike appeared well-armed with chemical munitions, and
civilian anti-gas training programs were common.23 Nevertheless, fear of
escalatory retaliation, coupled with the military's institutional reluctance
to accept CW as a reliable weapons system, precluded its use, even while
the production of lethal agents generated huge, idle stockpiles on all
sides.24
Since World War II, there have been occasional instances or allega-
tions of chemical weapons use around the world, usually with controver-
sial, ambiguous evidence to substantiate or refute the claims. 25 Some of
THREAT]; Hoeber, supra, at 36. The United States incurred far fewer CW losses, but they
were a relatively high percentage of overall American casualties, totalling 27 per cent of all
United States deaths and injuries during the war. Thatcher, Poison on the Wind: Part 2: Su-
perpower Arsenals, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 14, 1988, at BI, col. 4, B4, col. 1 [hereinafter
Thatcher, Superpower Arsenals].
22. There were many other occasions between the world wars when the use of chemical
weapons was seriously considered, such as in Egypt, India and the Soviet Union. See A.
THOMAS, supra note 15, at 33.
23. McFarland, Preparing for What Never Came: Chemical and Biological Warfare in
World War II, DEF. ANALYSIS, BRASSEY'S DEF. PUBLISHERS 107-21 (1985); Robinson, supra
note 2, at 294; A. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 54-59; see also Tanaka, Poison Gas: The Story
Japan Would Like to Forget, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1988, at 10-19. At the outbreak
of World War II, each of the belligerants suspected its enemies of a readiness and willingness
to use CW promptly and massively, but each of them actually had only a limited capacity to
do so, due to inadequate stockpiles of chemical agents and delivery systems. Robinson, supra
note 2, at 306; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 62-84; E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 62-88.
24. McFarland, supra note 23; F. BROWN, CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RE-
STRAINTS (1968); Robinson, supra note 2, at 304, table 5.1, at 333-35. Military and political
leaders in several nations, including the United States, considered the possible desirability of
using CW in a variety of contexts, such as to blunt a blitzkrieg, to thwart a Nazi invasion of
Britain, or to facilitate the island-hopping process, but none of these inquiries overcame the
powerful disincentives, and half a million tons of available CW went unused by the belliger-
ants. Hitler's own experience of having been a victim of a gas attack during World War I was
apparently also a factor contributing to Germany's decision not to use CW during World War
II. Robinson, supra note 2, at 328-33; A. THOMAS, supra note 15, at 67-72; Storella, Poisoning
Arms Control. The Soviet Union and Chemical/Biological Weapons, INST. FOR FOREIGN
POL'Y ANALYSIS, SPECIAL REP. 9 (1984); Burck, Recent Progress Toward Chemical Disarma-
ment, 40 F.A.S. PUB. INTEREST REP. No. 10, Dec. 1987; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 62-
84; S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, No FIRE, No THUNDER: THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 12 (1984).
25. Unconfirmed reports alleged the use of chemical weapons in the following contexts,
inter alia: Chinese Civil War, 1945-49; Israel-Egypt, 1948; Greece, 1949; Algeria, 1957;
Guinea-Bissau, 1968; Angola, 1970; and Rhodesia, 1970. Robinson, supra note 2, at 157-212;
Robinson, Information Processes and the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, in THE
PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE CON-
VENED BY THE WORKING PARTY ON CBW 2-3 (1988) [hereinafter Robinson, Information
Processes].
One of the difficulties in substantiating claims of CW use has been the frequent frustration of
timely access for objective inspectors or observers into the region where the suspicious activity
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these charges now seem to be bogus (such as the allegation that the
United States used CW during the Korean War2 6); some are quite seri-
ous, indeed (such as the reports of CW use during the Yemeni Civil War
of 1963-6727); and some seem to turn on legal technicalities (such as
whether the use by the United States of chemical defoliants in the Viet-
nam war properly fits the criteria of "chemical weapons").28
Recently, issues of chemical weapons production and use seem to have
accelerated, with highly publicized accusations that the Soviet Union and
its surrogates employed "yellow rain" chemical weapons in southeast
and southwest Asia,29 with the well-documented use of lethal chemicals
occurred. See Poison Gas Attacks: Why a Diagnosis Is So Difficult, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1988, at 14, col. 3; Flowerree, Chemical Weapons: A Case Study in Verification, 13 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1983, at 2 [hereinafter Flowerree, Chemical Weapons] (difficulties in
securing prompt access to areas of Southeast Asia frustrated 1982 United Nations inquiry into
allegations of CW use there); SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS USE IN KURDISTAN: IRAQ'S FINAL OFFENSIVE, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 S. Prt. 100-
148 (Oct. 1988) (difficulty in obtaining physical evidence of use of chemical weapons by Iraq in
Kurdistan) [hereinafter CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN KURDISTAN]; see also Note, Establish-
ing Violations of International Law: "Yellow Rain" and the Treaties Regulating Chemical and
Biological Warfare, 35 STAN. L. REV. 259 (1983) (proposing creation of international body to
investigate allegations of CW use).
Chemical weapons agents vary in their "persistence," meaning that although some will re-
main active (and therefore detectable) for an extended period of time, others are designed to
degrade naturally relatively quickly (e.g., depending upon the amount used, the weather, the
topography), leaving few unambiguous traces for subsequent monitors to detect. See R.
TRAPP, THE DETOXIFICATION AND NATURAL DEGRADATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE
AGENTS (SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Stud., No. 3, 1985); E. SPIERS, supra note 15,
at 213; Thatcher, Poison on the Wind: Part 4: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Dec. 16, 1988, at B1, col. 3.
26. Robinson, supila note 2, at 158. The United States denied that it used any chemical
weapons in Korea. Although the possible application of CW was considered at that time,
chemicals were not well assimilated into the American military arsenal as useable weapons.
The United States may also have been deterred by fear of Soviet retaliation. Id. at 158; S.
SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 94; J. COOKSON & J. NOTTINGHAM, supra note 15, at 57-63.
American proposals for an impartial international investigation of the allegations were rejected
by its accusers. S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra note 24, at 15.
27. There were many reports that Egyptian troops used chemical weapons during their
intervention in the Yemeni Civil War, with at least 40 separate incidents reported in the press.
Egypt denied all allegations, and most were unconfirmed, but at least three events were studied
sufficiently by outside observers, and most experts have concluded that some CW were used.
Robinson, supra note 2, at 159-61, 336-41; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 112-34; J. COOK-
SON & J. NOTTINGHAM, supra note 15, at 6-14, 287-91.
28. See infra text accompanying note 62. The United States and South Vietnam confirmed
their use of herbicides and riot-control agents in the war, but contended that these applications
were lawful. They also denied any use of lethal chemicals. North Vietnam neither confirmed
nor denied accusations of its use of CW. Robinson, supra note 2, at 162-210; Burck, supra
note 24, at 8; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 8; J. COOKSON & J. NOTTINGHAM, supra note
15, at 14-54; S. HERSH, supra note 16, at 144-87.
29. The United States government has alleged that the Soviet Union used chemical weap-
ons in numerous attacks against Afghan rebels from 1979 through at least 1982, that
Vietnamese and Lao troops used CW against H'Mong resistance in Laos, and that Vietnam
also used CW in Kampuchea. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN, CURRENT POL'Y No. 553; U.S.
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during the Iran-Iraq War,30 and with the disclosure that Libya is pursu-
ing an indigenous capacity for manufacturing its own chemical weap-
ons.3' Other disquieting reports, too, have surfaced in different locales. 32
Today, both the United States and the Soviet Union retain large stock-
piles of various sorts of chemical weapons, and formerly classified infor-
mation regarding the size, composition and location of the respective CW
arsenals has begun to be released.33 On the United States side, the over-
all amount of CW is estimated as roughly 30,000 tons of chemical
DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REP. No. 98, CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
AFGHANISTAN, REP. TO THE CONGRESS FROM SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER M. HAIG,
JR., Mar. 22, 1982; CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN: AN UP-
DATE, REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, Nov. 1982; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18;
Robinson, Guillemin & Meselson, Yellow Rain: The Story Collapses, 68 FOREIGN POL'Y 100
(1987). At least in the case of alleged uses in Southeast Asia, other independent analysts have
disputed the validity of the claims, finding little credible evidence to substantiate the anecdotal
reports. Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet Noncompliance?, 11 INT'L
SECURITY 41, 90-92 (1987) [hereinafter Harris, Sverdlovsk]; J. ROBINSON, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENTS: 1985 11-13 (SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare
Stud., No. 6, 1986) [hereinafter J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985]; Ziegler, Yellow Rain:
An Analysis That Went Awry?, 2 INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 91 (1988). An
inquiry authorized by the United Nations in 1982 was inconclusive. Flowerree, Chemical
Weapons, supra note 25, at 2.
30. Dunn, The Chemical War: Journey to Iran, 1 NBC DEF. & TECH. INT'L 28 (1986);
Segal, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 946, 955-6 (1988). Both
countries used CW during the Gulf War, with Iraq resorting to CW sooner and on a larger
scale than Iran. J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 6-11; Smolowe, Re-
turn of the Silent Killer, TIME, Aug. 22, 1988, at 46. CW may have been responsible for as
many as 50,000 Iranian casualties, becoming increasingly important to the outcome of the war.
Cordesman, Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L, Feb. 1989, at
54.
31. See US Case Against Libyan Plant Gains Support, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 13,
1989, at 1, col. 4.
32. See J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 6-13 (collecting allegations
of use of CW during 1985 in eight different conflicts); Harris, Chemical Weapons Proliferation
in the Developing World, RusI & BRASSEY'S DEF. Y.B. 67-88.(1989); McGeorge, Chemical
Addiction, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF., Apr. 1989, at 16, 19 (listing probable CW states); Defense
and Disarmament Review, Chemical/Biological Warfare, STRATEGIC DIG. 1490-91 (1988) (al-
leging use of Soviet-supplied nerve gas in Angola in 1988).
The Soviet Union used chemicals - probably a riot control gas that achieved lethal effect
when used improperly - to break up a popular demonstration in the Georgian capital of
Tbilisi in April of 1989. Norman, US. Physicians Probe Deaths in Soviet Georgia, SCIENCE,
June 9, 1989, at 1133; Soviet Expert Names Gas Used on Georgians, Wash. Post, May 1, 1989,
at A22, col. 1. Much more horrific, Iraq used lethal chemical weapons on a vast scale in 1988
against its own Kurdish minority population. Poison Gas Traces Are Found in Iraq, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1988, at 25, col. 1; CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN KURDISTAN, supra note 25.
Although internal (as opposed to internationhl) use of chemical weapons is generally beyond
the scope of this article, these incidents further support the importance of renewed efforts to
deal with the general problem of CW.
33. See Robinson, Review: World CW Armament, Part L. The United States, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL., Autumn, 1988, at 12; CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION,
18 DEF. MONITOR No. 3, 1-5 (1989) (detailing current types of United States CW, gleaned
from various government information releases). The United States spent $1.07 billion on
chemical weapons programs in 1988 (up from $597 million in 1983), including $777 million for
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agents, 34 although there is a substantial controversy regarding the contin-
uing usefulness of some of the oldest munitions.35 In 1987, the United
States resumed CW production after an eighteen-year hiatus, 36 manufac-
CW defenses, $98 million to produce new weapons, and $198 million to destroy old weapons.
Thatcher, Superpower Arsenals, supra note 21, at B3, col.4.
Of particular interest here is the question of chemical weapons housed outside the national
territory of the state that owns them. The United States now holds roughly ninety-eight per-
cent of its stockpiles of lethal CW inside American territory. The rest (which accounts for
perhaps one-eighth of the stockpile that the Department of Defense considers militarily useful)
is held in West Germany. It includes 435 tons of GB and VX nerve gases loaded into 155-mm
and 203-mm howitzer shells. Robinson, An Historical Context for European Chemical-
Weapon-Free Zone Concepts, with an Account of Current European Chemical-Warfare Forces,
in SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 7, at 1, 13 (1987) [hereinafter
Robinson, Historical Context]; see also S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra note 24, at 14
(reporting that as much as 10 per cent of United States stockpile is held overseas, in Germany
and on Johnston Island in Pacific Ocean). The United States has agreed to withdraw all these
chemical weapons from Germany by 1992, and to accelerate the withdrawal if possible.
Trapp, A European Zone Free of Chemical Weapons: A Regional Precursor for the World-Wide
Ban on Chemical Weapons, in SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 3, at
31, 33 (1987); Address by Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Vienna Ministerial Meeting
on New Horizons in Europe (Mar. 6, 1989), reprinted as U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT
POLICY No. 1154.
There is a wide range of speculation regarding the amount of Soviet CW stored outside the
Soviet Union; some authorities conclude that the U.S.S.R. has maintained substantial "for-
ward based" CW depots, while others believe that little or no lethal material is stored outside
Soviet national territory. Robinson, Historical Context, supra, at 13-14; SOvIET CHEMICAL
WEAPONS THREAT, supra note 21, at 17; Robinson, NATO Chemical Weapons Policy and
Posture, ADIU OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 4, at 21 (1986) [hereinafter Robinson, NATO Chemi-
cal Weapons Policy].
34. Smolowe, supra note 30, at 49. About two-thirds of the United States inventory of CW
agents is stored in bulk drums; the rest is weaponized, including 3 million artillery rounds and
nearly 500,000 rockets. These agents are scheduled for destruction by 1997, and they are to be
replaced by new binary chemical weapons, unless a comprehensive CW treaty intervenes. Id.;
50 U.S.C. § 1521 (1989). For a description of binary weapons, see infra note 37.
35. The Department of Defense now considers roughly 90% of the United States CW
agent stockpile to be obsolete and practically useless. Pentagon Cites Safety Concern in Cam-
paign for Nerve Gas Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1985, at A19, col. 1; see Thatcher, Super-
power Arsenals, supra note 21, at B4; Hamm, supra note 3, at 142-46; HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 100TH CoNG. 2D SESS.,
FISCAL YEAR 1989 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS 120-21 (Joint Comm. Print 1988)
[hereinafter ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS]. In addition, several leaks have been dis-
covered in the existing United States CW storage facilities. Pentagon Cites Safety Concern in
Campaign for Nerve Gas Funds, supra; Superpower Arsenals, supra note 21, at B4, col. 4; 135
CONG. REC. H4386 (daily edition July 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Nielson) (reports of at
least one leak per week in Utah). But see REPORT OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW
COMMISSION (STOESSEL COMMISSION) 19-20 (June 1985) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE STOES-
SEL COMMISSION] (calculations about CW obsolescence are "unduly pessimistic"; rumors of
leaks are "exaggerated and inaccurate"); 135 CONG. REC., supra, at H4385-86 (statement of
Rep. Porter) (stockpile contains only six thousandths of one per cent leakers).
36. President Nixon had halted all United States production of chemical agents in 1969.
Production was resumed at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas in December, 1987. Army
Begins Producing Chemical Weapons, Ending 18-Year Moratorium, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1987,
at A36, col. 1; Morrison, When the Chemistry's Not Right, 20 NAT'L J. 1417 (1988).
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turing a new generation of "binary" weapons, 37 although the political
controversies - within the NATO alliance, as well as inside the United
States - have not abated. 38
The Soviet Union is generally believed to maintain an even larger and
more diverse CW stockpile than the United States,39 and the U.S.S.R.
37. A binary weapon is one in which two relatively non-toxic chemicals are produced and
stored separately, and placed into separate canisters. The canisters are inserted into a bomb or
missile only at the battlefield immediately prior to use, and the walls separating the two chemi-
cals are ruptured only when the shell is in flight toward its target. When the two agents mix, a
lethal nerve gas is produced. Binary munitions are therefore said to be safer to produce, store
and use than traditional "unitary" CW, which are extremely hazardous at all times. The
United States has been the first nation to develop modem binary weapons; among the new
binary arms scheduled for production are a short-range 155 mm artillery shell, a longer-range
Multiple Launch Rocket System, and a "Bigeye" bomb. REPORT OF THE STOESSEL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 35, at 32-36; Thatcher, Superpower Arsenals, supra note 21, at B4, col. 5, B5,
col. 3; SUBCOMM. ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF., BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also Chemical Warfare Policy: Beyond the Binary Production
Decision, 9 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUD. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SERIES No. 3 (B.
Roberts ed. 1987) (providing commentaries on U.S. policy concerning binary weapons) [here-
inafter Chemical Warfare Policy].
38. See Robinson, NATO Chemical Weapons Policy, supra note 33; Morrison, supra note
36, at 1417; Weickhardt & Finberg, New Push for Chemical Weapons, BULL. ATOM. SCIEN-
TISTS 26 (Nov. 1986); J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 14 (reviewing
debates in 1985 regarding resumption of chemical weapons production); Foreign Policy and
Arms Control Implications of Chemical Weapons: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Interna-
tional Security and Scientific Affairs and on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (March 30 and July 13, 1982) (statement of Charles
C. Flowerree) [hereinafter Hearings on Foreign Policy Implications] (noting political problems
posed for relations between United States and NATO governments by United States binary
program).
39. Hoeber, supra note 21; Robinson, Review: World CWArmament, Part II: The Soviet
Union, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. No. 4, at 15-22 (1989); U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT 89-91 (1988); U.S.
DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 67-68 (1989);
Storella, Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and Chemical/Biological Weapons, INST.
FOR FOREIGN PoL'Y ANALYSIS SPECIAL REP. 42 (June 1984); Segal, The Soviet Union's
Mighty Chemical Warfare Machine, ARMY, 26-38 (1987); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CONTINU-
ING DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES IN THE USSR (1983). The So-
viet Union has officially declared that it maintains a CW stockpile of less than 50,000 tons of
agents - approximately the same level as the United States - but many Western authorities
dispute this claim, offering estimates of the Soviet CW arsenal as high as 750,000 tons.
Thatcher, Superpower Arsenals, supra note 21, at B8, col.5; J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS:
1985, supra note 29, at 35-40; SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT, supra note 21, at 1;
After the Paris Conference, supra note 4, at 4; E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 1 (quoting former
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as admitting that "there is no decent estimate" of Soviet
CW inventory). But see Robinson, Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw and North
Atlantic Treaty Organizations: An Overview from Open Sources, in SIPRI, CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION 9 (1980) [hereinafter DESTRUCTION AND CONVER-
SION] (CW capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact are roughly equivalent, although most
Western spokespersons do not seem to realize this fact). In January of 1989, the Soviet Union
announced that it had ceased production of chemical weapons and would shortly begin de-
stroying some of its stockpiled CW. Moscow Announces Chemical Arms Cuts, Wash. Post,
Jan. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Feinstein, Bush U.N. Speech on Chemicals Draws Mixed Reactions,
19 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 28-29 (1989). The most recent, secret official American estimates
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 15:1, 1990
has an impressive array of systems for the development, production, stor-
age and delivery of CW.40 In addition, the Soviet Union has developed a
more sophisticated and comprehensive doctrine41 for the military use of
CW, and has undertaken more training of troops for operations in a
chemical battlefield.42 The Soviets may also have a substantial lead over
the United States in CW defenses - devices for protecting individual
soldiers and for decontaminating equipment hit by CW.43
The contemporary upsurge in interest in chemical weapons as "the
poor nation's atom bomb" 44 has also led to heightened concerns about
the possible further proliferation of chemical capacity. 45 Already, about
fifteen countries are considered to be capable of waging chemical war-
fare, and perhaps twenty others on the threshold seem to be pointing in
the same hazardous direction.46 The alarming possibility of readily avail-
of the Soviet CW arsenal are substantially lower than those propounded earlier, now sug-
gesting a Soviet arsenal of roughly 75,000 tons of lethal agents, compared to 30,500 for the
United States. Estimate of Soviet Arms Is Cut, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1989, at A71, col. 1.
40. See SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT, supra note 21; Hamm, supra note 3, at
130-34.
41. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REP., supra note 3, at 25; see S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18,
at 208; CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE (E. Jacchia ed. 1985).
42. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REP., supra note 3, at 49-53.
43. SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS THREAT, supra note 21, at 19-20; Segal, supra note 39,
passim; Thatcher, Superpower Arsenals, supra note 21, at B9, col. 3 (U.S.S.R. has 40,000 vehi-
cles available to perform decontamination functions; NATO has fewer than 600). But see
Meselson & Robinson, supra note 15, at 41; COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REP., supra note 3, at
38-48 (United States is superior in some areas of CW defenses and defensive technology). See
generally Barnaby, Preface to SIPRI, MEDICAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL-WARFARE
AGENTS (1976) ("chemical weapons have the singular characteristic among weapons that, in
principle, nearly perfect protection against their effects could be provided to individuals"
through masks, antidotes, decontamination, etc.).
44. Livingstone & Douglass, CBW The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb, INST. FOR FOREIGN
POL'Y ANALYSIS, NATIONAL SECURITY PAPER: 1 (Feb., 1984). One group of experts has
estimated that "for a large-scale operation against a civilian population, casualties might cost
about $2,000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, $800 with nuclear weapons,
$600 with nerve gas weapons, and $1 with biological weapons." Id. at 7.
45. See Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3 (testimony of CIA Director William H.
Webster); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
1989 (NATO alliance strongly supports negotiation of comprehensive CW treaty); see also
World Takes New Form at ChemicalArms Talks, Wash. Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at A9, col. 1
(January, 1989 Paris Conference on chemical weapons reflected great international concern
about spreading CW capabilities, but few concrete solutions for dealing with problem; tradi-
tional means of diplomacy seem inadequate). Several states have explicitly renounced any CW
capacity, including some, such as the United Kingdom, which had previously developed im-
portant CW arsenals. Today, only the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iraq admit that
they deploy chemical weapons.
46. There is considerable variation in public estimates regarding which states already pos-
sess chemical weapons, which states are attempting to develop them, and which states have the
industrial and technological base to support a future decision to procure CW. In each in-
stance, the trend in recent years has clearly been rising. In the 1960s, perhaps 5 to 7 states
were thought to own CW; by 1985, the most common estimates were in the range of 13 to 16
states, usually including some combination of the following: United States, Soviet Union,
France, Burma, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel, North korea, Syria, Taiwan, Libya, Iraq, Iran,
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able chemical arms, distributed to numerous small countries, and possi-
bly to terrorist organizations as well, generates some of the most
intractable security nightmares for the United States and the rest of the
world, and injects renewed vigor into the international effort to regulate
the incipient danger.47
B. The Control of Chemical Weapons
The chronology of diplomatic and legal efforts to regulate the use of
chemical weapons is much shorter than the parallel history of military
and scientific attempts to perfect the devices - and the arms control side
is also a tale of much more limited successes.48
Vietnam, Czechoslavakia, Poland, East Germany. J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985,
supra note 29, at 40-44; Satchel & Blaug, supra note 1, at 30; Thatcher & Aeppel, Poison on the
Wind, Part 1: The Poisons Spread, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 13, 1988, at B8-9 [hereinafter
Thatcher & Aeppel, The Poisons Spread]; see Egypt Acquiring Elements of Poison Gas Plant,
Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1989, at A20, col. 3; N. Korea No. 3 in Chemical Weapons, Wash. Times,
Jan. 13, 1989, at A9, col. 1. Other states that may already possess CW, or are considered likely
to be trying to acquire them, include South Africa, Pakistan, India, Nicaragua, Peru, Bulgaria,
Sudan. Satchel & Blaug, supra note 1.
47. See Livingstone & Douglass, supra note 44 (presenting scenarios in which CW
proliferation would be a credible danger and in which current international mechanisms do not
seem to offer an effective response); Ember, Worldwide Spread of Chemical Arms Receiving
Increased Attention, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEws, Apr. 14, 1986, at 8 [hereinafter Em-
ber, Worldwide Spread]; Schrag, A New Genie Emerging, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 25,
1988, at 14, col. 1 (describing dangers of combined proliferation of CW and long-range ballis-
tic missiles); Tesko, Chemical Warfare Treaty! Chemical Warfare Threats: It's Not Just the
Soviets Anymore, 74 NAT'L DEF. No. 446, at 31 (1989); After the Paris Conference, supra note
4, at 4; Hoeber, supra note 21, at 44-50; Raymond A. Zilinskas, Terrorism and Biological/
Toxin Weapons: Inevitable Alliance?, Speech to Annual Meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (Jan. 17, 1989); Adelman, Chemical Weapons: Restoring the
Taboo, 30 ORBIS 443 (1986). Chemical weaponry may be of only marginal military value for
either of the superpowers (because CW is hard to control, its use forces the user to don cum-
bersome protective clothing, and it can be defended against). Nonetheless, it may be an ideal
terrorist device, and the leading nuclear powers therefore have an especially compelling shared
interest in limiting its spread. The CW treaty, however, will do little that directly addresses
the threat of terrorist use of CW. Instead, the treaty aims principally to prevent the accumula-
tion of militarily significant stockpiles of CW by states; this effort, if successful, may have some
subsidiary effect on retarding the spread of lethal capabilities to subnational groups, but this
aspect of the CW nightmare is likely to persist in any event.
48. There are records of some ancient attempts by the Greeks, Romans and Hindus to
outlaw the use in war of poison gases, poison arrows, and the like, but there were no compre-
hensive or durable agreements. Storella, supra note 39, at 4.
One commentator has asked whether the entire legal regime of chemical weapons arms
control today is still so impotent as to be meaningless, essentially irrelevant to states' decisions
about whether to produce or use CW. Robinson, Chemical Warfare Arms Control: A Frame-
work for Considering Policy Alternatives, in SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
STUDIES No. 2, at 6 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson, Chemical Warfare].
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The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg49 was the first international
accord to consider even indirectly the question of CW, and it reflected a
shared, albeit general, notion that the use of devices that cause unneces-
sary suffering was "contrary to the laws of humanity. '50 The Hague In-
ternational Peace Conferences of 189951 and 190752 were the first
occasions to deal explicitly with chemical weaponry, and the parties
there agreed to forbid the use of "poison or poisoned weapons"53 and of
"asphyxiating or deleterious gases."' 54 Other similar prohibitions shortly
followed in other international accords. 55
49. Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, reprinted
in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 95) (1907).
50. Id. The Declaration did not deal with chemical weapons specifically, but provided the
principles upon which wars were to be fought (for example, stating that the sole purpose of
hostilities is to weaken the enemy's military forces) and renounced the use of certain light-
weight projectiles which were "either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable
substances." Id.
Similar principles were expressed in the work of the Brussels Conference of 1874: I. Final
Protocol; II. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War, Aug. 27, 1874, 4 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 219, but this convention never en-
tered into force. 2 A. VAN W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 53
(1968) (report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
51. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L.
(Supp. 129) (1907) [hereinafter 1899 Convention]; Annex to the Convention. The Hague Con-
ferences were called by Tsar Nicholas II to codify the laws of war and to create a system for
the peaceful resolution of international disputes. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 3; 2 A. VAN W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., supra note 50, at
54-67.
52. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L.
L. (Supp. 90) (1908) [hereinafter 1907 Convention], Annex to the Convention. The 1907 con-
vention also included a prohibition against certain types of mines and torpedoes.
53. 1899 Convention, supra note 51, art. xxiii; 1907 Convention, supra note 52, art. xxiii.
54. 1899 Convention supra note 51, at Declaration, para. 1.
55. The Treaty of Peace with Germany, 11 Martens Nouveau Receuil (ser. 3) 323, re-
printed in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 151) (1919), prohibited Germany from using, manufac-
turing, or importing "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices." Id. at art. 171. See A. vAN W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., supra note
50, at 68-73. The Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,
Feb. 6, 1922, reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 57) (1922), negotiated among the leading
military powers in 1921-22, would have prohibited the use of CW in similar terms (see article
V), but never entered into force due to the opposition of France. E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at
40-43; F. BROWN, supra note 24, at 61-72. The Convention on the Limitation of Armaments
of Central American States, Feb. 7, 1923, art. 5, reprinted in 2 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLATION 942, 945 (1931) (no longer in force) also contained a similar ban. See A. VAN
W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., supra note 50, at 81.
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The most important CW treaty, the Geneva Protocol of 1925,56 arose
from revulsion with the experience of World War 1.57 It prohibits "the
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices."58 The Geneva Protocol does not prohibit
the development and acquisition of chemical arms, only their actual use
in international battle, and then only against another state party to the
treaty.59 The Geneva Protocol was signed by all the leading states of the
world and promptly ratified by many of them; it entered into force in
1928.
The United States, however, remained outside the Geneva Protocol for
50 years, due to a variety of domestic political considerations, 60 until rat-
ifying it in 1975. The United States had earlier declared that it would not
be the first to use chemical weapons in war, 61 but the national leadership
was divided on the question of the scope of the treaty's ban, with some
56 . Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S.
8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 49 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
57. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 4, 9-13; F.
BROWN, supra note 24, at 97-110.
58. Geneva Protocol, supra note 56, at para. 1. The treaty also extended this prohibition
to comparable methods of bacteriological warfare, and committed the parties to "exert every
effort to induce other States to accede" to it. Id. at paras. 4 and 5. Many states have affixed
restrictive reservations to the Geneva Protocol, undertaking to apply its restrictions only
against an enemy who is also complying with it, so the treaty has, in effect, become merely a
prohibition against thefirst use of CW. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 5, at 9.
59. See Libya Says It Can Make Chemical Arms if Others Do, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989,
at A12, col. 3; Note, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow
Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011; S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra
note 24, at 87 (30 states have attached reservations to their ratifications of Geneva Protocol, to
preserve right to use CW in retaliation against another state that uses them first). The impreci-
sion of the Geneva Protocol has led to speculation that it might provide very little protection
against incremental escalation of the use of various poisons during a war - for example, when
the first use of riot control agents might serve as a justification for the introduction by the
other side of more lethal agents, and ultimately for the full-scale, retaliatory use of all chemical
and biological arms. R. CLARKE, supra note 2, at 201.
60. F. BROWN, supra note 24, at 103. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had favor-
ably reported the Geneva Protocol in 1926, but there was intense lobbying activity against the
treaty, led by various veterans' organizations and the chemical industry, and it was never
brought to a vote. President Truman withdrew the treaty from the Senate, and it attracted
little attention thereafter. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5,
at 10; S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 18, at 76; E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 46.
61. During World War II, President Roosevelt had declared, concerning CW, "I state
categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless
they are first used by our enemies." ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 5, at 9. CW are the only category of weapons that the United States has pledged it
will not be the first to use. Thatcher & Aeppel, The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B2. But
see S. HERSH, supra note 16, at 22-25 (United States changed policy in 1956 to permit first use
of chemical and biological weapons during conventional warfare).
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maintaining that it should not be interpreted as applying to non-lethal
chemicals used as herbicides or for riot-control purposes.62
Other interwar efforts at more comprehensive CW controls were un-
successful,63 and after World War II, the arms control negotiators began
to consider the possibility of splitting the general problem in half, dealing
more promptly with biological weapons, which seemed ripe for regula-
tion, and deferring the more intractable issues of chemical weapons. 64 In
1969, President Nixon renounced biological warfare, and set about uni-
62. Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of1925, in THE CONTROL
OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS I (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace ed. 1971).
Most of the international community (including many traditional United States allies) had
long asserted that the Geneva Protocol was designed to deal with not only lethal chemical
agents, but irritants and herbicides as well. See J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at 6; G.A. Res.
2603 A, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). In the 1970s, the
Nixon administration was still of the view that the treaty properly had only the narrower
scope, and proposed that the Senate give its advice and consent, subject to a reservation adopt-
ing the more restrictive interpretation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however,
favored the broader view of the treaty and was unwilling to approve it in the limited form.
Finally, in 1974, the Ford Administration announced that, although still convinced that the
narrow interpretation was legally justified, it would renounce as a matter of policy the possibil-
ity of using non-lethal chemical agents in war, except for a very small set of contingencies. The
Senate accepted this compromise, and the United States then proceeded to ratification. See
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 9-13.
The distinction between lethal, incapacitating, and irritant chemicals is an ambiguous one,
and even nominally riot control agents may be harmful or fatal when used improperly, in high
concentrations, or against the elderly or infirm. See Hearings on Foreign Policy Implications,
supra note 38, at 19 (statement of Michael J. Matheson, Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-
Military Affairs, Dep't of State); Russian Nerve Gas Used in Angola War, Sunday Times
(London), Mar. 20, 1988, at A17, col. 1; 8 ARMS CONTROL REP. No. 5, supra note 4, at 202.
63. The 1932-37 Disarmament Conference attempted, without success, to develop an
agreement to prohibit the production and deployment of biological and chemical weapons.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 120; F. BROWN, supra
note 24, at 110-21.
After World War II, the peace treaties forbid former Axis powers from acquiring CW in the
future. Meselson & Robinson, supra note 15, at 44; N. SIMS, THE DIPLOMACY OF BIOLOGI-
CAL DISARMAMENT: VICISSITUDES OF A TREATY IN FORCE, 1975-85, 41 (1988). In addition,
pursuant to the treaty which admitted West Germany into NATO, the Western European
Union has conducted on-site inspection of the West Gernian chemical industry to monitor the
non-production of CW. See A. VAN W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., supra note 50, at 140-47;
N. SIMS, supra, at 40-41.
64. Lawler, Progress Towards International Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons,
13 U. TOL. L. REv. 1220, 1220-26 (1982). Biological weapons were seen as less militarily
useful, and therefore easier for countries to give up. Fieth, Biological Weapons & the Limits of
Arms Control, NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 1986/87, at 80; Douglas, The Challenges ofBiochemi-
cal Warfare, 3 GLOBAL AFF. 156 (1988).
Some had argued that the process of imposing tight constraints on BW would simply exacer-
bate the problem of CW by emphasizing the relative absence of effective controls. Others,
however, urged that the two groups of weapons really were dissimilar (i.e., BW had never been
generally used in war, and seemed to most military experts to be too uncontrollable to be truly
promising as weapons, so the cost of giving them up would be lower), and that arms control
advocates should pursue progress, even limited progress, wherever possible. The superpowers
argued this question for years before reaching a reconciliation. ARMS CONTROL AND DIS-
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laterally destroying all United States biological weapons stocks.65 This
American initiative was heralded internationally, and a multilateral Bio-
logical Weapons Convention 66 was quickly drawn up, entering into force
in 1975.67
In addition to this progression of international treaties, there is sub-
stantial authority for the proposition that the consensus of the interna-
ARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 120-21; Trapp, supra note 5, at 108; COMPTROL-
LER GENERAL'S REP., supra note 3, at 78-79.
During the same era, the United States and Soviet Union negotiated, and then opened for
multilateral adherence, the Convention on the Protection of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 88 (1977), which prohibits military use of techniques for widespread,
long-lasting or severe manipulation of the environment, a ban which might have implications
for the large-scale use of certain chemical or biological weapons.
65. Holmes, Foreign Policy Implications of Biological Weapons, 89 DEP'T STATE BULL. 22,
23 (1989). On November 25, 1969, President Nixon announced that the United States was
unconditionally forswearing all forms of biological warfare, REPORT OF THE STOESSEL COM-
MISSION, supra note 35, at 91, Appendix E; on February 14, 1970, the ban was extended to
cover toxins as well. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at
121. These declarations reserved the right to possess research amounts of the controlled sub-
stances, however, and research on defenses against biological weapons has continued, and has
recently accelerated in the United States and elsewhere. Preliminary Report of the Majority
Staff of the Senate Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management on DOD's Safety Pro-
grams for Chemical and Biological Research, May 11, 1988, reprinted in Department of Defense
Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 270-86, appendix A-(1988); Poison on the Wind, Part 3. Tailor-
made Toxins, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 15, 1988, at B1, col. 3; Germ Wars, Hearing Before
the Senate Governmental Affairs Comm. and its Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (photo. reprint 1989); Wright, The Military and the New Biology, BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS 10-16 (May 1985); DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SOVIET BIOLOGI-
CAL WARFARE THREAT, DST-1610F-057-86 (1986).
66. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacte-
riological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, April 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 310 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter Biological Weapons Convention]. See generally E. GEISSLER, BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS TODAY (1986); ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 5,
at 120-23; N. SIMS, supra note 63, passim. The Biological Weapons Convention makes little
provision for verification of compliance, on the assumption that since the United States was
already willing to renounce BW unilaterally, the possibility of the Soviet Union or others
cheating on the terms of the agreement was less important. Storella, supra note 39, at 14. The
Convention provides only that the parties shall consult and cooperate to resolve compliance
questions, and that complaints about violations may be lodged with the United Nations Secur-
ity Council. Biological Weapons Convention, supra, arts. 5 & 6. In retrospect, this sparse
treatment of compliance issues has been a mistake, as unresolved controversies over alleged
Soviet biological weapons-related activities have damaged the arms control process and jeop-
ardized other negotiations. Harris, Sverdlovsk, supra note 29; Flowerree, Cloudy Treaties,
FOREIGN SERVICE J., May 1983, at 15; E. GEISSLER, supra, at 90-91; Fieth, supra note 64.
67. Note, supra note 59, at 1042-44. The Biological Weapons Convention also obligates its
parties "to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on
effective measures for the prohibition of [chemical weapons] development, production and
stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and
means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weap-
ons purposes." Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 66, art. 9.
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tional community has developed to the point where the use of lethal
chemical agents has now become a violation of customary international
law. 68 As such, CW use would be illegal for all states, even those not
party to a binding agreement.69 Although this jurisprudential point is
hard to test, and its exact parameters are indeterminate, 70 it is supported
by the virtual unanimity with which CW applications are condemned, 71
as well as by the overwhelming consensus approving resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly on point.72
68. S. BOWMAN, YELLOW RAIN AND RELATED ISSUES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB82025 at 7-8,
Sept. 29, 1983) (many international lawyers argue that prohibition on use of chemical weapons
is so widely recognized that it has become a part of customary international law; others note
that customary international law is difficult to establish and controversial to apply); Hoeber,
supra note 21 (both United States and Soviet Union have officially supported view that CW use
is violation of customary international law); A. VAN W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., supra
note 50, at 154-216; Note, supra note 59, at 1048-57.
69. Customary international law, binding upon states even in the absence of an explicit
agreement, arises from "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(2).
70. It is difficult to state with precision what the regime of customary international law
encompasses regarding chemical weapons. For example, does it govern the use of non-lethal
chemicals, such as riot-control agents or herbicides; does it automatically include some form of
"reciprocity" requirement, effectively prohibiting only the first use of CW; does it acknowledge
any states as having effectively dissented from the emerging norm and thus being exempted
from it? See Note, supra note 25, at 290-91 (questioning whether alleged use of CW in Af-
ghanistan and Southeast Asia would be illegal under ambiguous terms of existing treaties).
71. In the recent case of Iran and Iraq, for example, much of the international community
expressed outrage at the use of chemical weapons in violation of international norms. George
Shultz, Chemical Weapons: A Global Call to Action (address at Conference on Chemical
Weapons, Jan. 7, 1989), reprinted as Secretary's Address, Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Conference Held in Paris, DEP'T STATE BULL. 4, Mar. 1989, at 9 (Final Declaration of the
1989 Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); Dickson, Chemical Arms
Ban Still Uncertain, 243 SCIENCE 301 (1989). There was, however, little collective action by
way of sanctions against the users, and Iraq seems not to have paid much of a price for breach-
ing the taboo against CW use. Thatcher & Aeppel, The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B14;
Hoeber & Feith, Poison Gas, Poisoned Treaties, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1988, at A35# col. I;
Smolowe, supra note 30; Gupta, What Do We Do about Chemical Weapons?, SWORDS AND
PLOUGHSHARES: THE BULL. OF THE PROGRAM IN ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND
INT'L SECURITY, Mar. 1989, at 11. Some commentators have feared that the global consensus
against chemical warfare is breaking down, and that the increasing use of CW in combat has
led to a "banalization" of the issue, with decreasing international reprobation. Morel, How to
Prevent the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons: The Political Aspects, in DISARMAMENT, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, APRIL 19-22,
1989, KYOTO, JAPAN 39, 41 (1989); Adelman, Chemical Weapons: Restoring the Taboo, 30
ORBIS 443 (1986).
72. See 1987 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 249-75 (numerous General Assembly resolutions
concerning CW have been adopted since early 1970s, and two more were adopted in 1987:
G.A. Res. 42/37 A (urging CD to intensify its negotiating efforts) and G.A. Res. 42/37 C
(opposing use of CW)); 1988 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B., supra note 5, at 285 (G.A. Res. 43/74
A on December 7, 1988); see also S.C. Res. 620, 43 U.N. SCOR Supp. at 12, U.N. Doe. S/
INF/44 (1988). A resolution or declaration of the United Nations General Assembly is not
ordinarily binding as international law, but it is a type of "state practice" and may be evidence
of an international consensus on point. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 reporters' note 2.
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C. The Current Negotiations
The present iteration of chemical weapons negotiations has been pro-
ceeding incrementally in the CD since the early 1980s, building upon
some fifteen years of preliminary talks and explorations. 73 Some phases
of the conversations have been strictly bilateral, as the United States and
Soviet Union attempt to iron out a mutually acceptable regime that they
could then present to the rest of the world.74 Some phases have enjoyed
a limited multilateral participation, as the leading chemical-producing
states collaborate among themselves to develop a regime that adequately
balances the interests of arms control, verification, and commercial activ-
ity.75 And some important phases of the negotiations have been fully
73. Compilation of Material on Chemical Warfare from the Conference of the Comm. on
Disarmament and the Comm. on Disarmament Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1979,
Comm. on Disarmament document CD/26, July 1, 1979, reprinted in DESTRUCTION AND
CONVERSION, supra note 39, at 169-92; 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 5, at v; Flowerree, The Politics of Arms Control Treaties: A Case Study, 37 J. INT'L
AFF. 269 (1984); E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at 175-97; Robinson, Information Processes, supra
note 25, at 6; 1988 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B., supra note 5, at 274. Much of the important
technological and historical preparatory work for the negotiations was done for many years by
non-governmental entities, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI); the Pugwash Chemical Warfare Study Group, 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at ix-x; and the International Red Cross, A. VAN W. THOMAS &
A. THOMAS, JR., supra note 50, at 147-51.
74. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, supra note 35, at 131-34; Joint U.S.S.R.-U.S.
Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in
letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament (Aug. 7, 1979), CD/48; Joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (July 7, 1980). The United States and Soviet Union opened bilateral negotiations on
CW in 1977, and these talks became institutionalized, with sustained contact between expert
delegations. By 1979 the two states had commenced a "joint initiative" to try to develop a
mutually acceptable treaty, via bilateral negotiations, for subsequent presentation to the CD.
Joint U.S.S.R.-United States Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibi-
tion of Chemical Weapons, Committee on Disarmament document CD/48 (Aug. 7, 1979),
reprinted in DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION, supra note 39, at 165-68; Goldblat, Status of
US-Soviet Negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Convention, in id. at 157-64; Meselson &
Robinson, supra note 15, at 47. However, these talks were suspended in 1980, ostensibly due
to American concerns about Soviet use of "yellow rain" chemical weapons in Asia. Trapp,
supra note 5, at 113-15; Fokin & Babievsky, Toward Freeing the European Continent from
Chemical Weapons, in 2 THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAP-
ONS CONVENTION, PROCEEDINGS OF A SIPRI/PuGwAH CONFERENCE [hereinafter 2
SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS] 91 (1986); Hearings on Foreign Policy Impli-
cations, supra note 38, at 176-77 (statement of Charles C. Flowerree). In 1984, bilateral
United States-Soviet Union contacts on CW were resumed in the margins of the CD discus-
sions. J. ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 49; see also Flowerree, Chemi-
cal Weapons, supra note 25, at 7 (Soviet Union may be more receptive in bilateral context than
in multilateral negotiations, and more willing to agree to intrusive verification when only
United States would be inspecting); Smith, Reagan Offers a Chemical Weapons Treaty, 224
SCIENCE 263, 264 (1984) (quoting former arms control official Tom Davies as saying, "for any
important- treaty, there has to be a bilateral agreement" first).
75. Since 1985, the "Australian group" of developed states (composed of the Western Eu-
ropean states, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others) has met
periodically on the fringes of the CD, to consider informal methods for coordinating their
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multilateral, as the CD develops the rolling text in painstaking negotia-
tions open to the public view.76
The current rolling text has evolved largely in response to American
initiatives. 7 In February, 1983, the United States delegation tabled its
individual policies regarding the export of CW-related materials and equipment. Thatcher &
Aeppel, The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B14; Ember, Worldwide Spread, supra note 47,
at 11; Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3 (submission of Government of Australia to
Hearings on Chemical Weapons by Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs). Following discussions with the United States, the Soviet Union
also announced the imposition of export controls upon its own shipments of a number of
sensitive chemicals. Chemical Warfare Policy, supra note 37, at 38.
76. Trapp, supra note 5, at 115 (CD established Ad Hoe Working Group on Chemical
Weapons in 1980); Note, supra note 17, at 106-07, 121-22 (recounting early CW negotiations
in CD and its predecessor institutions).
Unlike most bilateral United States-Soviet Union arms control negotiations, CD proceedings
are unclassified and generally open to the public (although there are many important private
meetings of subsidiary bodies and of informal groupings operating on the margins of the main
negotiations). This openness may mean that the CW negotiations proceed at a more deliberate
pace, but it has the advantage of public participation and accessibility, as well as recognizing
the reality that, with such a large number of participants, effective secrecy would be impossible
to sustain. In contrast, the ongoing bilateral negotiations concerning United States and Soviet
Union nuclear arms are confidential, and the negotiating documents are generally not made
available. See McNeill, U.S.-US.S.R. Nuclear Arms Negotiations: The Process and the Lawyer,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 52, 56 (1985).
77. Other states, too, have made major contributions to the evolving negotiations. See
Fokin & Babievsky, supra note 74; Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Proposal of the USSR, June 15, 1982, reprinted in ARMS CONTROL REP., June 1982, at
704.D.3 (Soviet initiatives); Cooper, Verification of the Non-production of Chemical Weapons:
The United Kingdom Approach, in 2 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 74, at 33-82; Luce, Chemical Weapons: Negotiating a Total Ban, NATO REV. No. 3
(1985) (British contributions); Lau, A Comprehensive Approach for Elaborating Regimes for
Chemicals in a Future Chemical Weapons Convention, in 2 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 113-20 (Swedish draft convention). In 1982, during the sec-
ond United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviet Union tabled a draft chemical
weapons convention, widely regarded as a major step forward. J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at
7. See generally Basic Provisions for a Chemical Weapons Convention, CD-294, June 15,
1982.
A number of rather different types of CW treaties have been considered in recent years. J.
ROBINSON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 45. See generally Robinson, Chemical
Warfare, supra note 48, at 17-23. This article is principally concerned with the concept of a
relatively "comprehensive" CW agreement, designed to deal with the full range of outstanding
issues; this is the version of an agreement that has received by far the most attention and
support in the CD negotiations and elsewhere. In contrast, some have expressed interest in a
more limited "non-proliferation" agreement that would address solely the concerns about the
spread of CW capacity to other states. Kamal, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Some
Particular Concerns of Developing Countries, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. No.
4, May 1989, at 1. This more modest goal might be thought to be more achievable, but few
states now seem interested in the concept of splitting the entire problem into pieces. J. ROBIN-
SON, DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 51-52; Ember, Worldwide Spread, supra note
47, at 12. In addition, some have proposed "regional" solutions to the problem of CW, start-
ing with agreement among several states in a geographic area (e.g., Europe or Latin America)
to "freeze" CW inventories or to ban them outright. See Fokin & Babievsky, supra note 74, at
93-95; Lohs, Verification of the Non-Production of Chemical Weapons: A View from the GDR,
in 2 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 121-28; J. ROBINSON,
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"detailed views" for an extensive draft treaty, with major new ideas re-
garding a comprehensive verification apparatus.7 8 The Soviet Union
originally balked at the intrusiveness of the inspection regime, but ulti-
mately agreed to accept the principle of detailed oversight.79 In April,
1984, Vice President Bush unveiled an even more far-reaching draft con-
vention 80 that "goes beyond anything we've really proposed before."81
This draft convention incorporates an "open invitation"8 2 for inspections
to verify compliance with a total ban on the production, stockpiling, and
use of chemical weapons.83
DEVELOPMENTS: 1985, supra note 29, at 49-51, 67-72; Chemical Weapon Free Zones?, in
SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 7 (R. Trapp ed. 1987); Westing, Ban
Chemical Weapons in Europe, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May 1985, at 17-19.
78. United States Government, United States Detailed Views on the Contents of a Chemi-
cal Weapons Ban, Feb. 10, 1983, CD/343, Appendix II; Hamm, supra note 3, at 158-59; U.S.
Outlines Chemical-Arms Proposal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at A3, col. 4. The 1983 United
States proposal was the first to deal in a thorough fashion with the need for on-site inspection
(OSI) to verify compliance with the obligations of the treaty. It called for OSI provisions more
substantial and intrusive than those that had been agreed to in any previous arms control
accord.
79. Chemical Arms Talks Progress, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 22, 1984, at 4, col. 3. The Soviet
acceptance of the American concept of detailed OSI was a major step forward in the negotia-
tions. Under General Secretary (now President) Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has, on occa-
sion, become even more open regarding its chemical facilities, even inviting American and
other visitors to tour a CW facility. Bohlen, Soviets Allow Experts to Tour Chemical Weapons
Facility, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1987, at A17, col. 4; Steps Toward Greater Openness and Trust
(interview with Colonel-General Vladimir Pikalov, chief of the Soviet chemical troops), So-
VIET LIFE, Dec. 1987, at 10-11.
80. United States Draft Convention Submitted to the Conference on Disarmament: Prohi-
bition of Chemical Weapons (Apr. 18, 1984), CD/500, reprinted in 1984 DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 269 (ACDA ed. 1986).
81. Quoted in Smith, A Novel Proposal on Chemical Weapons, 224 SCIENCE 474 (1984).
82. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 8. In presenting the 1984
American proposal to the CD, Vice President Bush recognized that the concept of "open
invitation" inspection was a major departure from previous OSI regimes, but stated that "it is
indispensable to an effective chemical weapons ban." Id. at 3; see also US. Unveils Draft
Treaty Banning Chemical Arms, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1987, at A31, col. 1. More recently,
however, the United States itself has wavered on the desirability of "anytime, anyplace" in-
spection, which would obligate a party to allow foreign inspection, on 24-48 hours' notice, of
any facility suspected of serving an illegal CW function, whenever a five-member Fact-Finding
Panel so requested. Some authorities fear that the availability of such unlimited verification
could lead to a severe loss of classified information. The United States delegation at the CD
may therefore modify and dilute the availability of the proposed OSI rights. U.S Expects De-
lay on Chemical Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, at 23, col. 1.
83. Under the 1984 American proposal, all stockpiles of CW would be declared promptly
and would be destroyed within ten years. Chemical weapons production facilities would be
dismantled on a comparable timetable. Each country would be permitted to maintain only a
single, small-scale CW production facility, under international inspection, for manufacturing a
small quantity of CW agents that would be used only in research on defenses against chemical
weapons. The American proposal also incorporated the concept of "anytime, anywhere" in-
spection. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6; Tanzman, Constitutionality of
Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 21
(1988).
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The current rolling text builds upon the 1984 United States draft, and
it is expansive indeed. Under it, the parties would undertake not to "de-
velop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons,
or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone"; 84 not to
"assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities
prohibited to Parties under this Convention"; 5 not to use chemical
weapons; 86 and not to engage in any "activities in preparation for [the]
use of chemical weapons."87 They would also assume the obligations to
destroy existing stockpiles of chemical weapons88 and existing chemical
weapons production facilities 9
Much of the draft treaty is devoted to definitions of chemical weapons,
with elaborate "schedules" of different levels of toxicity or weapons po-
tential eliciting different degrees of concern. 90 The treaty also contains
the seeds of a new bureaucracy to administer the treaty,91 with a Confer-
84. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. 1.1.
85. Id. at art. 1.2.
86. Id. at art. 1.3.
87. Id. at art. I, para. 4. The exact wording of this clause is still under consideration. See
id. at 11.
The CW treaty is unlikely to ban "research" into chemical weapons and defenses, because
this activity, which typically occurs inside laboratories or libraries, is impossible to monitor
effectively. The parties could not therefore verify other states' compliance with treaty terms
that purport to regulate research. R. CLARKE, supra note 2, at 227-28; E. SPIERS, supra note
15, at 178; cf. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., June 18,
1979, art. IX, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1112 (1979) [hereinafter SALT II Treaty]; Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, art. 5, 23 U.S.T.
3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7545, 9444 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter ABM Treaty] (banning development,
testing and deployment of specified weapons, but permitting research on them).
88. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. 1.5; see also Ooms, Verification of
the Destruction of Stockpiles of Chemical Weapons, in DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION, supra
note 39, at 123-28 (description of process of veriflably and safely destroying stockpiles of chem-
ical weapons).
89. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. 1.6. See also Mikulak, Destruction
of U.S. Chemical Weapons Production and Filling Facilities, in DESTRUCTION AND CONVER-
SION, supra note 39, at 57-66 (description of illustrative process for elimination of CW produc-
tion plants).
90. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. II; annex to art. VI, paras. 2, 3.
The treaty differentiates between "super-toxic lethal chemicals," "other lethal chemicals" and
"other harmful chemicals," based upon their potency and on the ease with which they could be
converted into weapons. These distinctions also apply to the precursors of these agents. Id. at
annex to art. VI, para. 2. It also defines the munitions and devices that would be used to carry
and release the chemicals. Id. art. II; see Robinson, The Chemical Industry and Chemical-
Warfare Disarmament: Categorizing Chemicals for the Purposes of the Projected Chemical
Weapons Convention, in 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 55-
104; see also J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at 9-11 (outlining unresolved issues regarding scope
of the treaty).
91. The importance of an effective international control mechanism has long been recog-
nized, and negotiators have struggled over the years with a variety of possible mechanisms to
create a viable, politically acceptable regime. See generally N. SIMs, supra note 5,
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ence (composed of all parties),92 an Executive Council, 93 a Technical Sec-
retariat,94 and an International Inspectorate.95
The real teeth of the draft convention appear in its verification provi-
sions.96 These begin with declarations,9 7 at the outset of the treaty's life
92. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. VIII B. The Conference is to
meet in regular annual sessions as the principal or supreme organ for considering "any ques-
tions, matters or issues within the scope of the Convention." Among other duties, it may make
recommendations, take decisions, set the programs and budget of the institutions, and oversee
the implementation of the Convention. Id. The treaty would also establish an umbrella Or-
ganization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with all parties as members, "to achieve
the objectives of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including
those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consulta-
tion and co-operation among States Parties." Id. art. VIII A. In addition, the negotiators also
contemplate the creation of a Preparatory Commission, which would operate during the inter-
val between the signature and the entry into force of the treaty, "[flor the purpose of carrying
out the necessary preparations for the effective operation of the provisions of the Convention
and for preparing for the 1st meeting of the Conference of the State Parties." Id. at 91.
93. Id. art. VIII C. The Executive Council, among other duties, is to meet regularly, to
supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, to draft the budget for the Organization,
and to consider any other issues concerning the implementation of the Convention. Id.
94. Id. art. VIII D. Among the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat is the execu-
tion of the international verification measures provided for in the Convention. It is to be led by
a Director-General. Id.
95. Id. The International Inspectorate is a unit of the Technical Secretariat, and is princi-
pally responsible for conducting on-site inspections. Id. Addendum to app. I.
96. The major stumbling block in the chemical weapons negotiations - as in most other
arms control efforts - has been verification. Hearings on Foreign Policy Implications, supra
note 38, at 177 (statement of Charles C. Flowerree); Dunn, Chemical Weapons Arms Control.
Hard Choices for the Bush Administration, SURVIVAL, May-June 1989, at 209; see also Morri-
son, Trusting, But Verifying, 1989 NAT'L J. 2580 (discussing some practical problems raised by
on-site inspections).
The traditional mechanism for monitoring compliance with arms control treaties is via "na-
tional technical means [NTM]," referring to the array of reconnaissance satellites, remote seis-
mometers, and the like, maintained by individual countries. Hoeber, supra note 21, at 18; see
also Schear, National Methods of Treaty Verification and the Role of Third Countries: Com-
patibility or Conflict?, 7 ARMS CONTROL No. 1 3-16 (1986). Several existing arms control
agreements have included nearly identical language regarding NTM, authorizing its use and
prohibiting interference with it. See Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, art. V, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 791 (1972) [hereinafter
SALT I Interim Agreement]; ABM Treaty, supra note 87, art. XII; Treaty on the Elimination
of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. XII, re-
printed in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty]. The current rolling text of the CW
convention reflects uncertainty about the role of NTM in verification of a chemical weapons
pact, with the possibility that no language on point will be included. See Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee, supra note 6, at 24; see also Hoeber, ,supra note 21, at 18-19 (NTM are not
likely to be very useful in monitoring compliance with CW treaty; more intrusive inspection is
necessary). Trapp & Rehak, Principal Objectives to Verification Methods and Results, in SIPRI
CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 9, at 14-30 (1988).
97. National declarations of chemical weapons and of CW production facilities would not,
of course, be treated as absolutely reliable verification tools; other states would need to confirm
the accuracy of the figures reported. But arms control negotiators have come to recognize the
value of these types of national declarations as an important adjunct to the other verification
systems, easing the task of independent monitoring and complicating the possible evasion
plans of any potential violator. See INF Treaty, Memorandum of Understanding, 27 I.L.M.
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and throughout its term, of the stockpiles of CW98 and the CW produc-
tion facilities99 maintained by each party. Each party is also to propound
a plan for verifiably destroying the prohibited items, starting no less than
one year after the treaty enters into force, and being completed no more
than nine years later. 1°° Each party is permitted to engage in chemical
activities, without limit, that are not weapons-related,101 and there are
provisions for two types of on-site inspections (OSI) to ensure that no
diversion can occur from peaceful to weapons purposes.
The first type of OSI, called "systematic" inspections, will begin at the
outset of the treaty regime, with each party affording access to all its
chemical weapons and CW production facilities, for the purposes of con-
firming the accuracy of its initial declarations and of monitoring the dis-
98 (incorporating data exchanged by the United States and the Soviet Union regarding their
stockpiles of intermediate-range nuclear missiles at the outset of the treaty regime).
98. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. III, para. l(a); art. VI, para. 4.
The declaration is to specify the location, aggregate quantity, and detailed inventory of its CW
stockpiles. Id. at art. IV, para. 2; annex to art. IV. Thereafter, each party is to provide annual
information concerning the destruction of its CW. Id. art. IV, para 4.
99. Id. art. III, para. l(b); art. V, para. 4 and annex to art. V. Upon entry into force of the
treaty, each party is to cease all activity at each chemical weapons production facility, except
that required for closure, and no new CW production facilities may be constructed. Id. art. V,
para. 2-3.
Recently, President Bush proposed that the United States retain the right to continue to
produce new binary chemical weapons for several years after the new convention comes into
force. This proposal has not been well-received internationally, and some authorities believe
that it will undercut the effort to make progress in the negotiations. Bush Keeps Option to
Make Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1989, at A20, col. 1.
100. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. IV, annex to art. IV (destroying
chemical weapons); art. V, and annex to art. V (destroying CW production facilities). Each
party will be permitted to retain a single small-scale facility to produce agents that could be
used in conducting research into CW defenses. Id. annex to art. VI(l), General Provisions,
Single Small-Scale Production Facility.
President Bush recently proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union agree to re-
duce their CW arsenals by as much as 80% during the negotiations, and that they destroy
98% of their respective stockpiles within eight years after the treaty enters into force. Neutral-
izing Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 5. Bush tied the elimination of the
remaining 2% to the acceptance of the treaty by "all nations capable of building chemical
weapons." Feinstein, Bush UN. Speech on Chemicals Draws Mixed Reactions, 19 ARMS CON-
TROL TODAY, No. 8, at 28 (1989). Critics have noted that the first of those proposed cuts
(reducing existing stockpiles even prior to conclusion of a treaty) is already a statutory require-
ment for the United States. Id.
101. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. VI; art. II, para. 3. The authori-
zation to continue to engage in nonweapons-related chemical activities - including activities
that use toxic chemicals that could be adapted to weapons purposes - is, in some ways, the
centerpiece of the treaty and the focus of its verification provisions. The treaty notes that it is
to be implemented
in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technologi-
cal development of parties to the Convention and international co-operation in the field of
peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and techni-
cal information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of
chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
Id. art. VI, para. 8.
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mantling and destruction process.10 2 The second type of inspections, to
be initiated upon a "challenge" or inquiry by a party having doubts
about another party's compliance, has yet to be fully worked out in the
negotiations. 103 Probably, the final version of the treaty would permit a
concerned party to raise questions about any ambiguous situation with
another state,10 4 to engage in consultations to attempt to resolve the mat-
ter,105 and then to request an OSI.1 06 The requested state would be obli-
gated (perhaps with some exceptions) to permit the inspection, to admit
the inspectors to the troublesome facility within a very few hours,10 7 and
to provide them full access to the site for the conduct of their mission. 108
Many questions remain, however, regarding the scope and depth of the
right to conduct challenge on-site inspections under the draft convention,
and regarding the possible right to refuse a request for inspection.109
102. Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. IV, para. 3; art. V, para. 5.
Access is also to be provided to facilities used to store chemical weapons and to facilities used
to destroy them. The inspections may be accomplished by a continuous presence of inspectors
and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments. Inspections may make use of technical
sensors, tamper-detecting apparatus, and data-authentication devices, and are to enjoy unim-
peded access to all parts of the facility. Id. art. IV, para. 6 and art. 5, para. 6; annex to art. IV;
annex to art. V.
103. The Conference on Disarmament has not concluded its work on the provisions for
challenge OSIs, and the rolling text does not include the relevant articles. The Report of the
Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, app. II contains a paper representing the current state of the
negotiations on the subject, as seen by the chairs of the relevant committees. It does not
constitute "agreement" among the delegations, and is therefore less authoritative than the roll-
ing text, but it does reflect the progress registered to date.
104. Id. at 141.
105. The burden of proof would be on the requested state to demonstrate its innocence, not
on the requesting state to demonstrate that there had been a violation: "Throughout the in-
spection the requested State has the right and is under the obligation to demonstrate its com-
pliance with the Convention." Id.
106. The request is filed with the Head of the Technical Secretariat, who then communi-
cates it to all the members of the Executive Council. Id. app. II, at 141.
107. A time span of 24-48 hours from the request to the arrival of the inspectors has been
discussed. Id. at n.1.
108. Id. at 142.
109. The CD negotiators contemplate that the inspection regime, for both systematic and
challenge OSIs, will be vigorous and detailed. See J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at 12-22.
Some states have conducted practice OSIs, to test methodology and equipment with a view
to perfecting the inspection algorithms prior to entry into force of the treaty. These "National
Trial Inspections" and "Practice Challenge Inspections" have been used by the CD to elabo-
rate agreed criteria as a template for future inspections. See Freeman & Mathews, Verification
of Non-production of Chemical Weapons and Their Precursors by the Civilian Chemical Indus-
try, in SIPRI CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 9, at 45 (1988) (Australia); ter
Haar, An Experimental Inspection of a Multi-purpose Plant, in id. at 53 (Holland); Jeschke &
Stock, Report on the Visit to VEB Synthesewerk Schwarzheide, GDR, During the 12th Work-
shop of the Pugwash Study Group on Chemical Warfare in 1987, in id. at 62 (East Germany).
The United States and the Soviet Union have recently concluded an agreement for a two-phase
bilateral verification experiment and data exchange, leading to practice on-site inspections in
1990. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America Regarding a Bilateral
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The negotiations are now proceeding in the Conference on Disarma-
ment - with prodding from the United Nations110 - sequentially deal-
ing with outstanding issues as they appear ripe for resolution. President
Bush has repeatedly declared CW to be one of his personal priorities,"11
stating that he would like to be remembered as the president who solved
the problem of chemical weapons.112 Similarly, CW negotiations have
become a regular topic for discussions at the highest levels in United
States-Soviet Union "summit meetings," and the leaders of both coun-
tries have underscored their joint commitment to a successful conclusion
of the negotiations. 1 3 Congress, too, has endorsed the negotiations and
called for vigorous action on the problem of chemical weapons.114 It
remains to be seen whether, and when, these good intentions will be
translated into a signed agreement, but the issue of CW now appears
substantially closer to the "front burner" of arms control than it has usu-
ally been placed.
Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
Sept. 23, 1989, reprinted in 19 ARMS CONTROL TODAY No. 8, Oct. 1989, at 23-24.
110. On November 30, 1987, the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolu-
tions regarding CW. See supra note 72. Similar measures were adopted in 1988. See 1988
U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B., supra note 5, at 285-88 (G.A. Res. 43/74A and 43/74C).
111. Ironically, as Vice President, George Bush was called upon three times to cast the tie-
breaking vote in the United States Senate to permit the production of chemical weapons at the
new facility-in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. See 129 CONG. REc. 18,968 (July 13, 1983); 129 CONG.
REC. 31,350 (Nov. 8, 1983); 132 CONG. REC. S10,686 (Aug. 7, 1986). He thus cast more votes
in favor of CW than he did on any other single issue.
More r&cently, Bush used the occasion of his first address as President to the United Nations
General Assembly to underscore the need to reach agreement on a CW treaty. Neutralizing
Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
112. See Isaacs, The Bush Administration, the Senate, and the Chemical Treaty, CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. No. 3, Feb. 1989, at 1-2; Hearings on Global Spread,
supra note 3, at 6 (testimony of Frank Gaffney).
113. See, e.g., Excerpts from U.S.-Soviet Declaration: "Considerable Progress on Arms,"
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1987, at 10, col. 1; Joint Statement by the United States and the Soviet
Union on the Geneva Summit Meeting (Nov. 21, 1985), reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1985, at 866, 869
(1989).
In addition, the members of the NATO alliance have underscored their joint support for
international regulation of chemical weapons. NATO Report, Adopted by Heads of State and
Government, North Atlantic Council Meeting, Brussels, May 30, 1989, reprinted in U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, THE NATO SUMMIT: 40 YEARS OF SUCCESS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS No.
37, para. 57.
114. Isaacs, The Bush Administration, the Senate, and the Chemical Treaty, CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN No. 3, Feb. 1989, at 3; Letter by Several Senators to the
President (Oct. 5, 1988), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. S9 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989); see also New
Threat: Poison-Tipped Missiles, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1989, at 23, col. 1 (members of Congress
expressing concerns about spread of chemical weapons).
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D. The Difficulties of Chemical Weapons Arms Control
In most modem arms control efforts, the actual "ban" portions of the
agreement - the sections of the treaty that specify what arms are to be
restricted or eliminated - are relatively easy to write and to negotiate.' 15
The thorniest problems are to be found instead in the verification appara-
tus - the system for ensuring that each party is complying with its basic
obligations, and that no one is being disadvantaged by another side's sur-
reptitious cheating.1 16
In the case of chemical weapons, the verification challenge is even
more severe than usual, for three reasons. First, the weapons themselves
have special characteristics that are highly problematic for arms control
purposes. They are small (extremely lethal doses of a chemical weapon
could be fit into a suitcase)117 and mobile,118 making it difficult to moni-
tor the weaponry 1 9 and hard to be confident that the inspectors had
115. In the case of the United States-Soviet Union negotiations over strategic nuclear
arms, for example, one participant has written that "[i]t would not be an exaggeration to say
that of the seven years spent on SALT II, something like 80 to 85 percent of the effort was
expended on negotiating appropriate verification limits." GROUND ZERO, WHAT ABOUT THE
RUSSIANS - AND NUCLEAR WAR? 189 (1983).
116. No state is willing to rely solely upon blind "trust" where national security is at stake,
and the negotiations over verification provisions often produce the most important and the
most controversial aspects of the treaty. Meyer, Verification and Risk in Arms Control, 8
INT'L SECURrrY No. 4 111-26 (1984); Negotiating the Arms Treaty: Verification Issue Proved
Thorny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at A8, col. 1; see also United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, paper submitted
to Committee on Disarmament, CD/353 (Mar. 8, 1983), at 1, reprinted in 2 SIPRI/PUGWAsH
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 37 (United Kingdom believes that "[lt has
become increasingly clear that the key to agreement on a chemical weapons convention is the
elaboration of a sound verification regime which will generate confidence that States Parties
are complying with provisions of the convention").
117. The possibilities for covert storage, movement and use of lethal chemicals will vary
considerably in different scenarios. Terrorists, for example, might attempt to smuggle compact
chemical agents into a target area through low-technology means such as a suitcase. Any
militarily-significant strategies involving CW use by a government, however, would have to be
undertaken on a far larger scale, much harder to conceal. At the same time, most CW delivery
systems (with the exception of spray tanks) are dual purpose - they can be used to fire con-
ventional high explosive devices as well as CW agents, and they are far more commonly associ-
ated with the former, so their retention would not be unequivocal evidence of a CW capability.
ASPEN STRATEGY GROUP AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY GROUP, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND
WESTERN SECURITY POLICY 33-34 (1987). Even for these ubiquitous weapons, however, the
CW infrastructure (the special logistics required for handling such toxic substances) would be
a telltale sign, and military intelligence systems would therefore concentrate on efforts to de-
tect the unique support systems.
118. One should not overstate the ease of mobility of chemical weapons. Any prudent
system for handling such dangerous substances will require multiple layers and kinds of pro-
tections, and these will inevitably make the transportation and storage more cumbersome and
harder to conceal.
119. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing new generation of "binary"
chemical weapons, which could further exacerbate verification difficulties, since relatively
harmless precursor chemicals would be produced and stored separately, and the lethal mixture
would not be formed until weapon was already in flight toward its target).
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detected and followed all the existing stockpiles. 120 In addition, chemical
weapons are relatively easy and inexpensive to manufacture, not requir-
ing substantial capital, rare technology, unique facilities or many special
materials. 121 The treaty's monitoring mechanisms - declarations, in-
spections and the like - will therefore have to be unusually robust.
Second, chemical weapons, and the capacity and materials to produce
them, have already proliferated to several countries,122 meaning that any
international control measures must be adapted to the very different
political, economic and legal systems of a wide range of developed and
developing states. 123 In contrast, the nuclear weapons genie is not yet
fully out of the bottle; only a handful of countries are known to possess
nuclear devices, 124 and an overwhelming percentage of the world's nu-
clear weaponry is still commanded by just the two superpowers. 125 As
the capacity for CW spreads even further, the diversity of demands upon
the new treaty's verification system is sure to become even more
profound, while its international application must be even more
pervasive. 126
120. Most chemical warfare agents have very long shelf lives, and any covert stockpiles
could remain useable for decades. See REPORT OF THE STOESSEL COMMISSION, supra note
35, at 20.
121. Livingstone & Douglass, supra note 44, at 7-11. But see Ezz, The Chemical Industry
in the Developing Countries and the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, in 2 SIPRI/
PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 84 (clandestine production of CW
would generally be difficult to conceal, because most civilian chemical facilities - even those
manufacturing hazardous materials such as insecticides or herbicides - were not designed and
constructed to be safe enough to adapt to CW production).
122. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (extent of CW proliferation).
123. See Ezz, supra note 121, at 85-86. Previous efforts at multilateral arms control have
proven immensely frustrating, as the negotiators wrestle with the very different interests and
demands of dissimilar societies, each with its own peculiar agenda of concerns to pursue. See
Neidle, The Rise and Fall of Multilateral Arms Control: Choices for the United States, in
ARMS CONTROL: THE MULTILATERAL ALTERNATIVE 7, 17-19 (E. Luck ed. 1983). The diffi-
culties of fashioning a multilateral CW accord have given rise to the suggestion that the super-
powers might first usefully negotiate a strictly bilateral treaty, applicable only as between the
two of them, and defer the problem of meshing bilateral and multilateral issues. N. SIMS,
supra note 5, at 107.
124. See L. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 5 (1984).
125. R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1987-88 16 (12th ed.
1988); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 3, at 48; Watson, Winds of Death,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1989, at 25; Gupta, supra note 71, at I1 (comparing prospects for con-
trol of nuclear and chemical weapons).
126. The leading international inspection regime for the control of nuclear weapons is ad-
ministered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and is often considered a
rough prototype for the inspections that might occur under a chemical weapons convention,
von Baeckmann, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Some IAEA Experiences, in SIPRI
CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STUD. No. 9 175 (1988). See generally J. KEELEY,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY SAFEGUARDS: OBSERVATIONS ON LESSONS FOR VERIFY-
ING A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (Arms Control and Disarmament Division, De-
partment of External Affairs, Canada, Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers No. 1,
1989). There is, however, substantial controversy concerning the effectiveness of the IAEA
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Third, and most important, the problem of verifying a potential chemi-
cal weapons treaty is confounded by the reality of multiple applications
of the basic chemicals themselves: many of the same substances that are
used for making chemical weapons are also used in enormous quantities
for a dizzying array of important industrial purposes in the United States
and elsewhere. Moreover, the facilities employed to manufacture or to
process chemical weapons may, in many instances, be readily converted
to a variety of civilian commercial purposes - and just as easily con-
verted back to weapons production. 127 By comparison, nuclear weapons
seem relatively amenable to government or international regulation:
there are few civilian uses for plutonium, uranium or other "special nu-
clear materials"; all the nonweapon demands for fissionable matter are
controlled or highly regulated by governments; and it is relatively easy to
maintain close scrutiny over all the radioactive materials.
In contrast, none of those felicitous circumstances obtains in the case
of chemical weapons. Many of the chemicals that are currently consid-
ered most effective in weapons are also highly popular in diverse sectors
of the civilian economy, 128 with applications in pesticides, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, plastics and paints. 129 A huge number of privately
owned commercial establishments of varying size and function can pro-
duce, process, or consume chemicals of all sorts, including many that are
simultaneously useful (or potentially useful) for weapons purposes.13 0
system, with many critics identifying shortcomings in the legal rights of the inspectors and the
staffing of the agency. How Iraq Nearly Got the Bomb, Wash. Times, May 30, 1983, at 2C, col.
1; IAEA: Too Few Inspectors and Too Little Money, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 25, 1983, at
13, col. 3.
127. See Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Frank J. Gaffney).
But see CMA s Olson Unravels Intricacies of Verifying a Chemical Arms Treaty, CHEMICAL &
ENGINEERING NEWS, Apr. 24, 1989, at 7-12 (not clear that existing chemical production facil-
ities could be easily and secretly converted to weapons production and back to civilian activi-
ties); G. Burck, Chemical Weapons Production Technology (July 21, 1989) (unpublished
paper) (substantial difficulties in attempting to convert from production of ordinary civilian
chemicals into production of CW; special materials and equipment would be required, and
these could be readily identified).
128. Ethylene, for example, is perhaps the most basic industrial chemical in the world,
with an annual global production over 50 million tons. It is used to make plastics and other
common chemical products, but is also a possible precursor of mustard gas. Any attempt to
regulate, or even to monitor, production of ethylene (or of hydrogen chloride, another com-
mon dual-purpose chemical) would be daunting. Burstall, The Industrial Context of Chemical
Warfare, in 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 39.
129. Storella, supra note 39, at 16. See also I SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 5, at 19-20; Nerve Gases and Pesticides: Links Are Close, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
130. The equipment and facilities that produce chemical weapons are also themselves
dual-capable, being used, or adaptable, for a variety of legitimate civilian purposes as well as
CW production. See Thatcher & Aeppel, The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B2, col. 1
(quoting General Howard Eggleston, head of the United States Army's Space and Special
Weapons Directorate, as saying "[e]very pharmaceutical plant, every brewery, every fertilizer
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These private facilities - some estimate that the treaty will have to apply
its verification measures to over 30,000 private production facilities
around the world 31 - include many that have no connection whatso-
ever to government 132 (and hence, no particular reason to be apprised of
the development of a draft CW treaty), but whose activities may be im-
pacted in important ways. 133 They produce and consume an immense
quantity of chemicals annually, 34 and their record-keeping and inspec-
tion operations are already voluminous.13 5 The private industry that is
plant is potentially a chemical weapons plant"); see also J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at 16
("History has shown that most chemical weapons agents have been developed through discov-
eries made in private industry rather than in research-specific government laboratories."). But
see G. Burck, supra note 127 (there are substantial differences, readily observable, between
plants designed to produce ordinary commercial products and plants designed to produce mili-
tarily significant quantities of CW).
131. 135 Cong. Rec. H4390 (daily ed. July 27, 1989) (statement of Rep. Porter).
132. Originally, the United States 1984 draft CW treaty appeared to confine the inspection
provisions to only those facilities that were owned by a government. The Soviet Union pro-
tested that this limitation would create an unacceptable asymmetry: virtually all chemical
facilities in a socialist state such as the U.S.S.R. would come under its reach, while many of the
most important comparable facilities in a capitalist state like the United States would escape
controls. The American delegation then clarified the proposal, specifying that it would cover
privately held facilities, too. U.S. Clarifies Stand on Chemical Pact, Wash. Post, May 1, 1984,
at A12.
133. CW negotiators have recognized that the chemical industry has an especially impor-
tant stake in the outcome of the treaty negotiations, and have sought to enlist the participation
of nongovernmental commercial experts in molding the draft convention. See 1 SIPRI/
PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at vi.
In the United States, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has been active in
CW treaty negotiations for a decade, providing expert advice concerning the practical ramifi-
cations of the proposed verification provisions, and recently adopting an official policy of orga-
nizational support for the draft convention. See Olson, The Proposed Chemical Weapons
Convention: An Industry Perspective, CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULL. No. 2, Au-
tumn 1988, at 1; Ember, Global Chemical Experts Offer Advice for Chemical Weapons Treaty,
65 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, July 27, 1987, at 16-17. The CMA has also attempted
to consult and coordinate with its counterpart trade associations in other chemical exporting
states. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, on Export Controls over
Chemical/Biological Weapon Materials: Organizational Challenges for the 1990's, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) (photocopied set of materials) [hereinafter Glenn Hearings]. The CMA, how-
ever, is the spokesperson only for chemical producers, and may therefore not be able to repre-
sent the interests of other potentially affected industries, such as the users of pharmaceuticals
or agricultural products. See also Dickson, supra note 4, at 23 (leading international associa-
tion of chemical producers, the Brussels-based European Confederation of Chemical Industry
Associations (CEFIC), has recently declared that current draft convention would be "unac-
ceptable" due to intrusiveness of contemplated inspection regime).
134. The United States chemical and allied industry shipped $239.7 billion worth of mater-
ials in 1988, of which 13.5% were exported, generating a trade surplus of $12 billion for the
United States. Glenn Hearings, supra note 133, at 3 (testimony of Max Turnipseed); Hearings
on Proliferation, supra note 4 (statement of Joan McEntee, at 3).
One source has estimated that of more than six million known chemicals, 60,000-70,000 are
in common use, and 500-1,000 new chemicals come onto the market each year. Vojvodic &
Minic, Civil Industry and Permitted Activities in Production of Lethal and Other Harmful
Chemicals, in 2 SIPRI/PuGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 203.
135. W. Carpenter, Implementing Global Chemical Weapons Disarmament: Chemical In-
dustry Perspective (remarks to American Association for the Advancement of Science, Jan.
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potentially relevant to the verification provisions and other constraints of
a CW treaty, in short, is huge and diverse,136 dwarfing any government's
own participation in chemical production and far outstripping the mag-
nitude of any prior arms control monitoring structures. 137
Not only is this commercial chemical operation economically large
and diverse, it is also subject to rapid technological change.138 Innova-
tion is vitally important to the chemical community, with new products
and new processes introduced regularly; the unpredictability of the fu-
ture directions of these enterprises is an important characteristic,
strongly tied to their market competitiveness. 139 Also related is the im-
portance of secrecy: there is a great perceived need to protect novel for-
mulas and processes. 14° Preservation of trade secrets is a high priority
16, 1989) [hereinafter Carpenter, Implementing Disarmament]. In the United States and
many other countries, each firm in the chemical industry is required to file a huge quantity of
different types of reports, regarding production, toxicity, safety, pollution and the like. Much
of this information includes closely guarded industrial secrets concerning production processes
and formulae. The quantity of information and the format of the reporting vary dramatically
from country to country. 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at
6-10; Akiyama, Regulatory Procedures on Chemicals in the Japanese Chemical Industry, in 2
SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 1-9 (describing regulatory
scheme in Japan); Carpenter, Government Regulation of Chemical Manufacturing in the USA
as a Basis for Surveillance of Compliance with the Projected Chemical Weapons Convention, in
2 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 11-32 (describing govern-
ment controls applicable to one typical American chemical plant) [hereinafter Carpenter, Gov-
ernment Regulation]. In addition, the chemical industry in most states is already subject to a
variety of inspection programs. 1 SIPRI/PuGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note
5, at 12; Carpenter, Implementing Disarmament, supra.
136. Chemical manufacturing plants account for 10 per cent of the total value added in
United States manufacturing. B. Gelb, U.S. Chemicals Manufacturing: Status, Issues, and
Prospects (Congressional Research Service Report 88-387 E, May 26, 1988), at 1. Chemical
producers are distributed all across the United States, with no state having fewer than 25
facilities. Id. 'at 2.
137. In the case of the INF Treaty, for example - which has incorporated by far the most
ambitious arms control verification system implemented to date - the United States and So-
viet Union are conducting hundreds of on-site inspections inside each other's territory. Most
of these, however, take place at government-owned or government-operated facilities, where
the procedural and practical problems are muted. Connolly, Warrantless On-Site Inspections
for Arms Control Verification: Are They Constitutional?, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 179 (1987). In
the one instance of intense, long-duration inspection of a private facility (at the Hercules Plant
at Magna, Utah), the task of arranging the logistics for enabling and sustaining the inspections
has proven laborious and expensive. Emerson, Getting Ready for Soviet Spies, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 27, 1988, at 24-25; The Russians Are Coming to Inspect, and Missile Maker
Is Up in Arms, Wash. Post, June 1, 1988, at A29, col. 1.
138. See Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3 (statement of Brad Roberts, at 38) (sum-
marizing multiple effects of technological change on CW).
139. Burstall, supra note 128, at 36 (chemical industry is research-intensive, with some
sectors devoting 10% or more of sales revenue to research into new products).
140. 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 30; Carpenter,
Government Regulation, supra note 135, at 22-23. Many segments of the chemical industry (at
least in the market economies) jealously guard both the intellectual property of their produc-
tion processes and the commercial secrecy of customer lists and the like, which arms control
inspectors might seek. 1 SIPRI/PUGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 30;
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 15:1, 1990
for the chemical industry, and many private firms are both extremely
hostile to outside snooping and suspicious of governmental abilities to
preserve their vital commercial confidences from the prying of
competitors. 141
Finally, many participants in the civil chemical industry are transna-
tional in their activities, providing another important new wrinkle that
arms control has not previously had to confront. An American-incorpo-
rated business may own a chemical factory operating inside country X; it
may also own a subsidiary incorporated in country Y which itself oper-
ates some type of chemical-related facility inside Y or inside country
Z142 Conversely, a foreign corporation may engage in chemical activi-
ties inside the United States, either directly or via an American-incorpo-
rated affiliate or subsidiary.1 43 Chemicals (raw materials or processed
goods) readily flow internationally, and the resulting proceeds or profits
also cross boundaries. Control (legal or financial, de facto or de jure)
Hoffmann, Some Aspects of Verification from the Viewpoint of the Chemical Industry of the
FederalRepublic of Germany, in 2 SIPRI/PDGWASH CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note
74, at 97-104 (a precondition for the control measures of a CW treaty must be some mecha-
nism for ensuring that restrictions do not impede technological progress or compromise the
competitiveness of industry by reducing the protection for trade secrets).
141. See The Spy in the Ointment for Negotiators, NEw SCIENTIST, Jan. 14, 1989, at 27
(importance of avoiding industrial espionage was underlined by Dutch expert, saying, "[o]ne
chemicals company in the US said that it was not too bothered with Soviet inspections, but
told us to please keep the Germans and the Japanese away").
For a discussion of a noteworthy example of a chemical company devoting substantial re-
sources to security measures designed to thwart industial espionage, see Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364-65 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd., 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1984), aff'd., 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
142. See Ezz, supra note 121, at 88-89 (danger of circumventing CW treaty, where mul-
tinational chemical enterprise could use its plant inside developing country for purpose of
clandestine production of CW for benefit of third party); India Seen as Key on ChemicalArms,
N.Y. Times, July 10, 1989, at Al, col. 3 (chemical companies in India have sold tons of materi-
als, potentially useful for CW, to Iran, Iraq and Egypt.)
The chemical industry in most developing states is relatively small, and most often is domi-
nated by foreign corporations. It typically concentrates on the production of a narrow range
of specialty products, using imported technology and equipment. I SIPRI/PUGWASH CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 9; Ezz, supra note 121, at 85-87. The international
chemical market is dominated by a small number of very large firms, based in France, West
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Burstall, supra
note 128, at 37.
143. Foreign-owned companies account for an estimated 30 percent of total United States
chemical shipments and 40 percent of the industry's American employment. Gelb, supra note
136, at 6-7.
As with much of the rest of international trade, the cross-border traffic in chemicals has
become increasingly complex, with financial intermediaries and deal-making firms facilitating
the trading - making it difficult for individual nations to police the activities. See Thatcher &
Aeppel, The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B12, col. 4.
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over the activities of the corporation's various far-flung entities may be
concentrated or internationally diffuse. 144
Overall, the challenge for CW arms control - unique in the sector of
national security policy - will be to develop a system for the effective
regulation of the weapons capability of the chemical industry in a fashion
that does not unduly inhibit the commercial operations of this important,
dynamic segment of the international economy. A method must be de-
vised for accomodating not only the demands for intrusive government
inspection for arms control verification but also the requirements of free-
dom and confidentiality for the chemical and allied industry. 145
III. The Law of Extraterritoriality
Modern international law has so far been successful in developing only
an incomplete mechanism for understanding the competing claims of au-
thority to control activities that transcend national boundaries.1 46 This
section discusses three aspects of the law of extraterritoriality: first, the
different types of jurisdiction which countries might assert in relation to
chemical weapons arms control; second, the alternative bases that have
become recognized as being at least partially legitimate for claiming such
jurisdiction; and third, the largely inchoate international law applicable
to reconciling conflicts of asserted jurisdiction.
144. In most instances, the chemical companies may not be aware that their products
(equipment, technology, chemicals) are being diverted by purchasing countries into weapons
purposes; but in other instances, the chemical manufacturers are a knowing and deliberate part
of the problem. See Chemical Weapons Proliferation Spurred by Business, Panel Says, Wash.
Times, May 10, 1985, at A 4, col. 1.
145. This article concentrates on the overseas operations of the private chemical industry.
Any governmental chemical-related facilities that operate inside foreign states (e.g., chemical
weapons storage depots) would ordinarily be covered by basing agreements or other govern-
ment-to-government understandings that spell out the states' respective rights and responsibili-
ties with respect to proceedings such as the verification arrangements of a CW treaty. If
additional inspection rights were necessary in order to implement a new inspection regime,
additional treaties could be negotiated, as was accomplished in the context of the INF treaty,
which provided for inspections inside European states that housed American and Soviet nu-
clear forces. Agreement Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty of December 8, 1987
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-
range Missiles, Dec. 11, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 58 (1988).
146. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 12, at viii (extraterritoriality is low-
visibility issue, tending to be dealt with on ad hoc basis when crises arise); see also K. Dam,
Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, address to American Society of International
Law, (Apr. 15, 1983), reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1983, at 48 (extraterritoriality is
ancient problem, antedating nation-state); Wallace, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 15 LAW &
POL. INT'L Bus. 1099 (1983) (international law is thin in dealing with extraterritoriality).
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A. Types of Jurisdiction
International law has traditionally differentiated two types of state ju-
risdiction: 147 jurisdiction to prescribe (that is, to create substantive rules
of law applicable to particular persons or actions) 148 and jurisdiction to
enforce (that is, to apply those substantive rules to actual cases or
circumstances). 149
The two types of jurisdiction frequently overlap, and a state may law-
fully invoke jurisdiction to enforce its law only when it also possesses
valid jurisdiction to prescribe the standard in question. That is, if the
state has no power to make a rule of law to govern a particular situation,
then it can have no power to apply that rule.150 There are numerous
types of circumstances in which the two types of jurisdiction may di-
verge, and the framers of a CW convention will have to consider both
categories. Indeed, the classic international confrontations regarding the
transnational application of various types of national "longarm" laws or
choice-of-law rules often concern precisely this problem of meshing com-
peting states' claims to prescribe and to enforce conflicting laws. 151
147. R STATEMENT (THIRD), Introductory Note, Part IV, at 230; Note, Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Under the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12
FORD. INT'L L.J. 127, 129-30 (1988). The new Restatement itself, however, departs from this
tradition, by identifying three separate categories of jurisdiction: to prescribe, to adjudicate,
and to enforce. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) at 231. All three of these "aspects of jurisdiction"
concern types of limitations upon a state's lawful authority to subject foreign persons or inter-
ests to its own control. Id. § 401 comment a.
148. Jurisdiction to prescribe involves the rule-making function of a state, and is most
closely associated with the operation of a legislature; it has sometimes, therefore, been referred
to as "legislative jurisdiction." Many of the rules that might have transnational reach, how-
ever, are propounded by executive or administrative agencies, and the broader term "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe" is therefore preferable. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) at 230.
149. The concept of "jurisdiction to enforce" here includes the competence of both judicial
and executive organs; it addresses the total legal authority of a state to extend its coercive
powers in order to apply its rules to transnational individuals and events. Id. at 231.
150. Id § 431; United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1978) (no jurisdiction to
enforce unless also jurisdiction to prescribe). State X may, however, voluntarily cooperate in
state Y's enforcement processes, assisting Y's judicial or executive officials in the transnational
assertion of their proceedings, even where X would not have any jurisdiction itself to directly
regulate the persons and activities in question. Numerous international agreements have been
effectuated to promote this type of collaboration. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Introductory Note,
Part IV, cI. 7, at 526.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 206-28; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) at 236.
A "1ongarm" statute essentially concerns the assertion of jurisdiction to adjudicate; it is here
considered to be one aspect of jurisdiction to enforce.
Within any particular state, conflicts between domestic and international law will be re-
solved according to local supremacy provisions, but the international system will still recog-
nize the priority of the international rules. See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972) (for purposes of United States jurisprudence,
international law is on par with ordinary legislation; if Congress intended to assert United
States jurisdiction in situation where international law did not permit, United States court
would be obligated to apply statute and violate international law norm); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Long Arms and Chemical Arms
B. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Underlying the two "types" of jurisdiction are several more-or-less
recognized "bases" upon which a state may rest its assertion of authority.
Six of these may be relevant to a state's power to prescribe standards
implementing a future chemical weapons convention. 152
1. Territoriality
The territorial basis of jurisdiction is the most widely utilized and
least-problematic source of prescriptive rules.1 53 Under it, a state is ac-
corded wide latitude to prescribe rules applicable to persons and property
within its national borders' 54 and to transactions and other activities oc-
curring there.155 A chemical plant operating inside state X, for example
- regardless of who owns the facility, where it sells its products, etc. -
is ordinarily amenable to X's jurisdiction to prescribe, and X may un-
questionably declare a wide range of controlling standards regarding pro-
duction, safety, taxation, inspections, and the like.
2. Nationality
International law also generally recognizes an overriding right of a
state to prescribe rules for its nationals, even while they are outside its
sovereign territory.156 Both real and juridical persons may be governed
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1177-78 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (inquiry for
court is simply whether Congress intended to apply United States law extraterritorially, not
whether it was wise policy or consistent with international law to do so).
152. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 401-88; M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 241-49 (1988); Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United
States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 146, 153-61 (1957). The leading interna-
tional law case regarding assertion ofjurisdiction supports the proposition that a state need not
identify some source of lawful "permission" to exercise jurisdiction; rather, the presumption is
that an assertion of jurisdiction is valid unless there is some rule of law that forbids it. The S.S.
Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7, 1927).
153. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 935 (D.C. Cir.
1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment c.
154. Territorial jurisdiction to prescribe applies even to the activities of a foreign state
government undertaken within the territory of the host state. The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity will often prohibit the subsequent assertion of jurisdiction to adjudicate or to enforce, but
the power to prescribe rules is not so limited. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 461.
155. Although the territoriality principle is recognized as an exceptionally strong basis of
jurisdiction to prescribe, it is nonetheless somewhat amorphous at its fringes (e.g., under what
circumstances may a corporation or a transaction be said to be present within the national
territority?) and may not be applicable in all situations (e.g., if some other state has an even
stronger claim to jurisdiction). Id. § 402 comment c.
156. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932) (United States retains author-
ity over its citizen even when he or she resides abroad); United States v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (statute proscribing ownership of gold was
intended to have extraterritorial effect, covering American nationals abroad); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 402(2). Many states, including the United States, do not assert jurisdiction to pre-
scribe based on nationality to the fullest extent that international law might allow. For exam-
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in this way, 157 and the United States has with some frequency asserted
that a foreign-incorporated subsidiary is amenable to American jurisdic-
tion where it is "owned or controlled" by a United States national.1 58
Even more controversial has been the United States position that goods
and technical data, too, may in some circumstances have a "nationality"
that renders them susceptible to this basis of jurisdiction - a contention
that other states have resolutely resisted.15 9 In the case of a CW treaty,
the nationality principle means that state X would usually be deemed to
possess jurisdiction to prescribe rules applicable to all persons with X
nationality, including chemical corporations organized under the laws of
state X, even while they were living and operating abroad.
3. Effects
Closely related to the territoriality principle is another basis of juris-
diction that applies to activities undertaken outside the national ter-
ritority of state X, but having or intended to have a sufficiently
substantial effect inside the territory. 16° Again, this is a well-recognized,
ple, in the domestic fields of marriage, divorce, and wills, states increasingly look to the state of
the individual's domicile, rather than to the state of nationality. Id. § 402 comment e and
reporter's note 1.
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment e. Ordinarily, a corporation is deemed to be
a national of the state in which it is incorporated, even if its headquarters, stockholders, and
operations are elsewhere. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v.
Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3; Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Ameri-
can-incorporated firm that was wholly-owned subsidiary of Japanese corporation considered
United States, not Japanese, national).
158. See Marcuss & Richard, supra note 12, at 445 (United States has not developed con-
sistent theory about nationality of foreign corporation owned or controlled by United States
nationals); Kincannon, The Dresser Case: One Step Too Far, 5 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
191, 210 (1984) (describing competing theories upon which nationality of a corporation is
based); Merciai, The Euro-Siberian Gas Pipeline Dispute - A Compelling Case for the Adoption
of Jurisdictional Codes of Conduct, 8 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1, 28-30 (1984) (difficulty of
ascribing nationality to multinational corporations).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment c; Marcuss & Mathias, U.S. Foreign Policy
Export Controls: Do They Pass Muster Under International Law?, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 1, 21
(1984); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under In-
ternational and American Law, 81 MicH. L. REV. 1308, 1324 (1983). International law has
not generally recognized any nationality for goods or technology, apart from special categories
such as ships, aircraft, or historical relies. Griffin & Calabrese, Coping with Extraterritoriality
Disputes, 22 J. WORLD TRADE No. 3 at 5, 18-19 (1988). Sometimes these claims over goods
have been premised on the territoriality basis, arguing that the production of the goods inside
state X should afford X a continuing jurisdiction to prescribe rules concerning the goods even
after they leave that state. Id. at 19.
160. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 623 (1926) (smugglers who remained outside
territory of United States were nonetheless subject to criminal prosecution due to intended
effects inside United States); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1986)
(international law permitted, and Congress intended, drug smuggling legislation to cover activ-
ity undertaken outside United States as part of conspiracy to import contraband); In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (United States court may exercise
jurisdiction over alleged conspiracy among 20 domestic and 9 foreign firms to fix worldwide
and United States prices for uranium); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(l)(c). But see Montreal
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although not invariably-dominant, basis of jurisdiction, and it allows a
state to prescribe rules to cover activities in which it has a major interest
even when its own national borders are not directly traversed.161 The
potential overbreadth of an expansive reading of such effects, however,
has made this particular basis of jurisdiction more controversial than the
first two described above. 162 An illustration of the effects principle in the
CW context could be state X's ability to prescribe rules applicable to a
facility located inside state Y and owned by nationals of state Y, where
the facility regularly used input products bought from suppliers inside X
or sold output products to customers inside X.
4. Protective
A special version of the effects principle applies to certain activities
which are undertaken outside a state, by non-nationals, but which
threaten the security of the state or the operation of its governmental
functions. 163 International law acknowledges a state's right to protect its
Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981) (United States court has no
jurisdiction over antitrust suit brought by Canadian corporation alleging conspiracy by Cana-
dian subsidiaries of American firm to refuse to sell Canadian potash for delivery in Canada,
where effect on United States commerce was only speculative and insubstantial); National
Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Association, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (United States court
lacks jurisdiction over antitrust claim where no linkage was shown between activities in Can-
ada and adverse market conditions in United States).
The effects principle is sometimes considered to be merely a special aspect of the territorial
principle (in that territoriality may embrace the "object" of an action as well as the "subject"
or person who performed it), Wallace, supra note 146, at 1102, but the better view now is to
evaluate it as a distinct category. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment d.
161. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (United States law would not apply to injury
sustained by Danish national on board Danish ship in Cuban waters, where only connection
to United States was fact that seaman had signed on board ship in New York); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (state may impose liability for con-
duct outside its borders that has consequences inside); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon),
S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984) (United States
court has jurisdiction over securities transactions conducted between aliens outside United
States, when American securities market was involved); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 com-
ment d.
162. See Jennings, supra note 152, at 159-61; Note, supra note 159, at 1327; Note, supra
note 147, at 138-41 (noting historical debate over meaning and impact of effects doctrine). See
also Dam, supra note 146, at 49 (effects doctrine is accepted by West Germany and others, not
by United Kingdom); Joelson, International Antitrust: Problems and Defenses, 15 LAW &
POL. INT'L Bus. 1121, 1122 (1983).
The effects doctrine may be a source of less controversy in the future, as its application is
increasingly accepted by Europeans and others. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102 comment
d and reporters' note 2; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 104-05 (3d. ed. 1988) (illustrating the application of the
effects doctrine in the national courts of several states); Wallace, supra note 146, at 1103
(describing British application of effects doctrine to control overseas businesses during the
Falklands war).
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402(3); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968) (protective principle allowed United States to prosecute Ca-
nadian national for false statements made inside Canada in visa application to United States
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own integrity, but is wary of exiending this jurisdictional reach too far, as
it might be expansively asserted to justify extravagant claims of national
powers. 164 In the CW context, state X may be able to assert jurisdiction
to prescribe over acts performed inside state Y by nationals of state Y,
where the actions would lead to a chemical war, disrupt X's CW defenses
or - more controversially - impair X's foreign policy goals or treaty
relationships.
5. Passive Personality
Also related to the effects principle is international law's emerging rec-
ognition of a state's authority to prescribe rules governing criminal activ-
ity that victimizes its nationals. 165 This is the least-established basis of
jurisdiction,166 but it has arguably gained more recognition recently as a
partial response to the threat of international terrorism. 167 For CW pur-
poses, it might be applied to afford jurisdiction to state X in a situation
where a national of state X was injured by chemicals, even when the
injury was inflicted by nationals of state Y within Y's own territory.
consul); Marc Rich & Co. A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1215 (1983) (United States has broad jurisdiction to prevent evasion of its internal revenue
laws); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961)
(statute prohibiting fraud in misuse of visas was intended to have extraterritorial effect, reach-
ing actions committed by aliens outside United States in connection with attempted entry into
United States); United States v. Zehe, 601 F. Supp. 196 (D. Mass. 1985) (United States could
prosecute East German citizen for espionage for acts done entirely outside the United States).
164. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 12, at 445; Jennings, supra note 152, at 155. The
protective principle ordinarily applies only to activities that are generally recognized as crimes,
such as the counterfeiting of currency, perjury before immigration officials, or espionage; it
does not authorize laws limiting political expression. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment
f, Note, supra note 159, at 1330; Kincannon, supra note 158, at 210.
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comment g.
166. Jennings, supra note 152, at 155. In the 1887 Cutting Case, the United States asserted
that Mexico could not try an American national for libel merely because the victim was a
Mexican citizen, where the allegedly defamatory material was circulated only inside the
United States. The Secretary of State wrote a letter asserting that the passive personality prin-
ciple, "[t]hough formerly asserted by a number of minor states ... has now been generally
abandoned, and may be regarded as almost obsolete." J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH,
supra note 162, at 90-93.
167. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 reporters' note 3. The most recent, celebrated ap-
plication of this principle involved the trial of Fawaz Yunis, who was convicted of hijacking a
Royal Jordanian airliner from Beirut in 1985. Even though the crime occurred entirely
outside the United States, Yunis was tried in Washington, D.C. pursuant to a 1984 statute
making it a federal offense for anyone to hijack a plane carrying an American citizen. U.S. v.
Yunis, 867 F.2d 619 (D.C.Cir. 1989); Schuetz, Apprehending Terrorists Overseas Under United
States and International Law: A Case Study of the Fawaz Yunis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J.
499 (1988). See also Senate Votes Death Penalty for Overseas Terrorists, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1989, at A13, col. 3 (new legislation relating to terrorist actions inflicted upon American na-
tionals overseas).
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6. Universality
Finally, international law also recognizes the right of a state to pre-
scribe rules applicable to certain criminal acts that are so heinous as to
merit universal condemnation, regardless of where, by whom, and
against whom they are committed. 168 Piracy, for example, and the slave
trade, have long been recognized as being anathema to the code of con-
duct of civilized states, and this category of actions is expanding to per-
mit all states to outlaw hijackings, genocide, war crimes and terrorism,
wherever and against whomever they occur.1 69 As noted, there has been
a controversy regarding whether CW use is a per se violation of interna-
tional law;170 a future convention might affect this status, as well as the
legality of mere possession of CW stockpiles, perhaps giving state X the
authority to prescribe rules outlawing CW even inside state y.171
C. Bases of Jurisdiction to Enforce
As a general matter, jurisdiction to enforce national rules is much
more closely linked to the territoriality principle than is jurisdiction to
prescribe. 172 That is, a state is, in a number of circumstances, relatively
free to declare conduct to be illegal (or to subject it to taxation or other
forms of regulation), even when the actors in question are far from its
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404.
169. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986) (universal jurisdiction for war crimes authorizes Israel to try Nazi prison guard
for offenses committed before creation of state of Israel, so extradition from United States was
authorized); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 comment a; see also Filartiga v.-Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture is universally condemned as violation of international law
and United States court may assert jurisdiction even in case where alleged torture was commit-
ted by Paraguayan official against Paraguayan national inside Paraguay).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
171. The conclusion of a new CW treaty, as an authoritative action undertaken by many of
the leading countries of the world, will make a direct contribution to the history of "state
practice," an essential element in the evolution of customary international law. In this way,
the treaty could provide law, not only for its parties, but even for non-parties who will be
caught up in the emergence of a new, binding international norm against CW. See A.
D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-66 (1971) [hereinafter
A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM]; D'Amato, Custom and Treaty. A Response to Pro-
fessor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988) [hereinafter D'Amato, Custom
and Treaty].
172. Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("unlike a state's prescriptive jurisdiction, which is not
strictly limited by territorial boundaries, enforcement jurisdiction by and large continues to be
strictly territorial."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), pt. IV, ch. 3, at 320; see also id. pt. IV, ch. 2, at
304.
Jurisdiction to enforce is also the function that generates the sharpest international confron-
tations over authority. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J.
OF COMP. L. 579 (1983) [hereinafter Maier, Interest Balancing]. Enforcement generally im-
plies some form of coercion, and each state is reluctant to allow other states to exercise in-
dependent sovereign powers of coercion on its territory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 431-33
introductory note.
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shores. But to enforce those rules - to collect the money, enjoin the
behavior, or put the miscreant behind bars - official actions may ordina-
rily be undertaken only inside the sovereign's own territory. 173
State X, therefore, may declare it a crime for its nationals to engage in
a particular act, irrespective of where they are at the time of commission,
and this may well be a valid exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe based on
nationality of the actor. But to enforce the rule, state X is not customa-
rily privileged to dispatch its police or army into the territory of state Y,
apprehend the X nationals in question, and drag them back to court in-
side X. That type of law enforcement function - and most other en-
forcement and adjudication operations as well - may be performed
inside Y only by Y's officials (or through Y's cooperation and ac-
quiesence); X has little or no extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce its
own, or any other, national rules inside Y.174
There are numerous situations, therefore, where - in the absence of a
treaty175 - international law makes X's extraterritorial jurisdiction to
prescribe practically a worthless exercise: X is free to declare the actions
to be illegal, but until it can properly get its official hands on the wrong-
doers, it cannot effectively enforce the declaration. Further, if state Y is
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 432 comment b; id. ch. 7, at 526. In some instances, law
enforcement officers of one state who, in good faith, pursue their functions into the territory of
another state, have been prosecuted for violations of the local state's laws. See id. § 432 re-
porters' note 1 (collecting accounts of several such incidents).
Recently, the United States Department of Justice advised the FBI that under some circum-
stances it would be legitimate for American law enforcement officials to exercise their author-
ity inside the territory of foreign states, arresting individuals suspected of violating American
law and bringing them into the United States against their will for trial. U.S. Cites Right to
Seize Fugitives Abroad, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1989, at A6, col. 4. Many other authorities
criticized this policy change. FBI Told It Can Seize Fugitives Abroad, Wash. Post, Oct. 14,
1989, at A15, col. 1. Iran also claimed the legal power to arrest, anywhere in the world and
without the approval of the local authorities, anyone accused of violating Iranian law. Iranian
Newspaper Wants Capt. Rogers Held, Tried, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at B2, col. 1.
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 433. Recently, however, the Department of Justice has
altered its position on the legality of certain international enforcement actions, U.S. Cites Right
to Seize Fugitives Abroad, N.Y. Times, supra note 173, and future actions in this area are
unclear.
175. States may agree to permit extraordinary enforcement operations that would nor-
mally be incompatible with territorial sovereignty. Great Britain, for example, has allowed the
United States to stop, board, search and seize certain privately-owned British flag vessels on
the high seas in order to interdict drug traffic, although this type of interference with naviga-
tion would otherwise be a violation of international law. United Kingdom: Letters to U.S.
Concerning Measures to Suppress the Unlawful Importation of Narcotic Drugs into the United
States, 21 I.L.M. 439 (1982). Similarly, under "status of forces" agreements, other states have
allowed the United States to adjudicate many crimes involving American armed services per-
sonnel stationed abroad, using American military courts-martial, rather than local civilian
tribunals. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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unwilling to assist in the apprehension of the individuals within Y's terri-
tory, there is little that X can do.176
D. Resolving Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Obviously, the six bases of jurisdiction to prescribe can overlap in com-
plex ways. A particular transaction or event could involve nationals of
state X, who are taking some action while inside state Y, having an effect
inside state Z, and so forth; the real life of international transactions in
the chemical industry is even more convoluted than the hypotheticals
that law school teachers construct for final examinations.
In many instances, the potential conflict is avoided: perhaps state X
(which could assert jurisdiction based on the nationality principle) elects
for reasons of its own not to do so in this type of situation177; perhaps
state Y (which has territorial jurisdiction) proclaims a rule of law that is
substantially identical to that of state Z, so that the activity can be car-
ried out in harmony with the prescriptions of all concerned govern-
ments178; perhaps the states will voluntarily cooperate with each other to
achieve common purposes.' 79 But the states may not accommodate each
other in this way. They may pass conflicting rules, subjecting interna-
176. Some sanctions, however, may be applicable even without obtaining the cooperation
of state Y. State X might decide, for example, to do no further business with the individual
who has escaped its jurisdiction to enforce, and could instruct its nationals to similarly refrain.
Other rights, such as the ability to transfer assets or to obtain a permit to engage in a particular
business, may also be suspended. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 431 comment c; Griffin &
Calabrese, supra note 159, at 10-11, 22-23 (discussing cases in which United States has im-
posed sanctions on firms for violating export restrictions); Calcutta East Coast of India and
East Pakistan/USA Conference v. Federal Maritime Commission, 399 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (foreign corporations' failure to comply with valid subpoena for foreign-held documents
did not justify Federal Maritime Commission's cancellation of tariff agreement).
177. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1985) (presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States statutes); United States v. Mitchell, 553
F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (in absence of any evidence that Congress intended Marine Mammal
Protection Act to reach as far as possible, court would adopt the presumption that it was not
to be applicable to activities inside other states' territorial waters).
178. The concept of international "comity" - more than a purely voluntary act, but less
than binding law - has sometimes played a key role in resolving (or avoiding) conflicts overjurisdiction. States customarily attempt to avoid interference with each other, aligning their
affairs so as to minimize unnecessary extraterritoriality problems. Maier, Extraterritorial Ju-
risdiction at a Crossroads, supra note 12, at 281-85; Note, Compelling Production of Documents
in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50
FORD. L. REv. 877, 885-86 (1982). In the same vein, former United States Deputy Secretary
of State Kenneth Dam has suggested that the issue of extraterritoriality lies at the "intersection
of law and diplomacy." Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restatement, 15
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1147 (1983).
179. See Maier, Interest Balancing, supra note 172, at 586-87 (reporting examples of
United States-Swiss cooperation in securities investigations).
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tional actors to irreconcilable demands, and may through inadvertance
or design erect a network of hopelessly inconsistent prescriptions.180
International law has only barely begun to articulate rules applicable
to the resolution of these jurisdictional conflicts. There is no general
treaty that establishes a hierarchy among competing claims,181 there has
been no definitive exposition by the International Court of Justice, 182 and
there is no other international adjudication mechanism that can authori-
tatively resolve the disputes. The new Restatement declares that a bal-
ancing must be undertaken, weighing all the interests of all the involved
states, to determine whether it is "reasonable" for state X to prescribe a
rule with respect to a particular situation.18 3 Under this doctrine, even if
one of the six bases of jurisdiction is present, a state may still not pre-
scribe rules if the greater interest of another state makes it unreasonable
to do so.'8 4 The various factors linking the events to each of the contend-
ing states are to be examined, and all states with lesser interests should
defer to the state having the greatest stake in the outcome.18 5
Furthermore, the Restatement asserts that the defense of "foreign state
compulsion" may be available to help resolve conflicting commands of
asserted jurisdiction to prescribe.'8 6 Where two sovereigns both have a
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 comment e; A. LOWE, supra note 12. In addition,
even where states' laws appear identical as written, they may be applied very differently, and
political leaders in the various countries may, or may not, elect to cooperate in aligning their
national practices. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 404 commment a; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER
& N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 119 (inability of states to conclude generally acceptable defini-
tion of "terrorism" has impeded international efforts to cooperate in opposing and punishing
it).
181. There have been bilateral agreements that attempt to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction
between particular pairs of states. See A. LOWE, supra note 12. There have also been efforts
to develop a Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, to deal
with some aspects of competing extraterritorial claims, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414 re-
porters' note 2, as well as to negotiate comparable international accords regulating the produc-
tion of records and documents, id. ch. 7, introductory note, at 527.
182. Merciai, supra note 158, at 19.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403; see also Maier, Interest Balancing, supra note 172.
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(1). See Asahi Metal Ind. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S.
102, 114-16 (1987) (interests of foreign and of host state must be examined, with careful in-
quiry into reasonableness of assertion of jurisdiction in particular case); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977) (in considering extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States antitrust law, court must weigh interests of affected nations); Mannington
Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (United States court should consider
foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations on judicial power in determining whether to
exercise jurisdiction); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980)
(court should first ask whether it has jurisdiction, then - considering the interests of other
states - also ask whether that jurisdiction should be exercised); Shenefield, Extraterritoriality
in Antitrust, 15 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 1109 (1983).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403(2)(3). The Restatement directs attention to "the
center of gravity of a situation." Id. ch. 1, subch. a, introductory note, at 237.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441.
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stake in a transaction or event, the territorial state should generally pre-
vail, and no state is supposed to require actions that are prohibited under
the laws of the state where the action would have to be carried out.18 7
An individual caught between the diametrically opposing mandates of
unreconciled states, therefore, should not have to elect, without legal gui-
dance, which to offend. 18 Where the conflict is not so direct, however,
(as where a state attempts to prohibit an act that would be legal - but
would not be required - under the law of some other state where the act
would be performed) the doctrine of foreign state compulsion is inappli-
cable, and the extraterritorial mandate may be effected.18 9 Similarly,
where the private party has in bad faith instigated the state conflict, by
deliberately moving documents or activities abroad and courting a for-
eign state's xenophobic protection, the doctrine does not apply. 190
187. Id. at comments a and b; Pikna, The Uranium Cartel Saga - Yellowcake and Act of
State: What Will Be Their Eventual Fate? 12 CASE W. REs. L OF INT'L L. 591, 618-20 (1980)
(origins and current status of doctrine). The defense of foreign state compulsion would be
available to a person caught by conflicting orders, where the two involved states both back up
their prescriptions with substantial civil or criminal penalties, but not where one of the states
merely "approved" or "participated in" the challenged activity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 441 comment c, reporters' note 4. The doctrine is available regarding both matters of proce-
dure (such as conflicting national orders regarding the production of litigation documents) and
matters of substance (such as inconsistent national antitrust laws)., Pickna, supra at 618-31.
188. The individual may well ultimately have to pick one state's law to obey and the other
state's law to violate, but the concept of foreign state compulsion may nonetheless be available
to help mitigate punishment or damages. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 reporters' note 1;
Note, Extraterritorial Discovery. An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1320,
1340 (1983); see also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Urinium Contracts Litigation, 563
F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (sanctions not appropriate where corporation had made diligent
effort to produce documents physically held inside Canada, where Canadian government as-
serted strong interest in restricting access); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d
897 (2d Cir. 1968) (United States bank required under subpoena to produce documents held at
its branch in Germany, even when doing so would subject it to civil penalties under German
bank secrecy law); Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress Report
on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 319-26 (1982) (analyzing compul-
sion applied in uranium antitrust litigation).
189. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (where
antitrust activities involved participation of foreign government, private parties were still liable
for their own discretionary acts in pursuit of conspiracy); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927) (fact that alleged conspiracy to restrain trade was aided by discriminatory
legislation in foreign country does not preclude punishment by United States); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (court may exercise jurisdiction over for-
eign firms where foreign governments were sympathetic to their anticompetitive actions, but
did not mandate them); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979)
(defense of foreign state compulsion inapplicable where host state permits, but does not re-
quire, defendant's actions).
190. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208-09 (1958); General Atomic Co. v.
Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (imposing sanctions on plaintiff who had
deliberately housed relevant documents in Canada, where they would be immune from discov-
ery under Canadian security regulations).
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Other commentators, including the Legal Adviser of the United States
Department of State,191 have opined that the Restatement's conclusions
- while perhaps a desirable outcome for international order - are
rather ahead of the current state of international law on point. That is,
while this balancing of competing states' relative interests might be a
beneficial and plausible activity, it is not yet an approach that is required
by international law. 192 And American courts have not yet developed a
fully consistent approach to controversies of extraterritoriality, with the
jurisprudence in the field remaining controversial and somewhat
muddled.193
Of special relevance to the problem of the production of chemicals and
chemical weapons are the standards applicable to the extraterritorial
governance of multinational corporations. 194 The Restatement suggests
relatively greater powers for the state of incorporation to regulate the
foreign activities of "branches" of the entity,195 but relatively less ability
to prescribe conduct for foreign-incorporated "subsidiaries,"' 196 even if
they are wholly owned and controlled by the parent. 97 Only in ex-
191. Robinson, supra note 178, at 1152. See also Dam, supra note 146 (Deputy Secretary
of State concludes that Restatement's balancing approach, while not required by international
law, is generally good practice).
192. M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (1988) (Restatement is
unsupported by precedent on this point); Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign
Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 502 (1985) (section 403's rule of reasonableness is inconsistent
with international law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 comment a (some United
States courts have considered reasonableness criterion to be requirement of international
"comity," not quite binding law). See generally Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or
"There and Back Again, " 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984) [hereinafter Maier, Resolving Extraterri-
torial Conflicts]; Maier, Book Review, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 676 (1989) (tracing convoluted and
controversial evolution of various drafts of § 403) [hereinafter Maier, Book Review].
193. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1310, 1318-19 (1985) (court decisions have been inconsistent
and confusing regarding extraterritoriality). See generally Kestenbaum, supra note 188.
194. The problem of effective regulation of multinational corporations has long been rec-
ognized as a substantial one, where the usual territorial principle of jurisdiction is inadequate.
Stevenson, Extraterritoriality in Canadian - United States Relations, DEP'T ST. BULL. 429,
(Oct. 12, 1970), reprinted in I W. FREEDMAN, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 223-24
(1986).
195. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414(1). Host states in general are less concerned about
foreign state influence over branches of foreign corporations, and more xenophobic about for-
eign control over locally-incorporated entities. Id. at § 414 comments a and b. But see Wal-
lace, supra note 146, at 1104 (in many cases, an entity's identity as branch, rather than as
subsidiary, is merely accidental, or derivative of other factors.)
196. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414(2). Unlike a mere "branch," a foreign-incorporated
subsidiary acquires its own "nationality," and the justification for control by the state of the
parent's incorporation is attenuated. Id. at § 414 comment a. On the other hand, the host
state may not, as a ruse to wrest all control away from the state of the parent, require local
incorporation; and the entity itself may not conspire to escape all control from the parent state
simply by incorporating locally. Id. at § 414 comment b.
197. The definitions of "ownership" and of "control" are elusive, and different standards
are used by different countries for different purposes. Ordinarily, an individual or group with
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traordinary situations may the state of incorporation of the parent pre-
sume to prescribe rules applicable to foreign-incorporated subsidiaries,
and even then the preferred tactic is to prescribe the orders as instruc-
tions to the parent, which itself provides guidance to the subsidiary
(rather than allowing instructions to flow directly from the government
to the foreign subsidiary corporation). 198 The actual record of United
States practice, however, has frequently included attempts to regulate di-
rectly the activities of foreign corporations that are owned or controlled
by United States persons, and the response of the international system
has been mixed. 199
In order to observe the interplay between the various bases of jurisdic-
tion and to determine how previous clashes of prescriptions have actually
been resolved, it is necessary now to take a quick look at a few of the
more celebrated instances of conflicts of jurisdiction. These case studies
have arisen in varying contexts, 2°° but the incidents that can shed the
most useful light upon the possible future problem of conflicting jurisdic-
tion in a CW treaty are concentrated in the areas of export controls, 201
economic regulation,20 2 and litigation discovery.203 While many interna-
51% of the equity is considered to have both ownership and control, but in many instances a
smaller plurality holding will also suffice, and a major debtholder may also be the one who
plays the leading role in directing the corporation's business. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 414 comment e; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. Case (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, at 182 (opinion of Jessup, J.); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F.
Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (where parent corporation exercised relatively little control over
foreign-incorporated subsidiary, parent would not be liable for subsidiary's holding gold in
contravention of United States statute).
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414(2) comments c and e. See generally Thompson,
United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects,
15 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 319 (1983) (regulation of subsidiary through parent corpora-
tion); Vagts, A Turnabout in Extraterritoriality, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1982) (European
attempts to require parent corporation to notify its subsidiary's host government in advance of
certain major changes in subsidiary's operations).
199. See Note, Extraterritorial Application, supra note 159, at 1322; Kincannon, supra
note 158, at 211-20.
200. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12 (summarizing eight kinds of extraterritori-
ality conflicts); B. CARTER, supra note 12.
201. The United States and other countries have frequently imposed a variety of restric-
tions upon the export of designated goods to designated countries, for a variety of purposes,
including foreign policy or national security motivations. The field is a broad one, with many
different types of trade embargoes available for particular purposes. See D. LANGE & G.
BORN, supra note 12; B. CARTER, supra note 12; Abbott, Linking Trade to Political Goals:
Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Abbott, Linking Trade]; Abbott, Defining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Export
Controls: Congress as Catalyst, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 79 (1984) [hereinafter Abbott, Export
Controls]; Marcuss & Mathias, supra note 159; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14.
202. The principal extraterritoriality cases involving economic regulation have arisen in
the antitrust area, as many states sustain quite different attitudes toward legal regulation of
economic competition. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 4-12; Jennings, supra
note 152.
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tional clashes could be selected,2°4 the following five seem most applica-
ble to the prospective CW convention.20 5
1. Fruehauf
In 1964, Fruehauf, an American corporation, owned 70 per cent of a
French subsidiary corporation, Fruehauf-France. 20 6 The subsidiary con-
tracted with another French corporation to supply 60 truck trailers for
$360,000, making this the largest single customer for Fruehauf-France.
Subsequently, Fruehauf-France learned that the trailers were intended
for export to the People's Republic of China. Although no United
States-origin goods or technology were embodied in the trailers, Ameri-
can policy at the time was strongly antithetical to trade with China, and
the United States Treasury Department directed Fruehauf to order the
subsidiary to abrogate the contract.
Fruehauf complied with the government's request, and passed the in-
structions along to Fruehauf-France, under compulsion of a United
States statute that would apply both civil and criminal penalties for
American nationals as well as for corporations that were "owned or con-
trolled" by Americans. 20 7 The French directors of Fruehauf-France,208
however, applied to a French court for protection and commenced an
extraordinary judicial procedure, somewhat akin to a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, in which a local court administrator took over the subsidiary,
managing it through completion of the trailer contract.20 9
203. The efforts to procure documents from other states for use in United States courts
have produced a great deal of international friction, as the standards and procedures for dis-
covery are radically different in various states. See Extraterritoriality: Compelling Foreign
Judicial Assistance in Production of Documents and Evidence, AM. Soc. INT'L L.: PROC. OF
THE 79TH ANN. MEETING 1, 1-3 (1985) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
204. The recent trend in most areas demonstrates that problems of extraterritoriality are
becoming increasingly common. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 40; D. Rosen-
thal & W. Knighton, supra note 12, at 83. But see Feinberg, supra note 12 (problem of extra-
territoriality may not be as serious as some imagine; conflicts may not be as frequent or as
intractable as they appear).
205. Cf Rosenthal, supra note 192, at 488-92 (identifying antitrust, export controls and
discovery laws as most controversial aspects of extraterritoriality).
206. Regarding the Fruehauf saga, see Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls
- Past, Present, And Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 871-72 (1967); Kincannon, supra note
158, at 213-15; B. CARTER, supra note 12, at 188 n. 23; D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12,
at 19; Thompson, supra note 198, at 327-28.
207. The Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-5 (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
208. Five of Fruehauf-France's directors were United States nationals and three were
French.
209. Fruehauf v. Massardy [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II 14274 bis (Cours d'appel,
Paris), summarized in English in 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966). The United States could base its asser-
tion of jurisdiction upon several of the bases outlined above: nationality (on the theories that
the parent corporation was an American national, that the subsidiary was controlled by Amer-
icans, and perhaps that some of the production know-how had originated in the United States);
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Treasury officials ultimately elected not to prosecute Fruehauf, reason-
ing that the actions of the French court had effectively deprived the par-
ent of its "control" over the subsidiary, and acknowledging the practical
impossibility of extraterritorial compliance with the United States statute
in the face of determined local resistance.210 The incident also became
something of a political cause cdlebre, cited by President de Gaulle as an
illustration of the dangers of multinational corporations and especially of
American influence.
2. Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline211
In 1981, as a part of the United States response to Soviet participation
in the repressions in Poland, President Reagan levied a series of trade
controls to inhibit construction of a $25 billion pipeline designed to carry
Soviet natural gas from wells in Siberia to markets in Western Europe.
The pipeline project depended upon access to certain Western technol-
ogy, especially turbines and compressors to be manufactured in Europe
by local corporations under various arrangements with particular Ameri-
can sources.
Initially, the United States sanctions applied only to American corpo-
rations, prohibiting them from doing business directly with the U.S.S.R.,
but in 1982 the package was broadened in an attempt to reach 1) foreign
corporations that were owned or controlled by American nationals, 2)
equipment produced abroad by any corporation using American-origin
goods, and 3) equipment produced abroad by any corporation using
American technology.212
The resulting protests about overreaching United States extraterritori-
ality were vigorous, and European allies proceeded to issue their own
effects (since money, at least, would flow between parent and subsidiary); and protective (argu-
ing that the sale to China would conflict with United States foreign policy objectives). France,
on the other hand, could assert territoriality (since the contract would be performed in
France); nationality (based upon the subsidiary's independent legal personality); effects (if
Fruehauf-France went bankrupt, French nationals would lose their jobs); and protective (the
government of France did not want its foreign policy toward China to be dictated by the
United States).
210. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 comment e (availability of defense of foreign state
compulsion for American directors of Fruehauf in criminal and civil suits).
211. Regarding the Yamal pipeline controversy, see generally Moyer & Mabry, supra note
14, at 60-92; Kincannon, supra note 158; Abbott, Export Controls, supra note 201, at 82-90;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414 reporters' note 8; D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 22.
212. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 108. Moreover, the extraterritorial United States
controls were to have a retroactive aspect, too: they would bar transfers of goods or technol-
ogy even where a particular item had originally been exported from the United States to a user
in an allied country without any contemporaneous controls on subsequent use or reexport.
Many Europeans complained bitterly about the United States suddenly seeking to assert au-
thority over materials that it had previously exported without restrictions. See Marcuss &
Mathias, supra note 159, at 6-8; Morse and Powers, US. Export Controls and Foreign Entities:
The Unanswered Questions of Pipeline Diplomacy, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 537 (1983).
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countervailing orders, compelling their locally-incorporated entities to
comply with their production contracts, notwithstanding contradictory
directions from their respective American parents or licensors.213 When
United States officials began to take actions to discipline the companies
that refused to cease production, the Europeans did not back down.2 14
In the one case that came to trial in Europe, a Dutch court held that the
American extraterritorial order was not entitled to international recogni-
tion, and did not provide a sufficient rationale to excuse Sensor Neder-
land B.V., a Dutch subsidiary of an American corporation, from
performing its contract.215 Only a few months later, the Reagan admin-
istration rescinded the extraterritorial controls.
3. Libyan Arab Bank 216
In 1986, in response to Libya's participation in widespread terrorist
activities, the United States imposed a broad range of economic- sanc-
tions, including freezing all Libyan interests in property in the United
States or held by American nationals outside the United States. The Lib-
yan Arab Foreign Bank, a government-owned Libyan corporation, had
deposited funds ultimately totaling $292 million with Bankers Trust
Company, a United States corporation that was to hold the account at its
branch office in London. When the Libyan Arab Bank attempted to
withdraw the money, Bankers Trust replied that it was blocked by the
United States sanctions, and the Libyans sued in British court.
213. Among the companies most directly caught between the conflicting orders of the
United States and the local government were Dresser-France, a French corporation indirectly
owned by Dresser Industries, located in Texas, Kincannon, supra note 158, at 202, 205;
Atwood, The Export Administration Act and the Dresser Industries Case, 15 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1157 (1983); and John Brown Engineering, Ltd., a comparable British company.
Kincannon, supra note 158, at 202, 205. See Dresser Industries v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108
(D.D.C. 1982) (manufacturer of pipeline equipment unsuccessfully sought injunction prevent-
ing Secretary of Commerce from imposing sanctions against exports).
214. The governments of France and the United Kingdom took the most direct actions in
defiance of the United States sanctions, ordering locally-incorporated entities to fulfill their
contracts. Germany and Italy took resistant, but less bold, stances. Moyer & Mabry, supra
note 14, at 82-83; Maier, Interest Balancing, supra note 172, at 580, n.3.
215. Judgment in Compagnie Europ6enne Des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.
(Dist. Ct. at the Hague, Sept. 17, 1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 66 (1983). The court consid-
ered various bases for United States jurisdiction to prescribe, but found each wanting: mere
ownership or control of a corporation did not confer American nationality upon it, where it
had been separately incorporated in Holland; the protective principle applied only to acts that
jeopardized the security or creditworthiness of a state, not to acts that simply interfered with
foreign policy interests; and the exports in question did not have any direct or illicit "effects"
within the United States. Id. at 72-73. The court also noted that the American extraterritorial
rule might not be denied effect in a situation where United States nationals had created a non-
American corporation for the sole purpose of evading the United States trade controls, but
there was no suggestion that such motivations were present here. Id. at 73.
216. See generally B. CARTER, supra note 12, at 195-96.
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The United Kingdom had not enacted any sanctions similar to the
American program, and the British court held that the local law would
take precedence over the extraterritorial mandate, even with respect to a
"branch" (as opposed to a locally-incorporated subsidiary) of a United
States corporation.2 17 The court determined that the banking law of the
forum state, rather than the law of the national state of Bankers Trust,
should prevail, and it ordered Bankers Trust to remit the full account,
plus interest, to the Libyan Arab Bank.218
Bankers Trust would have been in a classic deadlock situation - or-
dered by its home government not to transfer funds to Libyan interests,
and ordered by its host government to do so immediately. The United
States, however, shortly thereafter elected not to press the case, and is-
sued a special license, allowing the funds to be moved. 2 19
4. Laker Airways220
Laker Airways, a bankrupt British corporation, endeavored through-
out the early 1980s to bring an antitrust claim in United States courts
against selected American and European airlines and other companies. 221
Some of the defendants attempted to find protection in the British courts,
217. Unlike most other sectors of international commerce, international banking is con-
ducted predominantly through foreign branches of the parent bank, rather than through for-
eign-incorporated subsidiaries. Under the 1983 Basle Concordat, the central banks of the
major commercial states agreed that, in general, the primary responsibility for regulating
branch banks would lie with the host state, and the home state of the parent bank would play a
reduced, secondary role. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414 reporters' note 6; Wallace, supra note
146, at 1104 n.16.
218. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. (Q.B. Comm'l Ct. Sept. 2, 1987),
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1600 (1987). The case for United States jurisdiction would include:
territoriality (the act of transferring funds would originate inside the United States); national-
ity (the London bank was merely a branch of the United States bank, with no separate legal
identity); effects (the millions of dollars would, or would not, be held for the United States);
and protective (release of the funds would interfere with the United States policy of responding
to Libyan provocations). British assertion of jurisdiction would be based upon: territoriality
(the branch office was in London, and the funds were held there); nationality (even if the
London branch were not separately incorporated, it was in some sense still a British bank);
effects (the integrity of the British banking system was implicated); and protective (the govern-
ment of the United Kingdom had decided, for its own reasons, not to follow the American
program of sanctions).
219. Bankers Trust Cleared by US. to Repay Libya, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
220. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 reporters' note 7; M. JANIS, supra note 192, at 252; D.
LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 7; Joelson, supra note 162, at 1123-25.
221. Many of the most important extraterritoriality cases (or at least the cases implicating
the largest amounts of money) have concerned antitrust law, and the jurisprudence of extrater-
ritoriality is most well-developed there. A. LOWE, supra note 12, at xv; Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (reviewing evolu-
tion of United States case law regarding extraterritorial application of antitrust statutes). An-
titrust cases, as others, have increasingly looked to a balancing of interests of states affected by
extraterritoriality claims. See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Industries, 473
F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (effect on United States commerce of anticompetitive behavior
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seeking antisuit injunctions against Laker's United States actions and ar-
guing for application of the substantially more permissive United King-
dom law regarding business combinations and practices.
Eventually, diametrically opposed restraining orders were issued: a
British court enjoined the plaintiff from proceeding in the United States
tribunal against certain European defendants, while the United States
court forbid many of the same defendants from proceeding in the United
Kingdom forum. The British government invoked a "blocking statute,"
prohibiting compliance with what was seen as an overly aggressive
United States assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the antitrust
field.
2 2 2
Finally, the impasse was broken when the United Kingdom House of
Lords dissolved the British injunction, allowing the litigation to proceed
in the United States.223
5. Litigation Discovery
One of the most vexatious, recurrent problems of extraterritoriality
concerns international discovery, where the courts of state X, in pursuing
a criminal or civil case, seek access to testimony, documents, or other
evidence from nationals of state Y located inside state y.224
outside the United States need not be direct and substantial, as long as it is not de minimus and
balancing of interests does not require abstention); Shenefield, supra note 184.
222. The passage of a blocking statute has become a standard tool in a nation's resistance
to what it perceives as another state's over-zealous extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction. The
statutes vary substantially, but generally have the effect of authorizing, or even requiring, local
persons and corporations to refuse to comply with orders from a foreign government. See M.
JAMs, supra note 192, at 252-53; A. LOWE, supra note 12; Marcuss & Richard, supra note 12;
Note, supra note 178, at 877 n.1 (noting several recent blocking statutes).
223. See Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, supra note 192 at 36-40 (noting sub-
stantial influence of Laker case on content and drafting of section 403 of the Restatement).
Bases of jurisdiction that could be adduced on behalf of the American courts would include:
territoriality (many of the flights in question originated or terminated inside the United States);
nationality (many of people injured by alleged price fixing were American nationals, as were
some of the defendants); effects (the higher prices were charged to American nationals, and to
others wishing to visit the United States); and protective (American policy opposed business
combinations in restraint of trade). The bases supporting British jurisdiction would include:
territoriality (there were many flights to or from the United Kingdom); nationality (Laker was
incorporated in Britain); effects (the outcome of the dispute would certainly affect air fares to
Britain); and protective (the British government policy on antitrust matters was strongly held,
too); see Note, supra note 188 (no coherence exists in case law resolving conflicts between
domestic discovery orders and foreign nondisclosure laws).
224. Societ6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (United States discovery procedures generally
operate in tandem with multilateral treaty procedures, providing two avenues for obtaining
foreign documents); Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mous-
son, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quashing investigatory subpoena by FTC against French
corporation operating, and holding documents, inside France); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442
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In many instances, the court, perceiving a great need for the solicited
material, is prepared to impose tough sanctions upon the party withhold-
ing it, while the requested state asserts equally firmly the local privacy
laws or other public policy considerations that forbid compliance.
Again, the litigant caught in the middle has little reliable guidance about
which sovereign to offend.22 5
In this situation, too, the Restatement directs primary attention to the
principle of reasonableness and the consideration of territoriality, sug-
gesting that the requesting state ought generally to defer to the presuma-
bly stronger interests of the state where the documents are physically
held, and ought not to take excessive actions against the non-compliant
litigant.226 The Restatement's rule would authorize a substantial degree
of extraterritorial discovery, but with heightened standards of materiality
and moderated sanctions for noncompliance. The litigating party may be
required to make a good faith effort to produce the solicited material, but
failure to overcome a foreign blocking statute may not be fatal.22 7
An extra measure of confusion surrounds the relationship here be-
tween a parent corporation and its foreign branches and subsidiaries. In
general, United States courts will hold a parent responsible for producing
reporters' note 1; D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 12, at 68-80; 1 W. FREEDMAN,
supra note 194, at 416-33; Note, supra note 178; Joelson, supra note 162, at .1126-29.
The considerations of this section arise most frequently, and in their most acute form, in the
context of litigation, but they can also occur in non-adjudicative settings, such as an order for
the production of documents pursuant to an administrative proceeding. See Civil Aeronautics
Board v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (CAB can
order defendant to use all good faith efforts to produce documents held abroad, notwithstand-
ing contrary German law); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (IRS summons may require Japanese corporation to produce documents held abroad);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 414 reporters' note 2; D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 14-
16.
225. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (balancing competing inter-
ests, it was permissible for district court to order defendant to produce Swiss bank records);
United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981)
(upholding sanctions for failure to produce tax records held by Swiss subsidiary of American
corporation, after balancing several factors to determine that Swiss privacy law was insufficient
excuse for non-compliance); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691
F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983) (companion cases in which
court upheld contempt fines when bank failed to produce foreign-held records, where docu-
ments were so important to grand jury investigation that even the creation of some interna-
tional friction was justified); D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 12-14.
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(1)(c).
227. Societ6 Internationale pour Participations IndustriMlles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (foreign corporation's failure, despite good faith efforts, to produce
foreign bank records did not justify dismissal of its complaint, when Swiss criminal law prohib-
ited access); United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983)
(reversing sanctions imposed for defendant's failure to produce records held by its Greek
branch, due to balancing of competing interests);Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (analyzing factors to be balanced in seeking documents for antitrust case in
opposition to French blocking statute); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 442(2)(a).
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documents held by its overseas affiliates, absent a blocking statute, but
many other states will not automatically require the parent to obtain and
surrender materials possessed by its foreign subsidiaries. The law is even
more unsettled in the reverse scenario, regarding the responsibility of a
subsidiary for producing documents or records held by its foreign parent
corporation.228
IV. The Extraterritorial Reach of the Chemical Weapons Convention
This section attempts a reconciliation of the previous two. It begins by
describing those aspects of the draft treaty and of the commercial chemi-
cal industry that will pose special problems of jurisdictional reach. It
then notes some factors that make this application of extraterritoriality
similar to, and some that ill conspire to make it fundamentally different
from, those analyzed above. Most importantly, it suggests, at the level of
principle and at the level of practice, how the negotiators and implement-
ers of the nascent chemical weapons treaty should strive to deal with the
problems.
A. The Reach of the Draft Convention
The current rolling text of the CD's draft chemical weapons conven-
tion deals with issues of jurisdiction at several disparate points; the term
"jurisdiction" itself appears in the document no fewer than twenty
times.229
More abstractly, there are four different kinds of obligations that the
treaty parties would assume that could generate substantial questions of
228. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (court has
discretion to order American national to produce documents held by foreign parent or subsidi-
ary); In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Regard to the Production, Transporta-
tion, Refining & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952) (court may order
parent corporation to provide documents held abroad by foreign subsidiary); REsTATEMENT
(THiRD) § 442 reporters' note 10.
229. The rolling text uses a variety of formulations to address jurisdictional issues at differ-
ent points. At four places, the text refers collectively to possession, jurisdiction and control
(Report of the Ad Hoe Committee, supra note 6, art. 1.5; art. 1.6; Annex to art. I1, para.
I.A.2; Annex to art. III, para. II.A.2). There are five references to territory, jurisdiction and
control (art. III.l(a)(ii); art. III.l(b)(ii); art. III.l.(c); art. IV.2(b); art. VI.l(b)); and eleven
references to jurisdiction and control (art. III.1(a)(i); art. llI.l.(b)(i); art. IV.1; art. IV.2(a); art.
V.1; art. V.4(a); art. VII.1; Annex to art. III, para. I.B; Annex to art. III, para. II.B; Annex to
art. IV, para. I.A; Annex to art. IV, para. I.B). In addition, the draft treaty contains two
references to possession and territory (Annex to art. III, para. I.A.1; Annex to art. III, para.
II.A.1); one reference to territory and control (art. V.4(a)); four references to control (art.
III.l.(a)(iii); art. III.l(b)(iii); art. IV.2(c); art. V.4(b)); two references to possession (Annex to
art. VI[1], para. I.C.(b); Annex to art. VI[1], para. 11.5); and one reference to territory (Annex
to art. VI[1], para. 2).
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extraterritoriality. 230 A credible interpretation must therefore be devel-
oped to deal intelligently and consistently with each.
1. Prohibitions
Basic to the concept of the CW agreement would be the undertakings
not to produce or maintain arsenals of chemical weapons or the facilities
that manufacture them.231 The parties will be obligated to halt produc-
tion promptly and to complete the destruction and dismantling process
within ten years of the treaty's entry into force.232
2. Declarations
Each party will be obligated to provide, thirty days after the treaty
enters into force, declarations regarding its chemical weapons and chemi-
cal weapons production facilities. 233 This information shall include the
locations, quantities, and inventories of all chemical weapons, and shall
be updated annually as the destruction operations proceed.234 With re-
spect to CW production facilities, the agreement will require each party
to disclose information regarding, inter alia, the ownership, operation,
capacity, layout and equipment of every CW plant.235
Moreover, each party is also required to provide information regarding
other chemicals - those which are produced for civilian or commercial
purposes, but which could also be adapted to CW programs. The scope
of the reporting requirements will vary substantially with the lethality of
the particular chemical and the danger of its diversion into weaponry,
and will include statistics regarding each facility's production, consump-
tion, imports and exports of controlled chemicals. 236
3. Inspections
Each party will be obligated to hold open for international on-site in-
spection, including continuous inspection through the installation of au-
tomatic instruments, all the locations where chemical weapons are
produced, stored or destroyed.237 The draft contains extensive elabora-
tion of the rights and functions of the International Inspectorate and of
230. The parties will also agree not to use chemical weapons, Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee, supra note 6, art. 1.3, and not to prepare for the use of chemical weapons, id. art. 1.4.
While a party might conduct some of these activities outside its national territory, they do not
raise jurisdictional questions of the same magnitude as the four actions cited in the text.
231. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. 1.1.; art. 1.5; art. 1.6.
232. Id. art. IV.5; art. V.8.
233. Id. art. III.
234. Id. art. IV.2; art. IV.5.
235. Id. Annex to art. V.
236. Id. app. to art. VI.
237. Id. art. IV.8; art. V.5; art. 6.
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the corresponding duties of the host state, with further details to be nego-
tiated on a state-by-state basis in subsidiary arrangements between each
party and the CW Organization.238
Even many facilities with no CW history will be subject to elaborate
international inspection, to ensure that only the benign functions are con-
tinuing.239 Inspectors "shall have unimpeded access to all areas" of these
facilities, shall "bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may
be necessary for the completion of their tasks," and shall receive and
analyze samples taken at their direction.24 Representatives of the host
state may accompany the international inspectors, examine their equip-
ment, and replicate their activities,241 but the final report is to be pre-
pared by the inspectors themselves.242
4. Noncircumvention
The draft convention also contains an undertaking "not to assist, en-
courage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited
to Parties. ' 243 Some states (the United States and the United Kingdom,
for example) 244 have such strong patterns of historical cooperation in
military matters, including CW research and production, that the
treaty's constraints must ensure against evasions that might be under-
taken through other countries.245
All of these obligations, of course, will be performed primarily within
the national territory of each state party.246 The vast majority of the
current CW inventories, as well as the facilities for producing, testing
and storing them, are held (for reasons of political and military strategy)
within the territory of the state that owns them.247 Similarly, although
the chemical industry is a multinational one, a substantial percentage of
238. Id. Annex to art. IV; Annex to art. V.
239. Id. Annex to art. VI [2].
240. Id.
241. Id. para. 14(d).
242. Id. para. 16.
243. Id. art. 1.2.
244. S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra note 24, at 88-93 (tracing evolution of Ameri-
can and British collaboration on chemical and biological weapons activities); SPOKESMAN FOR
THE RUSSELL COMMITTEE AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS 21-22 (1982) (describing agreement between United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
and the United States to cooperate in research, development, testing and production of CW
during 1950s).
245. See S. HERSH, supra note 16, at 244-46 (U.S. Department of Defense spent over $15.8
million in 1967 to finance CW-related research projects at dozens of foreign universities in
Japan, Austria, Ireland and elsewhere).
246. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies that ordinarily "a treaty is
binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 339. This is a minimum requirement; a
treaty could require states to assume greater responsibilities.
247. See supra note 33 (U.S. and U.S.S.R. foreign depots of CW).
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the business is still conducted within the national territory of the parent
corporations, raising no acute issues of extraterritoriality.
Nevertheless, a significant international problem will remain due to the
increasing internationalization of the chemical and allied industries.
Even if the CW convention is very successful, and a great many states
elect to adhere to it, there will undoubtedly be many holdouts, possibly
including some strategically and economically important states.248 What
will happen - and what legally should happen - if a corporation from
state X (which becomes a party to the treaty) operates a chemical facility
(through a branch or a locally incorporated subsidiary) inside state Y
(which does not join the treaty regime)? Are the prohibitions of the
treaty in effect for this facility? What happens if state Y refuses to allow
the corporation to collect and report the requisite data about production
and consumption of key chemicals? Is it a violation of the treaty, charge-
able to state X, if state Y declines to admit the International Inspectorate
to the facility, as X has pledged to do? And is it further a violation for
state X if one of its corporations is assisting state Y in the possible pur-
suit of a CW capacity?
B. What Should Not Be Done
It is convenient to begin the response by stating for emphasis the nega-
tive options, identifying some strategies that should not be employed here
because the costs would be far greater than the benefits.
A key part of the process of fashioning a feasible CW regime will be
the realization of the importance of avoiding undue interference with the
current structure, operation and dynamism of the chemical industries.
Obviously, there is a problem in the global chemical market at this time,
with some multinational firms evading controls on the export of sensitive
equipment and materials that can be used to bolster renegades like Iraq
and Libya in the pursuit of a domestic CW capability.249 Expos6s such
248. Other important multilateral arms control accords have attracted widespread accept-
ance, but in each case there are salient "problem countries" that have not acceded to the treaty
and remain outside its jurisdiction. See ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 5, at 131 (Biological Weapons Convention has 111 initial signatures and 90 current
parties); id. at 98 (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 97 initial signatures and 116 current
parties).
249. The case of the alleged Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabta has attracted the
greatest international attention recently, as American and West German officials have investi-
gated and exposed the web of international transactions that supplied equipment and other
assistance to Colonel Qaddafi. See, e.g., Bonn Names 4 More Firms Linked by U.S. to Libya,
Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1989, at A16, col. 3. More generally, a "Roll of Dishonor" has been
compiled, listing companies reported to be assisting in the proliferation of chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons. 135 CONG. REC. S217 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mc-
Cain); see also Western Industry Sells Third World the Means to Produce Poison Gas, Wall St.
J., Sept. 16, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
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as those depicting several German corporations and other firms blindly
pursuing commercial advantage despite obvious security concerns are
probably merely the tip of the iceberg of covert international trade in
dangerous dual-use chemicals. 250 Greater controls, both national and
among like-minded allies, must be developed to pinch this underground
economy, retarding the ability of potential CW proliferators to develop
their arsenals.251
At the same time, however, we must be careful not to constrain the
private chemical firms more than is necessary. Chemical manufacturers,
and the diverse consumers they serve, constitute a vital segment of the
economy, essential to sound growth for the United States and virtually
all other societies, and they should be encouraged, not shackled. The
following points should be observed in drafting the CW Convention.
First, do not make the verification provisions of the CW treaty that
apply to commercial entities more onerous than is necessary. To be sure,
the chemical industry is already heavily regulated, and additional re-
quirements might be only a marginal accretion to the current managea-
ble workload.252 But it is vitally important not to press too far, and
especially to take care to preserve the confidentiality of the manufactur-
ers' processes. 253 The rolling text recognizes this imperative, and its
strictures on this point should be fulfilled.254
250. The West Germans have been identified as "the most egregious offenders" regarding
the export of chemical weapons-related materials to the Third World. U.S. Sees Gains in Ef-
fort to Stop West German Aid to Libya Chemical Plant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at A5, col. 1
(quoting former Director of United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth
L. Adelman). But other states have also hosted companies or individuals that have sought to
make a profit by promoting the CW ambitions of developing states. See, e.g., U.S. Fears Japan
Aids Libya on Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988, at L15, col. 1; Thatcher & Aeppel,
The Poisons Spread, supra note 46, at B1, col. 1; Glenn Hearing, supra note 133 (testimony of
William von Raab, Commissioner of United States Customs Service, at 4) (United States); CIA
Cites European Role in More Gas-Weapon Sites, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1989, at A24, col. 1
(European nations).
251. See, e.g., Glenn Hearings, supra note 133 (opening statement of Sen. John Glenn);
Bonn Will Tighten Curb on Exports of Deadly Goods, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
252. See, e.g., Carpenter, Government Regulation, supra note 135 (description of mul-
tifaceted regulation programs applicable to typical American chemical facility).
253. The public statements of United States chemical producers about the rolling text of
the CW convention highlight their concern with the preservation of commercial secrets. See,
eg., Carpenter, Implementing Disarmament, supra note 135, at 8-9. The second most impor-
tant issue to the manufacturers is probably the importance of avoiding unilateral United States
trade restrictions, which could simply result in customers shifting their purchases to suppliers
from other nations, to the competitive disadvantage of American firms. See Hearings on
Proliferation, supra note 3 (statement of Max L. Turnipseed, at 2-3).
254. In three separate provisions, the draft convention addresses the importance of pre-
serving the confidentiality of information obtained during the course of verification inspec-
tions. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. IV.9, art. VI.9, art. VII.5; see
also ter Haar, Boter & Verweij, Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, in
NATO's SIXTEEN NATIONs 48 (1987).
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Second, do not hastily require chemical firms to withdraw from all
activities inside states that do not become party to the CW convention.255
Although it is within the power of the United States to require its nation-
als to refrain from conducting any business with, or inside, holdout
states,256 it would be unnecessarily blunt diplomacy and disruptive eco-
nomic policy to require precipitous withdrawals on short notice.257
Moreover, withdrawal would likely surrender whatever leverage the
United States might have been able to exercise through the parent corpo-
ration's continued operations inside the holdout state.258
Third, do not unduly restrict multi-party international transactions in
chemicals, equipment, information, and financial services. These types of
business dealings will continue to be profitable and socially desirable;
they should not be deterred.259 Although some tightening of exports is
undoubtedly required, 26° and stronger disclosure requirements in the ac-
companying documentation will be essential, 261 the international markets
should not be disrupted more than is necessary, and upheavals in busi-
ness operations should be minimized.262 The reporting requirements of
255. There have been proposals to develop a public "blacklist" of states that are attempt-
ing to acquire chemical weapons, and automatically to prohibit aid, credit, or other transac-
tions with them. See Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3 (statement of Sen. John
McCain, at 4).
256. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441 comment b.
257. See, e.g., Abbott, Linking Trade, supra note 201, at 831-37; Abbott, Export Controls,
supra note 201, at 99-102.
258. On the other hand, once the CW convention has attracted sufficient international
participation, it may be appropriate and politically strategic to force international chemical
companies to withdraw all operations from any holdout states in order to do business inside
the territory of any party state. This may be a difficult dilemma for some companies, but it can
also provide an additional source of political and economic pressure on recalcitrant states to
conform to the treaty regime or face economic consequences. The treaty might not require
this election to be made until after substantial time had passed (to give companies the opportu-
nity to make long-range strategic decisions) and a significant number of states had adhered to
the treaty (to ensure that the weight of economic factors would drive companies to want to do
business with the treaty members, rather than with the holdouts). But see 135 CoNG. REC.
S214 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1988) (statement of Sen. Dole) (proposing unilateral United States
sanctions against any foreign chemical corporation found to aid and abet proliferation of
chemical weapons, shutting it entirely out of American market for two years).
259. See Abbott, Export Controls, supra note 201, at 92-98.
260. Webster Says Law on Chemical Arms Exports May Be Too Weak, Wash. Post, Feb.
10, 1989, at A13, col 1.
261. The inadequacy of the current paper trail regarding exports of CW-related goods and
materials has been suggested by the difficulties that West German authorities have encoun-
tered in finding evidence of wrongdoing in the trade with Libya, see Bonn Will Tighten Curb
on Exports of Deadly Goods, supra note 251, as well as by the difficulty in following the parade
of "front" corporations that were used in the shipments to Iraq and others, see, e.g., Behind
the New Battle with Libya, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1989, at Cl, col. 5.
262. The imposition of sanctions in the Soviet natural gas pipeline case reportedly cost
United States businesses $800 million in lost sales. See Zaucha, The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions.
The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1135,
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the CW treaty, scrutinized by an effective and adequately staffed Techni-
cal Secretariat, 263 should be made sufficient to detect and deter attempts
to circumvent the treaty's obligations, so that ordinary commerce can
continue, even with its bewildering complexity. 264
Fourth, do not force companies into a situation where they must
choose, without effective guidance, which sovereign's laws to violate.
That is, the state of a corporation's nationality is free to prescribe rules
for it, but should not order it to undertake actions that violate the laws of
the host state where the actions would have to be carried out.265 The
international system should not protect conspiracies undertaken simply
to evade regulation, 266 but the principle of reasonableness should be sus-
tained,267 and the multinational companies ,should not be trapped be-
tween one state's rock and a competing state's hard place, at least until it
becomes clear that an international consensus has arisen regarding the
few holdout states as pariahs.
Fifth, it is important not to forget that the obligations of the chemical
weapons treaty will be fully symmetric among its parties, and that the
United States will therefore be implicated not only in the role of the capi-
tal-exporting "home" state of a multinational chemical corporation, but
also as the "host" state, inside which chemical firms incorporated else-
where will conduct some of their activities.26 The United States in the
past has played both roles in the extraterritoriality debate, attempting to
assert transborder claims broadly269 as well as protesting against what it
1177 (1983); see also Cloudy Legal Picture on Export Ban, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, at A31,
col. 3; Griffin & Calabrese, supra note 159, at 15.
263. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, art. VIII.D.
264. Affiliated companies engage in a wide variety of commercial transactions to develop,
produce and market chemical products. The flow of information between parent and foreign
subsidiary and between licensor and licensee - including the flow of confidential trade secrets
- is an essential aspect of the competitive market. See Glenn Hearings, supra note 133 (testi-
mony of CMA representative Max Turnipseed, at 12); see also Hearings on Global Spread,
supra note 3 (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., at 10) (focusing attention on institutions
providing financial services in aid of Libyan attempts to acquire CW-related materials); D.
ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 12, at 60 (in United Kingdom alone, there are
reportedly over 1,500 subsidiaries of United States corporations).
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 441.
266. See Joelson, supra note 162, at 1228-29 (where a company solicited foreign action
that results in conflict of mandates, that company may not subsequently rely on that foreign
action as basis for seeking relief from original United States requirements).
267. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403.
268. DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, DEP'T OF DEFENSE, INDUS. SEC. MANUAL FOR
SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFO. 30-31, 85-87 (1984).
269. The law of extraterritoriality "has a particularly U.S. flavor." PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 203 (remarks of Jonathan T. Fried, at 9). Other states have frequently criticized the
United States extraterritorial claims as exorbitant. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 reporters'
note 1; id. § 402 introductory note; Rosenthal, supra note 192, at 489, 493. -
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sees as other nations' grandiose extensions of legal competence. 270 In
both instances, the opportunities for effective international problem-solv-
ing are undercut by failure to understand that traditional notions of rigid
national sovereignty do not always serve well in resolving intricate inter-
national problems.271
Finally, it is important to remember that the chemical industry is far
bigger than the chemical weapons industry; 272 the interest in monitoring
and regulating the former is simply derivative of the interest in abolishing
the latter. Arms controllers should therefore interpose themselves into
the chemical industry as little as possible, not making the already oppres-
sive verification tasks even more difficult. 273
270. The United States has questioned the extraterritorial claims of the European Commu-
nities, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 reporters' note 1, and of Canada, id. § 414 reporter's
note 2. See A. LowE, supra note 12, at 63; Vagts, supra note 198, at 591. In an even more
direct confrontation, the United States enacted anti-boycott legislation as a direct response to
the attempt by Arab states to refrain from doing business with firms that also did business with
Israel. The American response was seen as a mechanism to prevent United States nationals
from being transformed into instruments of other nations' foreign policies. Marcuss & Rich-
ard, supra note 12, at 458-59; see also Marcuss, Extraterritoriality: U.S. Antiboycott Law and
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1135 (1983).
271. Glenn Hearings, supra note 133 (statement of Paul Freedenberg, at 7); April, Block-
ing Statutes as a Response to the Extra-territorial Application of Law, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 223-33 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984).
272. The chemical industry is said to be the United States' largest international trading
industry, with a total of $238 billion in shipments in 1988. Export controls currently apply to
40 products (of a total estimated 20,000 commercially-traded chemicals and chemical prod-
ucts); in 1988 the United States government received approximately 1,800 individual applica-
tions to export controlled chemicals, for a total of $68 million in sales. Glenn Hearings, supra
note 133 (testimony of James LeMunyon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration, at 2-3); Removal of Unilateral National Security Controls; Additional Con-
trols on Chemicals and Biological Agents and Precursors, 54 Fed. Reg. 38, 8281 (1989).
273. There is a political rationale for this-caution, too: the chemical industry in the United
States has to date been surprisingly supportive of the chemical weapons negotiations, assisting
the government in developing rational and acceptable solutions to difficult problems. Glenn
Hearings, supra note 133 (testimony of CMA representative Max Turnipseed, at 2-4). This
degree of support from the affected industry is unusual in arms control, cf H. YORK, MAKING
WEAPONS, TALKING PEACE: A PHYSICIST'S ODYSSEY FROM HIROSHIMA TO GENEVA 285-87
(1987) (discussion of analogous case of control of nuclear weapons), and-should not be squan-
dered.
The chemical industry would make a powerful and dangerous adversary for any chemical
weapons arms control efforts - as it was during the 1920s in opposition to the Geneva Proto-
col - and if the verification and compliance mechanisms were to become too onerous, they
would pose a substantial deterrent for the United States and others to adhere to the treaty
regime. Since the current United States regime of controls on exports of chemicals and related
equipment also depends upon the voluntary cooperation of the chemical industry, the export
regime would fall without substantial unverified self-regulation by manufacturers. See Glenn
Hearings, supra note 133 (statement of William von Raab, Commissioner of the United Cus-
toms Service, at 3); id. (statement of CMA representative Turnipseed, at 5-9).
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C. Similarities Between Arms Control and Other Expressions of
Extraterritoriality
Before noting those aspects of chemical weapons arms control that
make the problem largely sui generis, it is important to recall three points
of similarity between this set of issues and many others that have previ-
ously arisen among the more familiar genre of extraterritoriality.
First, in a general sense, this application of national jurisdiction is
largely cognate with many aspects of the more typical extraterritorial
controversies. That is, issues of both jurisdiction to prescribe and juris-
diction to enforce will surface in the CW treaty, as they have in the previ-
ous cases, and it is possible once again that a country will find itself free
to assert the capacity to develop rules for a particular individual, transac-
tion, or situation, yet devoid of the competence to enforce those rules or
to adjudicate cases of noncompliance.
Moreover, the chemical weapons treaty might provide a textbook illus-
tration of the possibility of raising, in sharp relief, all six of the tradition-
ally recognized bases of jurisdiction. A state might claim competence to
govern a particular chemical facility based upon one or more of those
bases: territoriality (if the facility operates within the state's national
boundaries); nationality (if the facility is owned, or perhaps controlled,
by natural or juridical persons with the state's nationality); effects (if the
operation of the facility has a substantial impact on the state, such as
through the purchase, sale or use of its products); protective (if the facil-
ity is used in a fashion that challenges the integrity of the governmental
operations of the state, such as through hostile use of the products, or
perhaps through interference with the state's treaty obligations); passive
personality (if the facility produces weapons that are illegally used against
nationals of the state); and universality (if the global norm against chemi-
cal weapons develops to the point where all production or possession of
CW is outlawed). And, of course, the CW treaty will provide a novel,
but not altogether unfamiliar, venue for applying and refining the evolv-
ing international law principles and mechanisms for attempting peace-
fully to resolve touchy conflicts of asserted national jurisdiction.
Many of the jurisdictional wrangles of earlier international controver-
sies may well be echoed in future CW applications. The extraterritorial
reach of the treaty's prohibitions, for example, will recall the United
States' efforts in the Fruehauf and Pipeline incident cases to ban trade
with targeted countries - how far may a state impose its own foreign
policy upon recalcitrant neighbors? The treaty's required declarations
raise issues reminiscent of those in prior discovery cases - testing the
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limits upon one state's ability to mandate the production of documents
and records held abroad by nationals of another state.
Similarly, the CW treaty's inspection provisions will again raise the
most ubiquitous questions of extraterritorial enforcement: under what
conditions may a host state deny effect to another state's attempted exer-
cise of jurisdiction to enforce, and what happens to the private individual
caught between opposing sovereign orders? Finally, the CW treaty's
non-circumvention provisions, like the Libyan Arab Bank and Laker
cases, will raise the choice-of-law issues of how abprivate entity may
responsibly balance its obligations to both its home state and its host
state, where inconsistent pressures exist.
Second, the CW case may be similar to its predecessors in that both (or
all) sides in a controversy may have something legitimate to say. With so
many potential bases of jurisdiction floating around, there may be no
clear "good guys" or "bad guys," and several nations may sustain plausi-
ble, yet conflicting, interests. Without authoritative rules for resolving
jurisdictional disputes, the CW treaty might degenerate into the same
indeterminacy that has to date characterized other extraterritoriality
contests.
The criteria of reasonableness, applied to this context, again brings
both the virtues and the shortcomings that it has supplied in other situa-
tions. That is, reasonableness does provide something of a standard, a
basis upon which nations should guide their actions. The previous run of
cases and clashes does generally seem to have come out the right way: as
a general matter, the state which had the greatest stake in the contro-
versy, which had the closest contacts and the most profound national
interests, seems usually to have prevailed. This happy outcome may not
always occur - and it may only rarely occur with ease, dispatch, and
dignity - but there are relatively few egregious instances of naked polit-
ical power prevailing over reasonableness in the application of
extraterritoriality.
On the other hand, reasonableness itself can carry the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism only so far. It is an extremely elastic standard, tending
to be appreciated very differently by diverse national observers.274 It is
unpredictable and hard to apply precedentially. 275 And it does not pro-
vide an objective mechanism for "breaking ties," to engineer an authori-
tative, consistent, and mutually acceptable outcome in situations where
more than one result might be plausible.
274. Thompson, supra note 198, at 383.
275. See Note, supra note 159.
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Third, the CW treaty case may be similar to its predecessors in provid-
ing a range of factors to consider in evaluating the reasonableness bal-
ance. Section 403 of the Restatement specifies a list of criteria for
assessing the reasonableness of a state's assertion of jurisdiction,276 and
many of these may conveniently be adapted to the CW context:
L. Where is the facility located and operating? Where are the chemi-
cals in question physically held? Where are the appropriate documents
prepared and housed?
2. Who is the owner of the facility, and of what state is that person a
national? Where is the owner domiciled? If there are multiple owners,
what is the dominant nationality? If the owner is not also the controller
of the operation, what are the nationalities and locations of the principal
equity and debt holders, and of the key managers?*
3. In the case of a corporate entity, where is it incorporated? Where
is the siege social?277 Where do the corporation's profits originate from,
and where do they go?
4. Where did the chemicals and their precursors come from? Where
did the equipment and the technology originate? Where will the finished
products be delivered?
5. What applications will the chemicals have? Will they be used to
the advantage, or to the detriment, of any identifiable state or group? Is
the chemical operation being conducted for peaceful purposes only, or is
there a threat of aggression?
6. What are the general expectations of states and the evolving opin-
ion of humankind regarding the facility and its purposes? Does the
proferred jurisdiction conform to the needs and desires of the interna-
tional CW control system? Would a denial of jurisdiction in a particular
case thwart the object and purpose of the CW convention?
As noted in the Restatement, this type of list of factors cannot be ex-
haustive and is not systematically prioritized.27 8 It does, however, pro-
vide some guidance regarding the possibilities to be considered, the
questions to be asked in a particular situation, and the considerations to
be scrutinized and balanced.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 152-71 (summarizing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 403(2)).
277. Many civil law systems do not focus exclusive attention upon a corporation's place of
incorporation, but look to the siege social or principal place of management, as well at to other
possible significant contacts, to determine an entity's nationality for different purposes. RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) § 213 comments c, d; see also Griffin & Calabrese, supra note 159, at 17.
278. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 403 comment b.
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D. Differences Between Arms Control and Other Expressions of
Extraterritoriality
In contrast to the preceding subsection, this part describes three fac-
tors that will collide to make the application of extraterritoriality sub-
stantially different in the arms control context from anything witnessed
to date.
First, the stakes are even higher here than they have previously been.
Prior international antitrust cases, of course, have debated substantial
sums of money, 279 but the transborder chemical industry is even larger.
More important still are the national security interests: it may be a na-
tion's survival, not merely its pocketbook, that is implicated.
280
The Fruehauf case281 is probably the most nearly apt precedent, for
there, too, perceptions of high public policy were raised, as the United
States attempted to extend the political isolation of the People's Republic
of China. But a closer comparison reveals how the CW case is likely to
be even more closely contested. On the American side, relations with the
two Chinas during the 1960s were certainly important; today, however,
the imperative of arresting the global spread of chemical weapons, espe-
cially in a context where the United States totally disarms itself of those
devices, will be of far greater moment.
On the French side in the Fruehauf case, the host government's pri-
mary concern was simply to have the local company fulfill its lawful con-
tract, keeping workers employed and sustaining the projected foreign
currency earnings. But in the CW context, the host government may
insist not merely that the local business remain solvent and operational,
but that it continue to conduct commerce with the host government itself,
and in a particularly sensitive line of work. Where there are few sophisti-
cated competing suppliers, the host government may be particularly re-
luctant to tolerate foreign controls.282
279. Joelson, supra note 162, at 1121.
280. It is commonly suggested that the problem of chemical weapons is less important and
less urgent than the problem of nuclear weapons, which pose an even greater, more immediate
threat to national security and international peace. However, the emergence of a rough nu-
clear "parity" between the United States and the U.S.S.R. may cause a resurgence in interest
in conventional and chemical arms, which have been used far more often throughout history,
and'which may again be used in the future to devastating effect. E. SPIERS, supra note 15, at
11.
281. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 211-15 and. ac-
companying text (controversy over Soviet natural gas pipeline).
282. In these circumstances, the host government might consider resorting to expropria-
tion, taking over ownership of the chemical facility (with or without adequate compensation to
tlie dispossessed foreigners). There are obvious costs to all participants in this type of national-
ization process, not the least of which might be the likely loss of expertise and technology-as
the former owners abandon their investment; in some circumstances, the expropriating state
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The implementation of a CW treaty - and especially the execution of
its expanded notions of extraterritoriality - will be strongly affected by
considerations of international politics, economics and strategy. As with
all other aspects of international life, a state's attitude toward the new
network of legal requirements - and its willingness to adhere punctili-
ously to additional transnational obligations - will vary from case to
case, depending upon factors such as alliance politics, regional or global
opposition, and extraneous, factors of bilateral relations.
State X, for example, would likely be far less willing to exercise the
CW treaty's extraterrorial powers vis-a-vis an allied state Y, and much
more willing to call for, and participate in, international sanctions
against traditional opponent Z. Similarly, X may be cautious about initi-
ating actions against a key neutral state, a geopolitically strategic state,
or a state that might exercise a potential "swing vote" in future political
confrontations well beyond the CW context. The potential will always
exist for diplomatic deals (or blackmail) to "trade off" the concerns of
the CW treaty against the manifold other concerns of international life.
In short, the CW treaty - just as all other obligations of international
law - may be bent toward "selective enforcement," with some states
being held to higher levels of performance than others, with some blocs
consistently opposing each other, and with charges of non-compliance
being exacerbated or toned down due to global politics. This type of
gamesmanship may prove a weakness in the treaty, as it undermines the
claim of universality and even-handedness. In the final analysis, how-
ever, perhaps this type of politics - an inevitable characteristic of inter-
national life, even regarding such important issues as the extraterritorial
application of the CW treaty - may be acceptable, because what the
treaty is truly trying to accomplish is the outlawing of chemical warfare,
not the building of any particular pattern of unanimous public censure of
opponents.
Second, the chemical weapons treaty will be unique in reversing one of
the fundamental premises of conventional extraterritorial fare. That is,
international law traditionally contains mostly prohibitions on the trans-
border assertion of jurisdiction; it rarely, if ever, has levied requirements
that a state assert its competence to prescribe or to enforce.28 3 In the
might not be competent to continue the particular chemical operations in question - or at
least not to do so in secrecy.
283. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (4th ed.
1982). The most nearly apt precedent might be the international community's attempt to rally
global support for economic and other sanctions against the racist regimes of Rhodesia and
South Africa. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 1347-73.
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famous Lotus case,284 the Permanent Court of International Justice de-
termined that absent any contrary prohibitions in international law, a
state was free (but was not obligated) to assert jurisdiction in an ambigu-
ous controversy. 285 International law thus implicitly makes an "offer" of
jurisdiction to a state (or to several states) in a situation, but does not
ordinarily "require" that the offer be accepted and jurisdiction be
asserted.2
86
In the case of the chemical weapons convention, however, that general
presumption will be reversed: the international system will want states to
press their jurisdiction aggressively, to make the treaty as effective and
inclusive as possible. The objectives of the treaty are not merely to recip-
rocally assist its several parties in the gradual retrenchment of their arse-
nals, but grandly "for the sake of all mankind, to completely exclude the
possibility of the use of chemical weapons" 287 and to pursue "the com-
plete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stock-
piling of chemical weapons. ' 28 8 These purposes will encourage, perhaps
even require, parties to expand their claims to extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, in aid of their collective security interests.289
This incitement to extraterritoriality means that states will retain pre-
cious little "wiggle room" to exercise national discretion concerning the
assertion of claims. That is, once the CW treaty is implemented, when-
ever a state may lawfully exercise jurisdiction, it must do so. Asserting
"too much" extraterritorial jurisdiction would continue to be a violation
of the international law principle of reasonableness; asserting "too little"
jurisdiction, however, would now be inconsistent with the strictures of
the CW treaty.
284. The S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.T.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7, 1927).
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984) and text accompanying notes 220-23. In Laker, the controversy was whether the United
States or Great Britain was entitled to hear the merits of the allegations of unfair trade prac-
tices, and to apply its own national rules to the commercial activities that transcended state
boundaries. It was, however, never argued by either side that international law would require
either state to attempt to extend its laws or provide a forum for adjudication.
287. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, Preamble, para. 6.
288. Id. Preamble, para. 8.
289. The ambitious scope of the CW treaty, and the probable widespread adherence to it,
will reinforce the treaty's role as a codification and progressive development of customary
international law. In this way, the norms embodied in the treaty could be understood as decla-
rations of customary international law, binding even on non-party states. Thus, the actions of
the parties in extending their extraterritorial jurisdiction would be consistent with interna-
tional law, for they would be attempts to apply new international law to the territory of an-
other state that stubbornly refuses to implement the treaty (and its binding customary law)
voluntarily. See A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 171; D'Amato, Custom
and Treaty, supra note 171.
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These constraints will create two opposite kinds of dangers for the CW
treaty regime. On the one hand, the treaty should not be constructed in a
manner that places impossible burdens upon its parties: State X should
not be found to be in violation of the treaty when one of its nationals
owns a facility inside non-party state Y, where Y forcibly prevents the
facility from complying with the reporting or inspection requirements of
the treaty.290 The defenses of foreign state compulsion291 or impossibility
of performance 2 92 should continue to be valid, rescuing X from liability
for misdeeds that are beyond its control.
On the other hand, the treaty regime must not be constructed in a
fashion that provides perverse incentives for its parties to evade their ob-
ligations merely by encouraging their nationals to set up shop inside non-
party states which will subsequently conveniently deny enforcement of
the treaty's verification provisions. 293 That is, state X should not be able
to circumvent the CW convention by colluding with one of its domestic
corporations and with state Y to deliberately create an "impossibility,"
such as by structuring a situation where a private'plant could continue to
operate, to the benefit of the potential CW arsenals of both X and Y, by
simply sheltering inside the territory of a treaty holdout state, or by
transferring all its CW-related records and materials to a "safe"
jurisdiction.
The third critical difference is that the CW situation will also depart
from previous international law practice by weighing somewhat differ-
ently the several factors - particularly the importance of the territorial
basis of jurisdiction - that have historically gone into the "reasonable-
ness" balance. Traditionally, the territorial consideration has been some-
thing of a "trump card" regarding both jurisdiction to prescribe and
jurisdiction to enforce: it has not always been decisive, but it has gener-
ally proven by far the single most important factor to consider.294
290. Nevertheless, as noted, supra note 258 and accompanying text, when the CW treaty
has attracted sufficient international adherents, it will be appropriate to increase the pressure
against the remaining holdout states, such as by requiring state X to compel its nationals to
withdraw from all chemical activities in non-party state Y, and also by requiring state X to
prohibit any foreign chemical companies that do business with or inside Y from conducting
any business with or inside state X. These measures can lead to further economic and political
isolation of the holdouts, perhaps driving them to accept the limitations of the CW treaty.
291. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
292. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 246, art. 61.
293. Cf. Abbott, Export Controls, supra note 201, at 123-25 (discussing importance of anti-
evasion provisions for trade sanctions).
294. Lowe, Public International Law and the Conflict of Laws: The European Response to
the United States Export Administration Regulations, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 515, 523 (1984);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 402 comments b, c.
Vol. 15:1, 1990
Long Arms and Chemical Arms
In the CW context, however, the weighing process may produce
sharply different results. A non-territorial state may have compelling in-
terests in a CW facility inside another country, as the chemicals may be
used or threatened against its soldiers or civilians, and the scope of the
potential harm may give the "victim" basis of jurisdiction an unusually
high priority. Similarly, there may be an important application of the
"protective" principle, for state X may have a greater stake in the actions
of state Y where those actions could interfere with X's own ability to
carry out fully the obligations X has assumed under the CW treaty. X
may not have to sit by idly while Y's actions call into question X's own
integrity and treaty compliance with respect to facilities located inside Y
but owned by nationals of X. Moreover, the strong language of the roll-
ing text's preamble295 and the outpouring of global support for a compre-
hensive CW ban suggest a stronger than usual "universality" interest,
enhancing the legal competence of all states to act with respect to rene-
gade facilities anywhere. In general, in a jurisdictional clash between a
state that is a party to the CW convention, and a rival non-party state
that is asserting jurisdiction based upon territoriality, international law
should take cognizance of the importance of the global interest in making
the CW ban as comprehensive and as effective as possible.
At the same time, of course, the world retains its profound interest in
the avoidance of the use or threat of force inconsistent with the principles
of the United Nations Charter.296 States will not be free to invade a non-
party state merely for the purpose of conducting an on-site inspection of
a suspect chemical facility.2 97 But the application of economic sanctions
or other non-military mechanisms of enforcement2 98 should be more tol-
erable here than elsewhere, due to the exceptional stake held by non-
territorial states.
295. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 6, Preamble.
296. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
297. The most similar precedent involved nuclear rather than chemical weapons, but
raised many of the same concerns. In 1981 Israel launched a unilateral military attack on a
nuclear reactor near Baghdad, Iraq. Israel feared that the reactor, which was about to become
operational, would be used to assist in the development of a nuclear weapons capability, which
Iraq could then threaten against Israel. Iraq denied that the facility would be used for those
purposes. When the Israeli strike destroyed the facility, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously condemned the action as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. See J. SWEENEY, C.
OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 1463-70. Israel has reportedly threatened the same
type of response against an Iraqi biological weapons facility. Israel Vows Action Against Iraqi
Germ Research, Wash. Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at A8, col. 1. Moreover, the United States has
considered military action against the Libyan chemical plant at Rabta. U.S. Officials See In-
sufficient Grounds to Justify Attacking Libyan Plant Now, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1989, at A24,
col. 1.
298. See B. CARTER, supra note 12; Hearings on Proliferation, supra note 3 (statement of
Elisa D. Harris).
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E. What Is to Be Done?
This section attempts to reconcile some of the competing pressures
outlined above, by suggesting - first at the level of principle, then at the
level of treaty drafting - how the extraterritoriality issues should be re-
solved in the chemical weapons convention.
1. Principles
The key principle is to push the CW treaty's assertions of extraterrito-
riality even beyond the Restatement's standard of reasonableness. The
new CW treaty should require its parties to attempt in good faith to ex-
tend their extraterritorial jurisdiction as far as possible, promoting far-
reaching efforts to prescribe and to enforce. They should be obligated to
try to reach all CW-related activities that they can, by harnessing all
available theories of jurisdiction, and they should be legally compelled to
attempt to surmount the recalcitrance of other states which might make
conflicting claims.299 It should not be deemed a treaty violation if a
party, despite sincere and vigorous efforts to control an activity, comes
up empty against the determined opposition of a holdout state that ada-
mantly asserts its territorial prerogative. But all parties should be
charged with responsibility for devising programs and strategies for in-
ducing persons and states to conform to the needs of the international
community3soo
The use of force should not be authorized in this context; violence will
not well serve the international effort to regulate the mechanisms of vio-
lence. A state or a group of states should not be authorized - at least
not outside the structure of the United Nations 30 1 - to invade another
state, or otherwise to take forceful actions inconsistent with its national
sovereignty, simply to vindicate the CW treaty's requirements ofjurisdic-
tion to enforce. But notions of extraterritoriality can, and should, be
pushed beyond their current limitations.302
299. As a practical matter, not all states will have the occasion to attempt to assert the CW
treaty obligations extraterritorially, nor will it be equally important for all states to do so. This
aspect of the treaty could probably be largely accomplished if a handful of leading chemical
producing countries (United States, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France, and a few others)
became particularly vigorous in asserting jurisdiction, as these states control the bulk of the
international chemical traflic. See supra note 142. Although some of these countries have
been the most vociferous in opposing previous extraterritorial claims, perhaps they could be
persuaded to adopt a different posture in this special context.
300. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads, supra note 12, at 319.
301. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
302. Even short of military action, the international law principle of non-intervention re-
quires states to refrain from activities that interfere with the sovereignty of another state; ex-
cessive claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be considered inconsistent with this duty.
Note, supra note 159, at 1319-20.
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Modem practice places a raft of non-military options at a state's dispo-
sal for bringing to bear economic and political pressures against individu-
als or states that run afoul of its policies. A state may curtail or
terminate exports to the target; restrict imports from it; freeze its assets;
interrupt its support from private or public financial institutions; and ap-
ply diverse other sanctions.30 3 In particular instances, some of these en-
forcement measures may be more effective than others, but the CW
treaty ought to authorize and require its parties to make a good faith
calculation about how best to bring the holdout entity into compliance.
A corollary principle should be the requirement that all parties to the
forthcoming CW convention pledge extraordinary judicial and extra-ju-
dicial cooperation in the pursuit of its objectives. Parties should agree to
set aside their ongoing squabbles about extraterritoriality, or at least not
to let them creep into the national security arena, where they may do real
damage to important global interests.
In particular, states should agree to permit much more open discovery
in cases involving the CW treaty, to grant requests for extradition in con-
nection with it, and to join efforts to uncover the truth about convoluted
and covert international chemical transactions and businesses. They
should reinforce each other's efforts to police compliance with the treaty,
and should defer (via executive discretion or judicial reliance upon forum
non conveniens) to the state that has the greatest immediate interest in a
controversy or to the state that has the greatest current opportunity to
deal effectively with the wrongdoers. By directing this degree of collabo-
ration among its parties, the convention may be able to harmonize their
policies and foreclose loopholes that evaders might otherwise exploit.3° 4
The general thrust of most authoritative legal commentary these days
seems to be cautionary regarding national assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.30 5 Undoubtedly, unwise expansive use of the power to pre-
scribe or to enforce can create severe international tensions, especially
303. See B. CARTER, supra note 12.
304. Some states might be wary of enhancing the extraterritorial reach of the CW conven-
tion, out of fear that it might set a precedent for permissive assertions of jurisdiction that could
be applied to many other contexts. Any general discussion of the desirability of extensive
extraterritoriality as a progressive development for international law is beyond the scope of
this article; however, it is clear that the experience of the future CW treaty need not become a
blueprint for other areas of international affairs. National security matters are different from
most other areas of international commerce, and chemical weaponry is different from other
areas of national security, so any models adopted in this context may not be applicable to other
circumstances. On the other hand, the pattern of cooperation envisaged here as a solution to
conflicts of jurisdiction may well be a useful model for more harmonious international balanc-
ing of interests in other sectors.
305. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at'44; D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON,
supra note 12, at viii-ix; Maier, Book Review, supra note 192; see also Wallace, supra note 146,
at 1107.
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when a single state seeks to act alone, without effective consultation or
collaboration with others.306 But what is recommended here is signifi-
cantly different from the unilateral extraterritoriality that has been prac-
ticed in the past: the CW treaty will provide the opportunity for
collective international action in pursuit of shared community objec-
tives. 30 7 It will therefore be more closely akin to the joint actions of the
United Nations Security Council, 308 rather than to singlehanded Ameri-
can sanctions as in the Fruehauf or Pipeline incident cases. Marshalling
the global interest in an effective CW ban, the implementers of the treaty
will have a far stronger basis for supporting and requiring aggressive
extraterritoriality. 309
2. Practices
At the level of practice, three specific suggestions to the treaty's negoti-
ators are in order. First, the treaty text should include a single general
section regarding the geographic extent of the treaty, replacing the thirty
or more current references to various formulations of scope.310 That pas-
sage should require that:
each party to this convention undertakes to apply all its provisions to all
persons, places, equipment, substances, events, documents, and transactions
306. When a single state asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as through the United
States trade sanctions in the Pipeline case, it risks aggravating its erstwhile allies who may have
taken a different political position, and it also jeopardizes the international commerce of its
nationals. See Tassey, Export Controls Can Hurt National Security, J. CoM., Oct. 11, 1984, at
4A, col. 2; see also Note, supra note 159, at 1335; Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 142-61.
307. It is generally concluded that the CW convention will not enter into force until it has
been ratified by 60 states. Chemical Weapons Talks Facing Tough Hurdles, N.Y. Times, Jan.
19, 1989, at A10, col. 3. Therefore, while some states will certainly remain outside the treaty
regime, it will start with a high level of international consensus.
The United States has adopted the position that entry into force should require the adher-
ence of "all CW-capable states." This phrase has not been defined, and the negotiators have
not yet agreed how to handle the problem of "holdout" states. ARMS CONTROL REP., Oct.
1989, at 704.B.384.38; Neutralizing Poison Gas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at AI; Feinstein,
Bush U.N. Speech on Chemicals Draws Mixed Reactions, 19 ARMS CONTROL TODAY No. 8,
Oct. 1989, at 28-29.
308. See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 1347-73 (analyz-
ing United Nations collective security measures against Rhodesia and South Africa).
309. Unilateral assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, such as trade embargoes used in
the Fruehauf, Pipeline incident, and Libyan Arab Bank cases, have been criticized as unduly
costly (in terms of economic losses, as well as political strain among allies) and as relatively
ineffective in achieving foreign policy objectives. See D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at
33-34. The collective actions envisioned here, however, would be premised upon widespread
commitment to joint action by numerous states. Compare with UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 149, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM (1986) (describing unilateral and cooperative efforts to deal with threat of
terrorism).
310. See supra note 229 (listing various categories of scope).
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that international law places within its national jurisdiction, wherever
located. 3 11
In explication of this text, the negotiating history3 12 should highlight the
parties' shared understanding that states are supposed to push their juris-
diction - using all six of the acknowledged bases - as far as the evolv-
ing norms of international law will permit. They are obligated to
undertake good faith "best efforts" to extend their reach to the maxi-
mum, so that as many CW-related concerns as possible will be brought
within the treaty's ambit. It is not a violation of the treaty for a state to
fail in the attempt to enforce a rule it has prescribed, as long as it is
making the maximum effort possible to stretch the law of
extraterritoriality. 313
In cases of overlapping plausible claims to jurisdiction, therefore, the
state that is a party to the treaty should place its commitment to the CW
ban ahead of any comity interest toward the holdout state, and should,
where possible, attempt to enforce the treaty provisions even if the other
state complains, with some legitimacy, that its prerogatives are being
trampled. 3 14
Second, in cases where jurisdiction might be asserted by two or more
states that are both parties to the treaty, the applicable rule ought to be
that:
both parties are obligated to cooperate in the assertion of jurisdiction, so
that the object and purpose of the treaty will be fulfilled.
311. The general language of United States extraterritoriality assertions in the Pipeline
incident case, where sanctions were to be applied to all persons "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States," 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1981), contains "a phrase that itself
invites reference to international law principles." Marcus, Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Pres-
ident's Authority to Impose Extraterritorial Controls, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 1163, 1163-
64 (1983); see also United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (Con-
gress intended Marijuana on the High Seas Act to authorize maximum prosecutorial authority
permitted under international law).
312. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 246, arts. 31 and 32, re-
garding the role of the negotiating history in interpreting a treaty.
313. Cf State of Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 833 (1978) (as litigant's failure to produce subpoenaed documents based on bad faith
assertion of possible conflict with Swiss banking laws, sanctions were appropriate); see also In
re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977)
(sanctions not appropriate where corporation had made diligent effort to produce documents
physically held inside Canada, where Canadian government asserted strong interest in restrict-
ing access); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (foreign
corporation could be compelled to produce documents, even in violation of Swiss law, where
corporation had acted in bad faith by making deliberate use of Swiss law to evade U.S. stric-
tures against insider trading).
314. Exactly how far a state may and must attempt to push its jurisdiction in a particular
situation should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Compare the Freuhauf, Pipeline inci-
dent and Libyan Arab Bank cases (where U.S. ultimately retreated) with the Laker case
(where U.S. did not retreat).
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This provision would be intended to clarify that where two states may
assert jurisdiction, both of them must do so, and they should collaborate
to promote the achievement of the treaty's purposes. 315 Again, the nego-
tiating history should be the device for acknowledging that the territorial
state (the state within whose borders the enforcement actions would be
carried out) should ordinarily take the lead responsibility in applying the
terms of the convention. But both states will have obligations, and a
failure to comply with the treaty could be chargeable as a violation to
both of them, so they should share the right to take appropriate actions.
Similarly, where a state party possesses or controls records or other doc-
uments that may be necessary in unraveling the paper trail of a suspi-
cious international chemical transaction, it should be willing to surrender
them, acknowledging that the common interest in sustaining the CW
treaty outweighs the individual state's interest in preserving the secrecy
of private papers.
Finally, the treaty should specify that disputes or controversies regard-
ing the assertion of the treaty's jurisdiction should be referred to a spe-
cific, standing adjudicative mechanism, where prompt and authoritative
answers can be developed. 316 This court or arbitrator could determine,
with conclusions binding upon all parties, whether a particular assertion
of jurisdiction was authorized by international law; whether a state had
acted in good faith in pressing its jurisdiction; and which of several plau-
sible assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction ought to be honored. 317
Perhaps some panel associated with the United Nations or with the
International Court of Justice could be established for this purpose.
More likely, the CW convention could create its own dedicated tribunal,
empowered to issue advisory opinions as well as to hear contentious
cases, and to issue opinions and orders swiftly.318 Even nonparty states
could be permitted to appear before the panel, to make arguments about
315. See Dam, supra note 146, at 50 (most effective way for states to resolve potential
conflicts of jurisdiction is to attempt to harmonize underlying substantive policies). Compare
with recent agreements concerning aircraft hijacking, where the parties have agreed that the
state which first arrests the accused must either prosecute him for the criminal violation or
extradite him to a requesting state for that purpose (the principle of "aut dedere aut judicare"),
The arresting state is not authorized simply to release the defendant. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 475 reporters' note 5; Schuetz, supra note 167, at 521.
316. CD has only begun to address the question of a dispute resolution mechanism, and no
decisions have been made regarding establishment of a court or arbitral tribunal.
317. See Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent Multilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT'L L.
171 (1983) (surveying various adjudication and arbitration provisions in modern international
practice).
318. Compare with Trimble, Beyond Verification: The Next Step in Arms Control, 102
HARV. L. REv. 885 (1989) (advocating creation of new "Institute" to resolve compliance ques-"
tions arising under arms control accords).
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extraterritoriality; even if they could not be legally bound by the judges'
decisions, they might be more willing to tolerate the outcome if they had
been afforded the opportunity to be heard.
This type of CW treaty tribunal could be patterned after those created
for other new international arrangements, such as that called for by the
Law of the Sea Convention. 319 It would supplement the International
Court of Justice and the other regional or specialized tribunals, and per-
haps rise to a higher level of international acceptance and usefulness. 320
Most importantly, the international tribunal could be used to ensure that
disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of the CW
treaty, and of its extraterritoriality provisions in particular, were ad-
dressed on the plane of state-to-state confrontation, with the private par-
ties appropriately relegated to secondary roles. The underlying problem,
after all, is one between the sovereigns, and the private corporations
should not be required, or permitted, to carry the bulk of the burden.
Issues concerning the extraterritorial aspects of CW treaty could also
be expected to arise within the domestic jurisprudence of its parties.
American courts, for example, might be drawn into controversies in
which the obligations of private parties could depend in part upon appro-
priately construing the international agreement.321 In many instances,
considerations of "sovereign immunity"322 and "act of state" 323 will pre-
vent effective adjudication of the disputes, but where the chemical weap-
ons treaty is dispositive,324 it is fully part of the law of the land, and is
entitled to enforcement under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause.325
Still, the principal action regarding the CW agreement would concern
relations among sovereign states, and it is there that the treaty's dispute-
resolution mechanisms should concentrate.
319. See U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, art. 287, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/
BUR, U.N. Sales No. E.83.v.5 (1983).
320. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 6i-70 (ICI has not
succeeded in attracting great international support as a functional and dispositive dispute-
resolution center; some other international courts, such as regional courts for human rights,
have been somewhat more productive).
321. In this respect, the CW treaty could spawn litigation similar to that described above
regarding private responsibilities in international antitrust cases, international discovery, or
criminal law.
322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. IV, ch. 5 (describing limitations upon domestic
courts asserting jurisdiction over foreign state).
323. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) pt. IV, ch. 4, subch. B (describing limitations upon
United States courts' power to assess legality of actions undertaken by foreign state within its
own territory).
324. See generally J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, supra note 162, at 1108-17
(discussing "self-executing" treaties, which are entitled to immediate enforcement as United
States law, without necessity of intermediate domestic law-making).
325. U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, supra note 162,
at 1055-75 (describing operation of treaties as domestic law).
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Overall, the concept of "going beyond reasonableness" would require
each state to push its jurisdiction as far as the international system will
tolerate. This means that where the holdout state actively resists, the
attempted extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce may not get far. But
where the holdout state is less vigilant in defending itself, the CW con-
vention should require its parties to press on, thrusting jurisdiction even
in situations where current international law would not sustain the
intervention.326
There are already some instances in which international law permits a
non-territorial state to assert itself, provided no other state objects, even
when - should a conflict arise - the extraterritoriality would not be
deemed "reasonable. ' 327 That is, to some extent, international law al-
ready lets states attempt to assert "unreasonable" extraterrritoriality, and
they sometimes "get away with it," where the territorial state does not
effectively resist.328
One illustration is in the area of taxation. Ordinarily, the international
system does not contemplate that a state will fully tax the worldwide
income of its nationals; the general expectation is that "double taxation"
is to be avoided by allowing a credit or exemption for any taxes paid to
another state based upon income earned in that second state.329 If a dis-
pute on this subject arose, an international tribunal might rule against
the state of nationality, finding that the assertion of an extraterritorial
326. A country attempting to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in aid of the CW conven-
tion will be able to exert different forms of leverage in contests with different neighbors; the
measure of requisite good faith efforts will therefore be hard to predict. See April, supra note
271, at 230 ("aggressor" state in extraterritoriality contest has certain advantages, allowing its
policies to be felt discreetly).
327. There are even situations in which the territorial state actively desires the non-territo-
rial state to exercise at least some attributes of jurisdiction, such as authority to conduct trials
for claims of damages inflicted by a multinational corporation. See In re Union Carbide Corp.
Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1986)
(Indian government filed suit in U.S. on behalf of citizens injured in Bhopal explosion); Note,
The Bhopal Incident: How the Courts Have Faced Complex International Litigation, 5 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 445 (1987).
328. Even in the Pipeline incident, there is a sense in which the U.S. "got away with" its
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Although the U.S. did not prevail in its attempt to
force cancellation of the Europeans' contracts, it did succeed in disrupting performance, per-
haps delaying the pipeline project somewhat, and making the political point about the dangers
of collaboration with the U.S.S.R. Kincannon, supra note 158, at 227; Dam, supra note 146,
at 50. But see Jennings, supra note 152, at 174 (it is wrong to assume that international law
will always permit assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction up to point where there is actual or
possible clash with foreign sovereign); Moyer & Mabry, supra note 14, at 91 ("[I]t is not too
harsh to characterize the pipeline controls as perhaps the least effective and most costly con-
trols in U.S. history.").
329. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 413; D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 29-31.
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taxing authority was unreasonable under the circumstances. 330 On the
other hand, if the territorial state did not protest, the taxing state could
probably "get away with it" and the international system would not itself
intervene (or permit the double-taxed individual to bring a claim) to
eliminate the "unreasonable" tax bite. Double taxation, therefore, even if
generally unreasonable, does not seem to be automatically prohibited: if
no state complains, the taxing authority can go beyond reasonableness
until it encounters determined resistance. 331
Similarly, the area of "official kidnapping" reveals the international
law system's willingness to tolerate "unreasonable" behavior if the victim
state does not protest. Ordinarily, a state is not permitted to send its law
enforcement officials into the territory of a second state to apprehend a
person and forcibly bring him or her back into the first state for trial -
such activity is usually a clearly improper assertion* of extraterritorial
jurisdiction to enforce.332 But if the territorial state does not care, or
otherwise fails to object, the trial may proceed, and the victim of the
kidnapping himself or herself ordinarily has no standing to object to the
propriety of the actions that resulted in presence before the court.333
In the same vein, the CW treaty ought to require its parties to press all
their potential bases of jurisdiction to the point of resistance by other
affected states, even if this practice means stepping beyond the limita-
tions on extraterritoriality that the international system has so far
deemed to be "reasonable." The asserting state may have to back down,
if the territorial state stands on its rights, but there is no harm - and
there could be considerable virtue - in trying to press further.
V. Conclusion
This study has broached only a single narrow issue concerning the
realm of chemical weapons, but even its restrictive scope provides a basis
330. Many states deny that there is any inherent international obligation to avoid double
taxation, and a network of treaties has developed to protect taxpayers who might otherwise be
penalized by overlapping levies. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 413 comment a.
331. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (upholding California
"unitary tax" against challenge that it unfairly subjected to local taxation all world-wide activ-
ities of multinational corporation).
332. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 432; D. LANGE & G. BORN, supra note 12, at 134-35. The
most famous illustration of this principle involved Israel's abduction of Nazi war criminal
Adolph Eichmann from Argentina in 1960. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 432 reporters' note 3.
More recently, Israel's abduction of Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid from Lebanon has raised simi-
lar issues. Israel Adamant on Terms to Free 4bducted Sheik, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at
A10, col. 1.
333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 432 reporters' notes 2, 3; United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d
1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1985) (only state from which defendant was taken could assert claim that
kidnapping was improper; international law gives no corresponding right to person seized).
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for launching three more generalized comments regarding the future
prospects for arms control.
First, the emerging chemical weapons convention will be radically dif-
ferent from its lineal ancestors, but it may at the same time be a harbin-
ger of the future shape and direction of arms control generally. That is,
the earlier CW-related international agreements - principally the Ge-
neva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention - now seem like
relics of a far simpler era. Even the sheer length of the documents tells a
tale: Geneva Protocol was barely one page long; the BW Convention ran
to four pages; the current rolling text of the CW convention now con-
tains 107 pages, with far more to come.334
The next generation of arms control will be drastically different in
other respects, too. The verification scheme, for example, virtually non-
existent in the earlier accords, 335 will henceforth occupy a central place
in the negotiations and in the text. The disclosure and inspection system
will increasingly implicate the interests of private corporations and indi-
viduals, not solely governments, and the legal and practical impediments
will accordingly multiply.3 36
In addition, arms control will become increasingly expensive, calling
into question one of the original purposes of the effort, i.e., to reduce the
financial burdens of conducting, deterring and preparing for war.337
Even in the nuclear field, arms control might not directly translate into
financial savings, 338 and the next CW treaty will be the first accord in
which the costs associated with the dismantling and verification mecha-
nisms will actually surpass the savings obtained from no longer produc-
ing, storing, or deploying the weapons.339
334. Geneva Protocol, supra note 56; Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 66. See
Spy in the Ointment, supra note 141 (using different printing format, Biological Weapons Con-
vention is three pages long and rolling text of CW convention will eventually exceed 600
pages).
335. The Geneva Protocol contained no provisions whatsoever regarding verification, and
the mechanism established for the Biological Weapons Convention has not proven adequate
for the task. See supra note 66.
336. See Connolly, supra note 137.
337. See R. SIVARD, supra note 125, at 6-7 (identifying tradeoffs each nation makes be-
tween socio-economic priorities and military budgets).
338. See Jones, The Costs of Disarmament Treaties: A Research Note, 9 ARMS CONTROL
280 (1988) (studying savings and expenses associated with INF Treaty).
339. See Lohs, Destruction or Conversion of Chemical Warfare Agents: Possibilities and
Alternatives, reprinted in SIPRI, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, supra note 39, at 67, 68-75 (elimina-
tion of CW stocks and facilities in verifiable and environmentally sound manner will be lengthy
and expensive undertaking); J. BOULDEN, supra note 10, at 6 (costs of CW convention are
difficult to estimate, but are likely to be substantial); Morrison, Trusting, But Vertfying, supra
note 96 (surveying bureaucratic and security problems of detailed on-site inspection for arms
control).
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Finally, the CW convention may also depart from precedent, and also
predict the future, in its comprehensive approach to the arms under ne-
gotiation. That is, earlier treaties were mostly partial, incomplete meas-
ures, dealing with a fragment of the overall problem; the CW convention,
on the other hand, provides a complete legal system that seeks to eradi-
cate totally the chemical weapons inventories of the entire world.34° It is,
of course, too early to tell whether the more ambitious approach can
succeed, but the change at least carries the suggestion that arms control
has developed to the stage where most of the "easy" problems have al-
ready been dealt with, and only the more intractable issues remain.
These outstanding problems are so intricate and so important that any
"halfway" measures may be unstable; only the most painstaking and de-
liberate negotiation of all-inclusive agreements may offer suitable scope
for mutually-acceptable tradeoffs and balances. 341 In any event, the CW
treaty, like the BW Convention and the INF Treaty, will attempt to close
off an entire category of arms competition: real "disarmament," instead
of mere "arms control. '342
Second, the CW convention will provide the occasion for a renewed
national debate concerning the place of verification in arms control. Ob-
viously, the system used to ensure reciprocal compliance with treaty obli-
gations must be a central concern, and much ink has rightly been spilled
in the arguments concerning the standards and mechanisms of verifica-
340. But see R. Cohen & R. Ranger, Enforcing CW Limits: An International Chemical
Weapons Authority 9 (January 1989) (unpublished working paper) ("Proposals such as that
for the complete ban on CW, though well-intentioned, may thus be unduly utopian. It is
unrealistic to try to abolish a weapons system that is as easy to produce as it is to conceal,
especially when many of the Third World producers or potential producers are unlikely to
agree to abolition anyway.").
341. Some have argued the contrary proposition, that a comprehensive CW agreement
inevitably takes so long to negotiate that it provides no adequate solution to the urgent current
problems; drawn out deliberations may produce a more elegant, enduring result, but they are
no way to fight a raging fire. Robinson, Information Processes, supra note 25, at 4.
342. In a larger sense, of course, all these arms control measures are only partial or incom-
plete. As long as states maintain substantial stocks of nuclear and conventional weaponry -
now exacerbated by the proliferation of longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles - the overall
problem of global security is far from solved. Several arms control treaties have explicitly
adopted the goal of "general and complete disarmament" as the long-term objective. SALT II
Treaty, supra note 87, Preamble; Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 66, at Preamble;
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S.
6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 811 (1968) [hereinafter Non-Proliferation
Treaty], at Preamble; see also ASPEN STRATEGY GROUP AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY GROUP,
supra note 117, at 8, 42-44 (noting future developments that chemical weapons engineers
might pursue if left unrestricted, and comparing advantages of partial and complete chemical
arms control).
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tion.3 43 But the CW convention will introduce a new element into the
controversies: the chemical agents and the facilities that could produce
them are so numerous, inconspicuous, and adaptable that critics may
well be correct when they assert that the next CW treaty cannot possibly
be monitored with the same high confidence that earlier arms control
accords enjoyed. 344
This concern, however, should not mean that arms control has
reached a dead end; we must, instead, reconsider the role of such high-
confidence verification, making it one important factor in the evaluation
of an arms control agreement, not an automatic sine qua non.345 In the
current political milieu, it is heresy to suggest that some uncertainty in
compliance is tolerable, but in the future, a more complex, sophisticated
calculation of national interests will be required. No treaty will be able
to put the CW genie fully back into the bottle; we cannot "un-invent" the
technology and we cannot dismantle all the equipment that could be
jury-rigged into producing lethal gas. Some level of "risk" will have to
be taken - but it is essential to realize that there may be even greater
risks in eschewing arms control.346 The status quo also contains abun-
343. See, eg., W. ROWELL, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: A GUIDE TO POLICY IS-
SUES FOR THE 1980s (1986); VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL (W. Potter ed. 1985);
Meyer, supra note 116.
344. See Hearings on Global Spread, supra note 3 (statement of Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., at 6)
("As a practical matter, there is no such thing as a verifiable ban on chemical weapons."). On
the other hand, any party contemplating violating a CW treaty would have to be wary of the
chance of timely detection: even if the verification system were imperfect, there would still be
a substantial chance that illegal activities would be observed, through one device or another.
CMA 's Olson Unravels Intricacies, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (1989), supra note 127,
at 7; see also Robinson, Information Processes, supra note 25, at 5; Robinson, Verifying a Ban
on Chemical-Warfare Weapons, FARADAY DISCUSSION PAPER No. 12, at 2 (1988) (noting
that choice may be between risky treaty and risky status quo).
345. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 435,
PRESIDENT REAGAN, PATHS TOWARD PEACE: DETERRENCE AND ARMS CONTROL 5 (Nov.
22, 1982) (Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan and elsewhere "makes ironclad verification all the
more essential for arms control."). But see BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF
STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 1121, SECRETARY SCHULTZ, THE ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS
CONTROL LEGACY 4 (Oct. 31, 1988) (United States must think realistically about verification,
realize that no arms control agreement will be perfectly verifiable, and ask whether particular
trade-offs of specific agreement are justified).
346. In the current political debates, opponents of arms control have been able to argue
both a) that detailed, intrusive inspection of Soviet and other facilities is essential, to ensure
that other states are not cheating on their obligations and creating a military disadvantage for
the United States, and b) that such invasive inspections could not be conducted by other states
inside American facilities, because such oversight would compromise national security secrets
that can be protected only by completely excluding foreign observers. This two-headed logic
would totally preclude arms control as a device for promoting national security and interna-
tional peace, but it has carried considerable political clout. See Cohen & Ranger, supra note
340, at 9 (citing statement of senior member of Reagan Administration who could not conceive
of verification regime which would both provide adequate guarantees of Soviet compliance and
be workable under American law if applied within the United States).
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dant national risks: that chemical warfare will break out in any sector of
the globe, that CW capability will spread to terrorist organizations, and
that the superpowers will inexorably become involved. It may be that
only an imperfect CW treaty could be implemented at this time, and that
limitations on the verification structure will be conceptually different
from those of earlier arms control, 347 but this should not mean that inter-
national anomie is the only alternative. 348
The verification calculation is especially difficult in a multilateral con-
text. The dangers of Soviet non-compliance are appreciably different
from the dangers of cheating on the part of any other state, and the in-
spection apparatus ought to be able to adapt flexibly to the diverse needs
without creating the specter of superpower hegemony and impolitic dis-
crimination between the CW "haves" and "have nots. ' ' 349 The fact is
that the Soviet Union and the United States, as military giants, currently
possess CW arsenals that no other states can rival; they also, as highly
industrialized economies, support such vast and complex commercial in-
frastructures that chemical stocks and flows are paralyzingly difficult to
monitor. A verification system that adequately supervises the CW-re-
lated materials and facilities of a typical nation, therefore, may be en-
tirely inadequate to build confidence in Soviet compliance. The objective
for the United States, therefore, should be to attempt to create a verifica-
tion apparatus that is simultaneously vigorous enough to detect Soviet
compliance-related activities in a timely fashion and benign enough to be
acceptable to the bulk of states in the world.
Third, the negotiation of a new CW treaty provides the occasion to
reflect more deeply upon the relationship between international law and
arms control. Law has always been an important component of the ne-
347. No treaty, of course, is ever 100% verifiable; there is always some scope for conjec-
ture about evasion scenarios. More sophisticated analysis breaks a treaty down into discrete
elements, asking for each provision how confident we are that violations could be detected in
sufficient time to allow an effective military response. See Jones, Eliminating Chemical Weap-
ons: Less than Meets the Eye, WASH. Q., Spring 1989, at 89.
348. Compare with Glenn Hearings, supra note 133 (opening statement of Sen. John
Glenn, at 1-2) (even if United States export controls alone cannot solve all problems associated
with international proliferation of CW capability, they are nonetheless important part of over-
all solution, and the United States should do everything it can to ameliorate difficulties) and
Dunn, supra note 96 (arguing that despite difficulties, CW arms control ought to be a top
United States.objective). But see Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Inte-
grated Long-Term Strategy (Jan. 1988) (arguing that "[flor the foreseeable future, it will not
be realistic to pursue agreements to eliminate all nuclear weapons, or all chemical weapons ...
[a] ban on chemical weapons could not be verified").
349. See H. YORK, MAKING WEAPONS, TALKING PEACE, supra note 273, at 301 (describ-
ing how negotiators of comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty attempted to develop two-tiered
verification structure, with more detailed and intrusive inspection rights operative as between
United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom, and less elaborate regime applicable as
between all other parties).
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gotiation and implementation process, but it has rarely been central.
Considerations of military doctrine and foreign relations strategy have
always predominated, and international law, frankly, has not been devel-
oped well enough to help fill in the important gaps.350
But there is law - including traditional "black letter" law - that
affects the arms control process. Article IX of the Biological Weapons
Convention contains a binding legal obligation upon all its parties to con-
tinue negotiations in good faith on an early agreement for effective prohi-
bition of CW.351 Although no timetable is specified, the commitment to
"good faith negotiations" is not an empty one,35 2 and international law
should be mustered to help identify its parameters.35 3
This article has identified another area, extraterritoriality, where ag-
gressive development of the law may assist in dealing with future
problems of arms control.354 The transnational commerce in chemicals
poses unique complications for CW arms control and for international
peace and security, and the mechanisms of international law should, at
the least, not make those problems any harder. For the best outcome,
350. See Boyle, The Legal Distortions Behind the Reagan Administration's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Buildup, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1175 (1986) (arguing that Reagan adminis-
tration's charges of Soviet CW violations were not made in good faith, but were part of effort
to gain public support for an American buildup of chemical arms); Falk, Inhibiting Reliance
on Biological Weaponry: The Role and Relevance of International Law, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 17-34 (1986) (considering relevance of international agreements in national decisions
regarding biological weapons).
351. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 66, art. IX.
352. In the field of labor law, for example, the National Labor Relations Act requires
employers and labor organizations to bargain collectively in good faith, and it provides some
partial statutory definition of the scope of that obligation. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1973 & Supp.
1989). The notion of "good faith" remains somewhat ambiguous in that context, too, but
courts and commentators have been able to supply meaningful interpretation. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir.
1958); A. Cox, D. Box & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 389-401
(10th ed. 1986); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
353. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 342, contains similar language,
obligating its parties more broadly "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international con-
trol." Id. art. VI.
The continuing superpower arms race has sparked allegations that the states possessing nu-
clear arms have not engaged in serious negotiations, in a truly "good faith" attempt to restrict
their respective arsenals. This concern has caused some to question the record of compliance
with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has led to apprehensions that the entire
treaty regime - the best existing legal bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons
capability - may unravel. See Vraalsen, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Other
Weapons, in DISARMAMENT: U.N. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES 46, 47 (1989)
(suggesting that dichotomy between "haves" and "have-nots" may undermine legitimacy of
Non-Proliferation Treaty).
354. But see D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 12, at ix (arguing that problems
of extraterritoriality are essentially political and economic, not legal, in nature and are "too
important to be left to lawyers").
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the effect of the jurisprudence should be mustered to help create a viable
legal barrier, joining the longstanding moral barrier, against the existence
of chemical weapons.
